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Abstract
Chapter 1 examines whether the option market leads the stock market with re-
spect to positive in addition to negative price discovery. We document that a
long only portfolio containing the stocks with the highest values of risk-neutral
skewness yields signicant outperformance in the post ranking week during 1996
to 2014. This outperformance is driven by stocks that are relatively underpriced
and exposed to greater downside risk. These ndings are consistent with a trading
mechanism, where investors may choose to exploit stock underpricing by buying
(selling) OTM call (put) options, rather than directly buying the underlying stock,
to avoid exposure to its downside risk.
Chapter 2 examines the eects of political uncertainty around US presidential elec-
tions on a rm's risk. We utilize information embedded in short term options and
exploit cross sectional dierences in rms' political features, such as their sensitiv-
ity to economic policy uncertainty, the rm's exposure to the presidential party,
its geographical political alignment with the presidential party, and its political
connectedness through campaign contributions. We document that sensitive, ex-
posed, and aligned rms exhibit a substantially higher degree of option-implied
price and tail risk, command a higher premium, and feature an increased dispersion
of investor beliefs around the presidential election day.
Chapter 3 utilizes the context of ane general equilibrium models, where the vec-
tor of state variables is ane on the level of the term structure of the risk-neutral
cumulants (RNCs) of the return distribution of a claim on aggregate consumption.
We constructs factors of ane transformations of the term structure of the RNCs
of the Standard and Poor's S&P 500 index, as proxies for the state vector. The
pricing performance of the factors is found to be insignicant, even once single
maturity RNCs are employed to construct factors. Factors are not priced within
an ICAPM setting either.
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Chapter 1
Positive Stock Information In
Out-Of-The-Money Option Prices
1.1 Introduction
In the real world of incomplete capital markets characterized by limits-to-arbitrage
and information asymmetry, option payos cannot be perfectly replicated by the
underlying assets, and hence options are not redundant assets as in the Black and
Scholes (1973) paradigm (Ross (1976), Detemple and Selden (1991), and Back
(1993)). An informed investor may choose to trade in the option market, if it
is suciently liquid, to exploit the higher leverage embedded in options (Black
(1975), Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998)), or to disguise her information signal
in the presence of noise traders (An, Ang, Bali, and Cakici (2014)). As a con-
sequence, option prices may convey information that is not already incorporated
into the price of the underlying asset. In fact, there is a growing body of evidence
that option-based variables can predict future stock returns.1
1Pan and Poteshman (2006) show that the put-to-call option volume ratio is inversely related
to future stock returns. Hu (2014) nds that option-induced stock order imbalance is positively
related to next-day stock returns. Johnson and So (2012) show that a high option-to-stock volume
ratio predicts low stock performance. Similar is the conclusion of Ge, Lin, and Pearson (2016),
13
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With respect to information extracted from option prices, Xing, Zhang, and Zhao
(2010) nd that stocks exhibiting the steepest implied volatility smirks subse-
quently underperform. Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) and Cremers and
Weinbaum (2010) document that stocks which feature the most negative call-put
implied volatility spreads, reecting deviations from put-call parity due to rela-
tively expensive puts, yield abnormally negative returns. An et al. (2014) nd
that stocks with large increases (decreases) in put (call) implied volatilities over
the previous month are characterized by low future returns. Finally, Rehman and
Vilkov (2012) and Stilger, Kostakis, and Poon (2017) nd that a strongly negative
Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) value, arising from very expensive out-of-the-money
(OTM) puts relative to OTM calls, signals future stock underperformance (i.e.
negative alpha).
In this chapter, we study the relation between RNS and future stock returns. Con-
sistent with the above studies, we conrm the positive relation between RNS and
future stock returns. We contribute to the literature by proposing and empirically
validating a trading mechanism that explains why and under what conditions, a
stock portfolio which contains the highest RNS stocks outperforms (i.e. it de-
livers a positive alpha). The mechanism is novel but it does not exclude other
explanations, such as price pressure eects, or inside information. Furthermore,
we examine how quickly the information embedded in high RNS stocks is subse-
quently incorporated into the underlying stock price.
According to the trading mechanism we conjecture, if the underlying stock is
who additionally document the ability of option volume associated with synthetic long positions
to positively predict stock returns. Moreover, a number of studies have also examined the
informational content of option-based variables in the context of: expected stock returns based
on analyst price targets (Bali, Hu, and Murray, 2017), option returns (Goyal and Saretto (2009),
Bali and Murray (2013), and Muravyev (2016)), equity risk (Chang, Christoersen, Jacobs, and
Vainberg (2012)), market timing and asset allocation strategies (Kostakis, Panigirtzoglou, and
Skiadopoulos (2011), DeMiguel, Plyakha, Uppal, and Vilkov (2013), and Kempf, Korn, and
Sassning (2015)), and corporate events such as earnings announcements and takeovers (Amin
and Lee (1997), Cao, Chen, and Grin (2005), Jin, Livnat, and Zhang (2012), Chan, Ge, and
Lin (2015), Augustin, Brenner, and Subrahmanyam (2015)).
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perceived to be underpriced, investors who anticipate a subsequent price correction
may resort to the option market to buy (sell) OTM calls (puts) in order to lever up
their positions and maximize their trading prots.2 However, risk averse market
makers may not be able to perfectly hedge their counterparty positions, e.g., due
to asymmetric information, transaction costs, stock price jumps, and the downside
or inventory risk they may face by buying the underlying stock. In this case, their
supply curve of OTM options is not perfectly elastic, and hence they ask for a
higher (lower) price to sell (buy) OTM calls (puts), leading to a higher RNS value.
As a result, to the extent that market forces subsequently correct this underpricing,
a relatively high RNS value or a large increase in RNS (∆RNS) may signal future
stock outperformance.
The signalled outperformance should be stronger, if the underlying stock exhibits
substantial downside risk. In this case, investors would be more incentivized to
buy OTM calls, rather than buying the stock itself, to lever up their long positions
without being exposed to downside risk (see Back, 1993, and Pan and Poteshman,
2006, for related arguments). At the same time, risk averse market makers would
require a higher premium to write these OTM calls because they would have to
resort to the underlying market to hedge their option position, and hence they
would also be exposed to the greater downside risk. In sum, a relatively high
RNS or ∆RNS value should be even more informative with respect to the future
outperformance of an underpriced, stock if its downside risk is more pronounced.
It is also expected that the RNS signal should be informative for stock outper-
formance, if options are suciently liquid in absolute terms or relatively to the
underlying stock. Otherwise, if their bid-ask spreads are too large, the incentive
to resort to the option market to speculate on stock underpricing becomes weaker
because round-trip transaction costs could eliminate the anticipated trading prot.
2Bali and Murray (2013) provide examples of synthetic skewness assets, which yield a high
payo in the case of a large increase in the price of the underlying stock. The construction of
these skewness assets involves buying (selling) OTM calls (puts).
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In addition, if options are too thinly traded relative to the underlying stock, an
informed investor may choose not to trade in the option market to avoid revealing
her information.
The stock outperformance that a high RNS value may signal should be short-lived
since RNS is computed from publicly available OTM option prices. This conjecture
is also consistent with the notion of arbitrage asymmetry (see Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan, 2015); stock underpricing should be rather quickly corrected by arbitrageurs
without facing the constraints that apply in the case of stock overpricing.3
We empirically test the above conjectures. To this end, we use two rather diverse
proxies for stock mispricing: the distance between the actual stock price and the
option-implied stock value (DOTS) of Goncalves-Pinto, Grundy, Hameed, van der
Heijden, and Zhu (2016), and the composite mispricing rank (MISP) of Stambaugh
et al. (2015) and Stambaugh and Yuan (2017). We measure stock downside risk
by using a direct as well as an indirect proxy. The direct proxy is the expected
idiosyncratic skewness (EISP ) of the underlying stock returns under the physical
measure introduced by Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010). The indirect proxy is
the estimated shorting fee (ESF) of Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006).4 In
addition, we utilize the average relative bid-ask spread (RSPREAD) of the options
used to calculate the RNS value to capture option liquidity in absolute terms and
the average daily option-to-stock volume ratio (O/S) in the prior 12 months to
proxy for the option liquidity relative to the underlying stock.
Our results corroborate the conjectured trading mechanism. First, we nd that
the long-only quintile portfolio of stocks with the highest RNS (∆RNS) values
3Even though stock underpricing should be corrected quicker than stock overpricing due to
the asymmetry of limits-to-arbitrage aecting long and short strategies, there are examples in
the literature where stock underpricing is not corrected quickly. A very prominent example is
the post earnings announcement drift (see Dubinsky, Johannes, Kaeck, and Seeger, 2018, and
references therein).
4In line with the arguments and the evidence of Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015),
stock downside risk is expected to be greater in the absence of short selling constraints, i.e.,
when the shorting fee is low.
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signicantly outperforms, yielding a Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) alpha of 12 (10)
basis points (bps) in the post-ranking week with a Newey-West (NW) t-stat of
3.11 (3.15). A fortiori, the intersection of the highest RNS and the highest ∆RNS
quintiles yields an FFC alpha of 21 bps in the post-ranking week (NW t-stat:
4.03).
Second, we nd that a relatively high RNS value becomes a strong signal for subse-
quent outperformance mainly for stocks that are also perceived to be underpriced
and for stocks whose downside risk is more pronounced. In fact, we nd that both
stock underpricing and pronounced downside risk are reinforcing mechanisms of
the RNS signal with respect to subsequent stock outperformance. Using triple-
sorted portfolios, we nd that a portfolio of stocks that exhibit higher than median
RNS values, are relatively underpriced, and are exposed to greater downside risk
yields a strongly signicant FFC alpha of 22 bps per week.
Third, we nd that the stock outperformance signalled by RNS is signicant only
when options are fairly liquid relative to the underlying stock and their bid-ask
spreads are not too high. Fourth, we decompose the post-ranking weekly returns
of the RNS- (∆RNS-) sorted portfolios and nd that most of this abnormal per-
formance is earned on the rst post-ranking day. We further decompose the rst
post-ranking daily returns into their overnight and intraday components and nd
that the signalled outperformance is entirely earned overnight.
Last but not least, we examine whether RNS simply captures stock price pressure.
In that case, the positive relation of RNS with future stock returns could be a
manifestation of a short-term reversal eect (see Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016)).
Alleviating this potential concern, we show that RNS exhibits an almost zero
rank correlation with the same-day and 5-day cumulative stock return. Equally
importantly, the positive RNS gradient with respect to post-ranking stock returns
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remains intact, even when we rstly condition upon positive, zero or negative stock
returns on, or up to the portfolio sorting day.
Collectively, our results corroborate the arguments of Easley et al. (1998) and An
et al. (2014) on cross-market predictability by showing that the expensiveness of
OTM calls relative to OTM puts predicts future stock returns. Furthermore, our
ndings lend support to the demand-based option pricing framework of Garleanu,
Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) by showing that a relatively high RNS value may
reect excess demand for OTM calls from investors who attempt to exploit stock
underpricing. In addition, our results comply with the mechanism of Hu (2014),
according to which market makers translate option order imbalance into stock
order imbalance in their attempt to hedge their counterparty positions. In our
setting, this mechanism can explain why a relatively high RNS value, arising from
excess demand (supply) for OTM calls (puts), can predict stock outperformance.
Our results can also be regarded as complementary to the evidence of Pan and
Poteshman (2006) and Ge et al. (2016), who show that high buyer-initiated OTM
call option trading volume predicts stock outperformance. Instead of utilizing pro-
prietary signed option trading volume data across dierent levels of moneyness, the
RNS signal we employ conveniently summarizes information embedded in publicly
available OTM option prices. To the extent that option prices reect the impact
of informed trading volume, their informational content should be equivalent.
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1.2 Methodology and Data
1.2.1 Risk-Neutral Skewness: Computation
We compute the Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) of the option-implied stock return
distribution using the model-free methodology of Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan
(2003). Using the time t prices of OTM call (Ct (τ ;K)) and put (Pt (τ ;K)) options
with strike price K and time-to-expiration τ , the RNS (τ) for stock i is dened
as:
RNSi,t (τ) =
exp (rτ) (Wt (τ)− 3µt (τ)Vt (τ)) + 2µ3t (τ)
[exp (rτ)Vt (τ)− µ2t (τ)]
3/2
, (1.1)
where r is the risk-free rate, µt (τ) is given by
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and Vt (τ),Wt (τ), and Xt (τ) are the time t prices of τ−maturity quadratic, cubic,
and quartic contracts, dened as contingent claims with payos equal to the sec-
ond, third, and fourth power of stock i log return, respectively. The corresponding
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where St is the price of the underlying stock adjusted by the discounted value of
future dividends.
To compute the integrals that appear in Vt (τ), Wt (τ), and Xt (τ), a continuum
of OTM option prices would be required. However, traded equity options are
available only at few and discrete strikes. In line with Rehman and Vilkov (2012),
Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels (2013), and Stilger et al. (2017), we require at
least two OTM puts and two OTM calls per stock with the same expiry date
to compute RNS on a given day. We interpolate the implied volatilities of the
available options, separately for puts and calls, between the lowest and the highest
available moneyness using a piecewise Hermite polynomial, and we extrapolate
beyond the lowest and the highest moneyness using the implied volatility at each
boundary. This way, we ll in 997 grid points in the moneyness range from 1/3
to 3. We convert these implied volatilities to the corresponding option prices
via the Black-Scholes formula. Finally, we use these option prices to determine
Vt (τ), Wt (τ), and Xt (τ) by numerically computing the corresponding integrals
via Simpson's rule.
We use daily prices of OTM equity options with 10 to 180 days-to-maturity. The
closing option price is computed as the average of the bid and ask prices. We
discard options with zero open interest, zero bid price, negative strike, price less
than $0.50, missing implied volatility, and non-standard settlement. As mentioned
above, we also lter out stocks with less than two OTM puts and two OTM
calls with the same expiry on a given day. Among the eligible sets of options
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that satisfy the above criteria, we use the one with the shortest maturity. This
choice is consistent with the conjecture that investors who seek to prot from
stock underpricing would trade short-dated options because, for a given level of
moneyness, they oer considerably higher leverage relative to long-dated options.
1.2.2 Data Sources and Firm Characteristics
We obtain daily data on equity options from OptionMetrics IvyDB and on stocks
from CRSP. Our stock universe consists of U.S. common stocks (share codes 10 and
11) listed on NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ (exchange codes 1, 2, and 3). The
sample period is January 1996 to June 2014. The risk-free rate is proxied by the
3-month T-Bill rate from the Federal Reserve H.15 release. Data on daily factor
returns are sourced from Kenneth French's website. We also compute overnight
and intraday equity factor returns in the spirit of Lou, Polk, and Skouras (2018).
We construct a series of rm-level variables, whose denitions are provided in the
Appendix. In particular, we compute the distance between the actual stock price
and the option-implied stock value (DOTS) as in Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016),
the Expected Idiosyncratic Skewness EISP of stock returns under the physical
measure of Boyer et al. (2010), the Estimated Shorting Fee (ESF) of Boehme
et al. (2006), stock return momentum (MOM), market capitalization (MV), and
the book-to-market value ratio (B/M). We also use the composite stock mispricing
rank (MISP) of Stambaugh et al. (2015) and Stambaugh and Yuan (2017), which
is available from Robert Stambaugh's website. A low (high) value for DOTS and
MISP indicates that the stock is relatively underpriced (overpriced). A low (high)
value for EISP and ESF indicates that the stock entails greater (lower) downside
risk. As a proxy for option liquidity, we compute the average relative bid-ask
spread (RSPREAD) across the OTM options used to compute RNS on a given
day. As a proxy for option liquidity relative to stock liquidity, we compute the
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average daily option-to-stock volume ratio (O/S) in the prior 12 months, using all
available options expiring from 10 to 180 days.
1.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample of RNS values consists of 3,121,205 permno-day observations. Table
1.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the option dataset used to compute these
daily RNS values. The average RNS value is −0.41 and the average maturity of
the utilized OTM options is 91.8 days. The majority of these OTM options have
sizeable open interest, they are not particularly deep-out-of-the-money, and they
exhibit a median RSPREAD of 14.6%. Moreover, RNS values are available for
a suciently large cross-section of stocks on a given day, with a median of 671
stocks.5
Next, we examine whether RNS is correlated with rm characteristics that are
known to be related to future stock returns or with the stock characteristics we
use in the subsequent portfolio analysis. To this end, Table 1.2 reports the pair-
wise Spearman's rank correlation coecients between RNS and a series of vari-
ables; the corresponding Pearson correlation coecients are very similar. Since
our benchmark analysis relies on weekly portfolio sorts every Wednesday, the re-
ported coecients are the time-series averages of the rank correlation coecients
computed every Wednesday during our sample period.
The conclusion from Table 1.2 is that RNS is not highly correlated with any of
the variables considered. The rank correlation of ∆RNS with these variables is
even lower. As a result, stock portfolios constructed on the basis of RNS or ∆RNS
do not simply mimic the performance of portfolios constructed on the basis of
other stock characteristics. These low rank correlation coecients also ensure
5In our benchmark analysis, each RNS-sorted quintile portfolio contains, on average, 133
stocks, whereas each ∆RNS quintile portfolio contains, on average, 125 stocks.
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that bivariate or trivariate independently-sorted portfolios on the basis of RNS
and other stock characteristics will be well populated.
Of particular interest is the rank correlation of RNS and ∆RNS with DOTS.
Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016) conjecture that DOTS could reect both stock price
pressure and informed trading embedded in option prices. However, they show
that it mainly captures stock price pressure, rendering it a meaningful mispricing
proxy at the daily frequency. We nd that RNS and ∆RNS exhibit relatively
low rank correlation with DOTS (average: −0.31). Hence, we claim that RNS
does not mimic DOTS, and hence it cannot be regarded as a stock price pressure
or mispricing proxy. Supporting further the latter argument, we nd that RNS
exhibits an even lower rank correlation with MISP, whereas the correlation of
∆RNS with MISP is zero. Finally, consistent with the argument that RNS does
not reect stock price pressure, its average rank correlation coecient with the
stock return on the portfolio sorting day (RET(1)) or the cumulative 5-day stock
return (RET(5)) is close to zero.
1.3 RNS and ∆RNS Portfolio Sorts
The starting point of our analysis is to examine the relation between RNS and
future stock returns at the weekly frequency. To this end, we sort stocks in as-
cending order according to their RNS (∆RNS) values and assign them to quintile
portfolios. For our benchmark results, we construct these portfolios using RNS
values computed at market close every Wednesday. Arguably, the level of RNS
could be inherently related to a series of rm characteristics (see Dennis and May-
hew, 2002, for an empirical investigation). However, the low degree of persistence
of daily RNS values implies that RNS primarily reects transient price pressure
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in OTM options.6 Nevertheless, controlling for rm xed eects and a potential
option maturity eect, we also sort stocks into quintile portfolios on the basis of
the change in their RNS value (∆RNS) at market close every Wednesday relative
to the previous trading day.
1.3.1 Portfolio Characteristics
Table 1.3 reports the average characteristics of the constituent stocks for each RNS-
(Panel A) and ∆RNS-sorted (Panel B) quintile portfolio. We nd that the stocks
in the highest RNS quintile have smaller average capitalization relative to the
stocks in the lowest RNS quintile.7 Interestingly, the highest RNS quintile contains
stocks that are, on average, characterized as relatively underpriced according to
DOTS, but relatively overpriced according to MISP. The stocks in the highest
RNS quintile also exhibit, on average, lower exposure to downside risk according
to EISP and ESF, and their average return on the portfolio sorting day or during
the prior ve trading days is lower relative to the corresponding average return
of the stocks in the lowest RNS quintile. However, it should be noted that, as
illustrated by the low rank correlation coecients between RNS and the rest of
the variables reported in Table 1.2, a large cross-sectional variation within each
quintile portfolio underlies these average values. We explore this variation using
bivariate and trivariate portfolio sorts in the subsequent sections.
Regarding ∆RNS-sorted portfolios, the spread in the average values between the
highest and the lowest quintiles mostly disappears for persistent rm character-
istics (e.g., MV, B/M, MISP, EISP , ESF). This is an expected nding because
∆RNS cancels out rm xed eects that potentially determine the level of RNS.
6The average AR(1) coecient of daily RNS values across the rms in our sample is 0.70. In
comparison, the corresponding average AR(1) coecient of daily Risk-Neutral Variance values
is much higher (0.96).
7RNS takes predominantly negative values. Hence, a relatively high RNS value is dened
with respect to the cross-sectional distribution of RNS values on a given day, but it can still have
a negative sign.
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On the other hand, the corresponding spread in average values for the variables
that capture transient information at the daily frequency (e.g., DOTS, RET(1),
RET(5)) remains signicant. Nevertheless, the low rank correlation coecients
reported in Table 1.2 ensure that ∆RNS portfolio sorts by no means coincide with
stock mispricing or return-based portfolio sorts.
1.3.2 Post-Ranking Performance
Table 1.4 reports the weekly post-ranking performance of RNS-sorted (Panel A)
and ∆RNS-sorted (Panel B) quintile portfolios. In particular, we compute weekly
equally-weighted portfolio returns by compounding the corresponding daily portfo-
lio returns from the sorting Wednesday market close until the following Wednesday
market close. For both RNS- and ∆RNS-sorted quintiles, we nd a monotonically
positive gradient in the post-ranking premia as we move from the portfolio with the
lowest RNS (∆RNS) stocks to the portfolio with the highest RNS (∆RNS) stocks.
Most importantly for the focus of our study, we nd that the quintile portfolio
containing the stocks with the highest RNS (∆RNS) values yields a signicant
post-ranking weekly premium of 32 (29) bps.
Next, we examine the post-ranking performance of RNS- and ∆RNS-sorted quin-
tiles on a risk-adjusted basis. We nd that the quintile portfolio that goes long the
stocks with the highest RNS (∆RNS) values yields a signicant FFC alpha of 12
(10) bps in the post-ranking week with a NW t-stat of 3.11 (3.15).8,9 To highlight
8Throughout the study, we compute t-statistics using NW standard errors with the lag
length (q) given by the automatic lag selection procedure of Newey and West (1994), where
q = 4(T/100)2/9 and T is the sample size. In our benchmark analysis, we utilize post-ranking
portfolio returns for 962 weeks, hence q = 7.
9We present results for quintile portfolios to ensure that they contain a large number of stocks,
and hence are well diversied throughout our sample period. The documented outperformance
is even more signicant when we instead consider decile portfolios. In particular, the decile
portfolio containing the stocks with the highest RNS (∆RNS) values yields a highly signicant
FFC alpha of 19 (12) bps in the post-ranking week.
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its economic signicance, this outperformance corresponds to an annualized FFC
alpha of 6.43% (5.33%).
We can draw four remarks based on the ndings reported in Panels A and B of
Table 1.4. First, our nding shows that a relatively high RNS (∆RNS) value can be
an informative signal for signicant stock outperformance at the weekly frequency.
Second, Table 1.4 shows that the spread between the highest and the lowest RNS
(∆RNS) quintiles yields an FFC alpha of 24 (25) bps in the post-ranking week,
with a NW t-stat of 5.03 (6.65). This nding is consistent with the evidence of
Rehman and Vilkov (2012) and Stilger et al. (2017) who show that, at the monthly
frequency, the relation between RNS and future stock returns is positive. Third,
contributing further to this strand of the literature, we show that this positive
relation also holds when we alternatively use ∆RNS, which is well-suited to capture
the transient nature of the information embedded in RNS. Fourth, we nd that,
at the weekly frequency, the signicant abnormal performance of the long-short
RNS (∆RNS) strategy is symmetrically sourced from both the underperformance
of the lowest RNS (∆RNS) quintile and the outperformance of the highest RNS
(∆RNS) quintile.
Panel C of Table 1.4 reports the corresponding performance of two bivariate stock
portfolios constructed as the intersections of the lowest (highest) RNS and the
lowest (highest) ∆RNS independently-sorted quintiles. In line with the argument
that relatively high RNS and ∆RNS values can signal subsequent stock outperfor-
mance, we nd that the portfolio of stocks with the highest RNS and the highest
∆RNS values yields a strongly signicant FFC alpha of 21 bps in the post-ranking
week (i.e., 11.53% p.a.). Moreover, conrming that RNS and ∆RNS are positively
related to future stock returns, the spread between the portfolio with the highest
RNS & ∆RNS values and the portfolio with lowest RNS & ∆RNS values yields
an FFC alpha of 40 bps in the post-ranking week (NW t-stat: 5.80).
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1.3.3 Robustness Checks
We conduct a series of tests to examine the robustness of our benchmark results to
alternative methodological choices. First, we risk-adjust the post-ranking perfor-
mance of RNS- and ∆RNS-sorted portfolios using the 5-factor Fama and French
(2015) asset pricing model. Second, we sort stocks into quintile portfolios using
the corresponding RNS and ∆RNS values computed at market close every Friday
(rather than every Wednesday), and we estimate their weekly post-ranking perfor-
mance by compounding daily portfolio returns until the following Friday market
close. Third, we construct quintile portfolios by excluding from the sample stocks
whose RNS values are computed from OTM option prices associated with zero to-
tal trading volume. Forth, we repeat our benchmark analysis in the considerably
smaller cross-section of stocks whose RNS horizon is less or equal to roughly three
months (94 days).
The corresponding results are presented in the Appendix and they conrm the
conclusions of our benchmark analysis. The stock outperformance signalled by
relatively high RNS and ∆RNS values becomes stronger and more signicant when
we use the 5-factor alpha as an alternative metric of risk-adjusted performance.
Moreover, the magnitude and the signicance of the documented stock outperfor-
mance remains intact when we instead use Friday portfolio sorts. In addition, in
the case where we consider RNS values computed only from OTM options with
positive total trading volume, the quintile portfolio containing the highest RNS
stocks yields a similarly strong FFC alpha in the post-ranking week. Finally, even
when we eectively exclude half of the stocks of our initial sample whose RNS
horizon is greater than 94 days, we nd a quantitatively similar outperformance
that remains statistically signicant at the ve percent signicance level.
In the Appendix, we also consider an alternative, non-parametric proxy for RNS
(NPRNS), which directly measures the relative expensiveness between OTM calls
Chapter 1. Positive Stock Information In OTM Options 28
and OTM puts. Following Bali et al. (2017), NPRNS is computed as the dierence
between the 30-day implied volatilities of OTM calls (deltas = 0.20 and 0.25) and
OTM puts (deltas = −0.20 and −0.25). We compute NPRNS for the stocks in our
benchmark analysis, and we construct NPRNS-sorted quintile portfolios at market
close every Wednesday. Consistent with our benchmark results, we nd that the
quintile portfolio which contains the stocks with the highest NPRNS values yields
a signicant FFC alpha in the post-ranking week.
Throughout the chapter, we report the results obtained from the equally weighted
portfolios rather the value weighted portfolios as the former is indicative for the
average stock, whereas the latter is mainly representative for a small number of
stocks with the greatest market capitalisation in the portfolio. To alleviate the
potential concern that this choice drives our results, we repeat our benchmark
analysis by forming value weighted portfolios. The results are reported in the
Appendix and they are qualitatively identical. In particular, we nd that the
outperformance of the portfolio containing the stocks with the highest RNS values
equals 13 bps (t-stat = 3.68).
We have also examined the performance of RNS- and ∆RNS-sorted portfolios using
daily rebalancing. The corresponding results are reported in the Appendix, show-
ing that the quintile portfolio containing the stocks with the highest RNS (∆RNS)
values yields a highly signicant FFC alpha of 10 (9) bps on the post-ranking day.
These results indicate that the largest part of the weekly stock outperformance
documented in our benchmark analysis is earned on the rst post-ranking day. A
potential implication of this nding is that the information embedded in high RNS
is subsequently quickly incorporated into the underlying stock price. Section 1.6
examines this issue in detail.
Last, we have also entertained the possibility that the documented outperformance
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signalled by high RNS and ∆RNS values may be driven by positive stock infor-
mation embedded in OTM option prices around earnings announcements. To this
end, we repeat our benchmark portfolio analysis excluding RNS observations ±7
days around earnings announcement dates, which are sourced from Compustat.
In unreported results, which are readily available upon request, we nd that the
outperformance of the highest RNS (∆RNS) portfolio remains virtually identical
to the one in our benchmark analysis. Hence, the stock information that is sys-
tematically embedded in relatively high RNS (∆RNS) values cannot be attributed
to an earnings announcement eect.
1.4 Why can high RNS Signal Stock Outperfor-
mance?
The robust stock outperformance signalled by relatively high RNS and ∆RNS val-
ues warrants further analysis to reveal its sources. To this end, we develop and test
a trading mechanism that can give rise to this relation. We argue that a relatively
high RNS value may reect price pressure in OTM options, arising from the trad-
ing activity of speculators who resort to the option market to hold leveraged long
positions on relatively underpriced stocks. To trade on their optimistic beliefs or
positive information and maximize their leverage, investors would buy (sell) OTM
call (put) options. The purchase of OTM calls is particularly attractive in com-
parison to directly purchasing the underlying stock because the former entail no
exposure to the potential downside risk that holding the stock involves.
If risk averse market makers cannot perfectly hedge their counterparty positions,
then consistent with the demand-based option pricing framework of Garleanu et al.
(2009), this trading activity may exercise upward (downward) price pressure on
OTM calls (puts). In fact, to hedge their positions, market makers would need
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to buy the underlying stock, and get exposed to downside and/or inventory risk.
As a result, they would require a risk premium to act as counterparties, which
is reected in higher (lower) prices for selling (buying) OTM calls (puts) to the
speculators. This mechanism renders OTM calls (puts) relatively more (less) ex-
pensive, resulting into a higher RNS value. In turn, a relatively high RNS value
is followed by stock outperformance if market participants perceive this option
trading activity as an informative signal and subsequently correct the stock un-
derpricing, or if market makers, in their attempt to hedge their positions, translate
this option order imbalance into stock order imbalance by buying the stock, and
hence raise its price (Hu (2014)).
1.4.1 The Role of Stock Underpricing
A testable prediction implied by this mechanism is that a relatively high RNS
value should be a strong signal for subsequent stock outperformance, primarily for
those stocks that are perceived to be underpriced. Otherwise, there would be no
incentive in the rst place for investors to resort to the option market to set up
synthetic long positions using OTM options.
To test this prediction, we construct double-sorted portfolios on the basis of RNS
and a proxy for stock mispricing. For robustness, we use two alternative proxies for
stock mispricing: i) the daily DOTS measure of Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016), and
ii) the monthly MISP rank of Stambaugh et al. (2015). These two proxies reect
rather diverse sources of information and they capture potential stock mispricing
at dierent frequencies. In fact, they exhibit almost zero rank correlation. To
begin with, we construct bivariate conditional portfolios, where we rstly sort
stocks into tercile portfolios according to their RNS values at market close every
Wednesday, and then, within each RNS tercile, we further sort stocks into terciles
according to their mispricing proxy values.
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Panel A.1 of Table 1.5 reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance
for selected equally-weighted portfolios when DOTS is used as a mispricing proxy.
Consistent with the conjectured trading mechanism, we nd that the outperfor-
mance of the stocks with the highest RNS values is mainly driven by those stocks
that are perceived to be the most underpriced. The tercile portfolio with the most
underpriced stocks within the highest RNS tercile yields an impressive FFC al-
pha of 29 bps (NW t-stat: 5.98) in the post-ranking week. To the contrary, the
tercile portfolio with the most overpriced stocks within the highest RNS tercile
actually yields a signicant negative FFC alpha. In fact, the spread between the
most underpriced and the most overpriced stocks within the highest RNS tercile
yields a strongly signicant FFC alpha of 43 bps in the post-ranking week. The
conclusion from these results is that a relatively high RNS value per se is not a
sucient condition for subsequent stock outperformance, and hence it cannot be
regarded itself as a proxy for stock underpricing.
-Table 5 here-
Panel B.1 of Table 1.5 reports the corresponding results when MISP is used as
a mispricing proxy. We nd that the tercile portfolio with the most underpriced
stocks within the highest RNS tercile yields strong outperformance, whereas the
corresponding portfolio with the most overpriced stocks yields an almost zero
FFC alpha. Hence, these results conrm that a relatively high RNS value carries
information regarding future stock outperformance if the stock is perceived to be
underpriced in the rst place, whereas it is uninformative if the stock is overpriced.
To further examine the interaction between RNS and stock underpricing, we al-
ternatively construct independent double-sorted portfolios. Panels A.2 and B.2 of
Table 1.5 report the weekly post-ranking performance of these portfolios for the
DOTS and MISP mispricing proxies, respectively. The independent double-sorted
portfolios are well populated. This reects the low rank correlation coecients
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between RNS and DOTS or MISP reported in Table 1.2 and alleviates the poten-
tial concern that a high (low) RNS value may coincide with a low (high) DOTS
or MISP value.
The reported results support the argument that the combination of relatively high
RNS and stock underpricing strengthens subsequent stock outperformance. Panel
A.2 shows that the intersection of the stocks with the highest RNS and lowest
DOTS values yields an FFC alpha of 23 bps (NW t-stat: 5.85) in the post-ranking
week. To the contrary, the portfolio of stocks with the highest RNS and highest
DOTS values yields a highly signicant negative FFC alpha. Equally importantly,
we nd that the portfolio which combines the most underpriced stocks and the
stocks with the lowest RNS values fails to deliver a signicant FFC alpha. Hence,
stock underpricing, as proxied by DOTS, becomes a strong signal for subsequent
stock outperformance only when it is associated with a relatively high RNS value,
conrming that investors have resorted to the option market to exploit it. In
fact, the spread between the portfolio containing the lowest DOTS and highest
RNS stocks and the portfolio containing the lowest DOTS and lowest RNS stocks
yields a highly signicant FFC alpha.10 Finally, the corresponding results in Panel
B.2 further support the argument that a relatively high RNS value ceases to be
an informative signal regarding future outperformance for those stocks that are
considered to be overpriced. These results also show that a low MISP value cannot
be regarded either as a sucient condition for subsequent stock outperformance;
it becomes a valid signal when it is combined with a relatively high RNS value.
10The combination of stock mispricing and RNS is also informative with respect to subse-
quent stock underperformance. In particular, the portfolio of stocks with the highest DOTS
(MISP) and lowest RNS values yields an FFC alpha of −23 (−26) bps in the post-ranking week.
Consistent with the arguments of Stilger et al. (2017), this nding shows that the relation they
have documented also holds with alternative mispricing proxies, and it becomes stronger at the
weekly frequency. Moreover, the combination of stock mispricing and RNS becomes even more
impressive in the context of an enhanced investment strategy. For example, a spread strategy
that goes long the portfolio with the lowest DOTS & highest RNS stocks and goes short the
portfolio with the highest DOTS & lowest RNS stocks would yield an FFC alpha of 46 bps per
week.
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1.4.2 The Role of Stock Downside Risk
The trading mechanism described above also yields a testable prediction regarding
the role of stock downside risk. A relatively high RNS value is expected to be
more informative with respect to the future outperformance of a stock if the latter
entails greater downside risk. In this case, speculators have a stronger incentive
to resort to the option market to trade on their optimistic beliefs by purchasing
OTM calls rather than directly buying the stock. The RNS signal should also be
more informative in this case because market makers would require an even higher
risk premium to act as counterparties, and hence the option trading activity of
speculators should be more clearly reected in a higher RNS value.
To test this prediction, we construct double-sorted portfolios on the basis of RNS
and a proxy for stock downside risk. For robustness, we use a direct as well as
an indirect proxy. The direct proxy is the expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISP )
of stock returns, introduced by Boyer et al. (2010). A relatively low EISP value
indicates a higher probability of a large negative stock return in the future. The
indirect proxy is the estimated shorting fee (ESF) of Boehme et al. (2006). A lower
ESF value indicates looser short selling constraints, implying a higher probability
of incurring substantially negative stock returns (see Grullon et al. (2015)).
We initially construct bivariate conditional portfolios, where we rstly sort stocks
into tercile portfolios according to their RNS values at market close every Wednes-
day, and then, within each RNS tercile, we sort stocks into terciles according to
their downside risk proxy values. Panels A.1 and B.1 of Table 1.6 report the
weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance for selected equally-weighted port-
folios when EISP and ESF are used as a downside risk proxy, respectively.
In line with the prediction of the conjectured trading mechanism, we nd that the
outperformance signalled by a relatively high RNS value is mainly driven by those
stocks that exhibit the most pronounced downside risk. In fact, within the highest
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RNS tercile, the portfolio of stocks that are the most exposed to downside risk
according to EISP (ESF) yields a signicant FFC alpha of 17 (11) bps in the post-
ranking week. To the contrary, within the highest RNS tercile, the portfolio of
stocks characterized by the lowest exposure to downside risk does not subsequently
outperform. As a result, when stock downside risk is limited, speculators are less
incentivized to resort to the option market, and hence a relatively high RNS value
does not carry information regarding future stock outperformance.
We also construct independent double-sorted portfolios on the basis of RNS and
each of the downside risk proxies. This alternative approach ensures that the
classication of stocks' downside risk exposure is made relative to the entire cross-
section, not just within each RNS tercile. Panel A.2 (B.2) of Table 6 reports
the post-ranking performance of these independent double-sorted portfolios when
EISP (ESF) is used as a downside risk proxy.
The conclusions derived from the independent double-sorted portfolios are very
similar to the ones derived from the conditional portfolio sorting approach. Re-
gardless of the employed proxy, we conrm that it is the intersection of stocks that
exhibit the highest RNS values and are the most exposed to downside risk which
yields the strongest subsequent outperformance. To the contrary, the intersection
of stocks with the highest RNS values and the least pronounced downside risk
does not subsequently outperform. Stressing further the important role of down-
side risk, the spread between these two intersections yields a signicant FFC al-
pha.11 Concluding, these results further support the proposed trading mechanism,
showing that a relatively high RNS value is an informative signal for signicant
11The results in Table 1.6 also allow us to examine whether the reported stock outperformance
is simply driven by a downside risk premium. Rejecting this claim, we nd that downside risk
alone is not a sucient condition for subsequent stock outperformance. In fact, the combination
of stocks that are the most exposed to downside risk but exhibit the lowest RNS values yields an
FFC alpha close to zero. Moreover, within each downside risk classication, we nd a positive
relation between RNS and post-ranking portfolio performance.
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outperformance primarily for those stocks that are the most exposed to downside
risk.
1.4.3 Stock Underpricing and Downside Risk
In the previous sections, we examined separately the role of underpricing and the
role of downside risk in explaining the ability of a relatively high RNS value to
signal future stock outperformance. However, the ultimate testable prediction of
the conjectured trading mechanism is that the joint presence of underpricing and
pronounced downside risk should further reinforce the ability of a relatively high
RNS value to predict stock outperformance.
We test this prediction by constructing independent triple-sorted portfolios. At
market close every Wednesday, we independently sort stocks on the basis of their:
i) RNS value, ii) mispricing proxy value, and iii) downside risk proxy value,
and classify them as high or low relative to the corresponding median value. The
intersection of these three independent classications yields 8 portfolios for each of
the four possible combinations of the mispricing and downside risk proxies. Table
1.7 reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of these portfolios.
The reported results conrm the validity of the proposed trading mechanism. In
particular, we nd that the intersection of stocks that exhibit relatively higher
RNS values, are relatively underpriced, and are more exposed to downside risk
(i.e., portfolio P5) yields the strongest outperformance in the post-ranking week.
This pattern is robust for all mispricing and downside risk proxies. For example,
the long-only portfolio of stocks with higher than median RNS values, lower than
median DOTS values, and lower than median EISP values yields an FFC alpha
of 22 bps per week (NW t-stat: 4.92), which corresponds to an annualized FFC
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alpha of 12.11%. This is a striking result, if one takes into account how broad the
adopted classication scheme is.12
It should be also noted that we nd robust and signicant stock outperformance
only when all of the three conditions implied by this mechanism are satised
(high RNS, underpricing, and pronounced downside risk). Otherwise, in the case
where even one of these conditions is not met, stock outperformance becomes
either insignicant or not robust to the choice of the mispricing and downside risk
proxies (see e.g., P1, P6, and P7).13
1.5 Option Liquidity
Our analysis suggests that speculators may resort to the option market to trade on
their optimistic beliefs or positive information regarding a relatively underpriced
stock. In line with Easley et al. (1998), their incentive to create synthetic long
positions using options should be strong only if the latter are suciently liquid
in absolute terms or relative to the underlying stock. Otherwise, if their bid-
ask spreads are too large, then round-trip transaction costs could eliminate the
anticipated trading prot. In addition, if options are too thinly traded relative
to the underlying stock, an informed investor may choose not to trade in the
option market to avoid revealing her information. Therefore, we expect that a
12In selecting a classication scheme for triple-sorted portfolios, we face the following tradeo.
On the one hand, a ner classication scheme can reveal the sources of stock outperformance in
a sharper way. On the other hand, it may lead to sparsely populated portfolios, and hence the
reported performance may be driven by a small number of stocks. The presented classication
scheme is rather broad, ensuring that the triple-sorted portfolios are well populated. However,
we have also examined alternative classication schemes, such as independently sorting stocks
into terciles. In line with our arguments, this ner classication scheme yields an even stronger
outperformance for the intersection of stocks that exhibit the highest RNS values, are the most
underpriced, and are the most exposed to downside risk. Results are available upon request.
13We have repeated the analysis described in Section 1.4 by using ∆RNS instead of RNS. The
conclusions from this approach are similar to the ones discussed here. A high ∆RNS value is
a strong signal for future outperformance for those stocks that are perceived to be underpriced
and more exposed to downside risk. We report the corresponding results in the Appendix.
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relatively high RNS value would be more informative with respect to subsequent
stock outperformance when it is computed from suciently liquid options.14
To test this hypothesis, we construct double-sorted portfolios on the basis of RNS
and a proxy for option liquidity. As a proxy for option liquidity in absolute terms,
we employ the average relative bid-ask spread (RSPREAD) of the OTM options
used to compute the RNS value. As a proxy for option liquidity relative to the
underlying stock liquidity, we use the average daily option-to-stock volume ratio
(O/S) in the prior 12 months. A very high value of RSPREAD indicates that the
utilized OTM options are highly illiquid. A very low value of O/S indicates that
options are thinly traded relative to the underlying stock.
We initially construct bivariate conditional portfolios, where we rstly sort stocks
into quintiles on the basis of their RNS values at market close every Wednesday,
and then, within each RNS quintile, we further classify stocks into two categories
(High versus Low) according to their option liquidity proxy values. To isolate the
eect of highly illiquid options, we classify as high RSPREAD the values that
are above the 80th percentile of the corresponding distribution within each RNS
quintile. Similarly, we classify as low O/S the values that are below the 20th
percentile of the corresponding distribution. Panel A.1 (B.1) of Table 1.8 reports
the weekly post-ranking FFC alphas of selected equally-weighted portfolios when
RSPREAD (O/S) is used as a liquidity proxy.
For both proxies, we nd that, within the highest RNS quintile, the portfolio of
stocks with the highly illiquid options yields an insignicant FFC alpha that is close
to zero. To the contrary, within the highest RNS quintile, the portfolio of stocks
with the suciently liquid options yields a highly signicant FFC alpha in the
post-ranking week. Hence, in line with the previous arguments, a relatively high
14The bid-ask spread is a very rough measure of the actual trading cost an investor faces in the
option market. Muravyev and Pearson (2020) show that the real trading costs in option markets
may be substantially lower than what the bid-ask spreads suggest. An empirical investigation
of the actual round-trip trading cost an investor faces could be an interesting avenue for future
research. We would like to thank Andreas Kaeck for pointing this out.
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RNS value is informative with respect to subsequent stock outperformance only
when options are suciently liquid in absolute terms or relative to the underlying
stock.
For robustness, we alternatively construct independent double-sorted portfolios.
This ensures that our classication of stocks into high or low RSPREAD (O/S)
is done with respect to the entire cross-sectional distribution of RSPREAD (O/S)
values on the corresponding day. Panel A.2 (B.2) of Table 1.8 presents the post-
ranking FFC alphas of these portfolios when RSPREAD (O/S) is used as a proxy.
We reach very similar conclusions to the ones derived from the conditional portfolio
sorting approach. For either liquidity proxy, the intersection of the stocks with the
highest RNS values and highly illiquid options yields an insignicant FFC alpha,
whereas the intersection of the stocks with the highest RNS values and suciently
liquid options yields strong subsequent outperformance.
1.6 Speed of Price Correction
The results in Section 1.3 convincingly show that a long-only portfolio of stocks
with relatively high RNS or ∆RNS values subsequently yields signicant out-
performance. Since RNS is computed from publicly available option prices and
long-only strategies face negligible limits-to-arbitrage, this robust pattern seems to
be at odds with market eciency. Motivated by this evidence, in this Section we
examine how fast the information embedded in RNS is subsequently incorporated
into the underlying stock prices.
1.6.1 Decomposing Weekly Returns
First, we decompose the weekly performance of RNS- and ∆RNS-sorted portfolios
into their performance: i) on the rst post-ranking trading day, and ii) during the
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rest of the post-ranking week, skipping the rst post-ranking trading day. Panel
A (Panel B) of Table 1.9 reports the results of this decomposition for the RNS-
(∆RNS-) sorted portfolios.
We nd that most of the abnormal weekly return signalled by RNS is earned on
the rst post-ranking day. This is consistent with the conjecture that this stock
outperformance should be rather short-lived. In particular, the highest RNS and
∆RNS quintiles yield a highly signicant FFC alpha of 9 bps on the rst post-
ranking day. On the other hand, skipping the rst post-ranking day, the quintile
portfolio which contains the stocks with the highest RNS (∆RNS) values yields
an insignicant FFC alpha of only 3 (1) bps during the rest of the post-ranking
week.
These results reveal that stock market participants quickly incorporate the in-
formational content of a relatively high RNS (∆RNS) value into the underlying
stock price. Another important conclusion is that a relatively high RNS (∆RNS)
value contains genuine positive information about the underlying stock, since the
stock outperformance earned on the rst post-ranking day is not reversed in the
following days. Had it subsequently reversed, the outperformance on the rst post-
ranking day could have simply been a manifestation of uninformative short-term
price pressure in the option market, transmitted to the stock market by market
makers hedging their positions.
In addition, this performance decomposition shows that the negative information
embedded in the lowest RNS (∆RNS) values is incorporated in the underlying
stock prices at a slower pace. In fact, even if we skip the rst post-ranking day,
the quintile portfolio containing the stocks with the lowest RNS (∆RNS) values
yields a signicant negative FFC alpha of −7 (−8) bps during the rest of the
post-ranking week. This nding is consistent with the argument that the negative
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information embedded in option prices may be slowly diused to the underlying
stock price due to limits-to-arbitrage, such as short-selling constraints.
Equally importantly, even if we skip the rst post-ranking day, a long-short RNS-
(∆RNS-) based spread strategy would yield a signicant FFC alpha of 10 (9) bps
during the rest of the post-ranking week. This nding conrms that the positive
relation between RNS and future stock returns is neither driven by next-day return
reversals nor can be explained by a potential non-synchroneity bias.
1.6.2 Overnight versus Intraday Returns
We further decompose the performance of RNS- and ∆RNS-sorted portfolios
earned on the rst post-ranking day into its overnight and intraday components.
To this end, we follow Lou et al. (2018) in computing intraday and overnight stock
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where riclose−to−close,d is the standard daily close-to-close return. To estimate FFC
alphas, we also construct the intraday and overnight versions of the corresponding
factor returns. The risk-free rate is assumed to accrue overnight. Panel A of Table
1.9 reports the overnight versus the intraday performance decomposition for RNS-
sorted portfolios, whereas Panel B reports the corresponding decomposition for
∆RNS-sorted portfolios.
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We nd that the stock outperformance predicted by relatively high RNS or ∆RNS
values is entirely earned overnight. The highest RNS (∆RNS) quintile yields an
overnight FFC alpha of 13 (10) bps with a NW t-stat of 9.69 (8.30). This result
further supports the argument that market participants very quickly incorporate
the information embedded in publicly observable OTM option prices into the un-
derlying stock price. Moreover, we conrm that relatively high RNS (∆RNS)
values carry genuinely positive information about the underlying stock since little
of the overnight outperformance is subsequently reversed intraday.
Taken together, the results in this Section indicate a very fast price discovery
process and point towards a relatively ecient market mechanism. The ability
of relatively high RNS (∆RNS) values to predict overnight stock outperformance
can be further reconciled with market eciency, if one takes into account the crit-
icism of Battalio and Schultz (2006). Even though the potential non-synchroneity
bias is negligible in our sample period, it is not entirely certain whether the com-
puted RNS values could be practically used in real time to exploit the documented
stock outperformance. Nevertheless, these results collectively show that the option
market can lead the stock market with respect to positive price discovery too.
A remark is in order at this point. Unlike index options, the CBOE equity option
market closes virtually simultaneously with the underlying stock market at 4pm
(EST). Moreover, since March 5, 2008, OptionMetrics reports the best (or highest)
3:59pm (EST) bid and oer prices across all exchanges on which the option trades.
It is unlikely that the systematic risk adjusted return we nd is caused by a
non-synchronicity issue. However, to alleviate any potential concerns, we repeat
in the Appendix the decomposition of the rst post-ranking day return for two
subperiods. The rst period ranges from January 1996 to February 2008, and the
second period ranges from April 2008 to June 2014. We nd that the overnight
outperformance of the portfolio containing the stocks with the highest RNS values
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remains highly statistically signicant in the second period with a FFC alpha equal
to 5 bps (t-stat = 4.01).
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1.7 Stock Price Pressure and Return Reversals
Our results indicate that the predictive ability of RNS over future stock returns
derives from informed trading in OTM options, and that the option market leads
the stock market with respect to price discovery. This interpretation is in line with
the arguments of prior studies in the literature (see, inter alia, Pan and Potesh-
man (2006), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), Xing et al. (2010), and An et al.
(2014)). To the contrary, the recent study of Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016) argues
that the predictive ability of option-implied measures primarily reects short-run
return reversals following stock price pressure, rather than informed trading in the
option market. Contributing to this debate, in this Section we examine whether
RNS reects stock price pressure, and whether its positive relation with future
stock returns is simply a manifestation of the well-documented reversal eect of
Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990).15
First, we have documented that the pairwise rank correlation coecient between
RNS and the same-day stock return (RET(1)) or the cumulative 5-day stock return
(RET(5)) is close to zero (see Table 1.2). Therefore, we argue that short-term stock
depreciation (appreciation) is not mechanically associated with a higher (lower)
RNS value, and hence RNS cannot be regarded as a proxy for stock price pressure.
Second, we examine whether the positive relation between RNS and future stock
returns is exclusively driven from stocks that have recently experienced price pres-
sure. To this end, we construct bivariate conditional portfolios, where we rstly
sort stocks into terciles on the basis of their 1-, 3-, and 5-day cumulative stock
returns, respectively, and then, within each return tercile, we further sort stocks
into quintiles on the basis of their RNS values. Table 1.11 reports the weekly
post-ranking performance of the corresponding portfolios. Interestingly, we nd
that the positive relation between RNS and post-ranking alphas is evident within
15For recent evidence, see also Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006) and Nagel (2012).
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each return tercile, and it is robust regardless of the window used to compute
these returns. In fact, within the medium return tercile, where the average 1-, 3-,
and 5-day cumulative stock return up to the portfolio sorting day is approximately
zero, and hence no price pressure has been experienced, the spread between the
highest and the lowest RNS quintiles yields a highly signicant FFC alpha of 15,
16, and 19 bps, respectively, in the post-ranking week.
Last, we also nd that, within the lowest return tercile, it is the stocks with the
highest RNS values that subsequently yield the strongest outperformance. This
result is consistent with our trading mechanism because the stocks in the lowest
return tercile are more likely to be relatively underpriced due to downward price
pressure, and a high RNS value reects trading activity in the option market to
exploit this underpricing. To the contrary, within the lowest return tercile, the
stocks with the lowest RNS values subsequently underperform. Hence, we conclude
that downward price pressure is not a sucient condition for subsequent stock
outperformance. It is followed by stock outperformance only when it is associated
with a relatively high RNS value. We derive similar conclusions when we repeat
the analysis of this section using ∆RNS instead of RNS as a criterion to sort stocks
into portfolios. The corresponding results are reported in the Appendix.
Chapter 1. Positive Stock Information In OTM Options 45
1.8 Trading activity on OTM options
The main conjecture of our study is that a relatively high RNS predicts subsequent
stock outperformance due to investors' trading activity on the stock's options mar-
ket. The trading mechanism and the results we have presented in the previous
sections are consistent with this hypothesis. In this Section, we directly test it.
In particular, we construct a measure that captures the trading activity on OTM
call options relative to OTM put options from investors opening new long posi-
tions. We nd that the outperformance signalled by a relatively high RNS is not
evident across all stocks. It exists only for the stocks where investors have bought
predominantly, almost exclusively, OTM calls on their options market.
To construct a measure that captures the trading activity on OTM options we
employ the International Securities Exchange (ISE) Open / Close Trade prole
database. In contrast to the total traded volumes provided for each option contract
by OptionMetrics (OM), the ISE dataset disaggregates the traded volume into the
following categories. Traded volume from (i) buy orders that open new positions
(open buy), (ii) buy orders that close existing written positions (close buy), (iii)
sell orders that open new written positions (open sell), and (iv) sell orders that
close existing purchased positions (close sell). Furthermore, ISE reports whether
a market-maker (designated as a rm) or an investor (designated as a customer or
professional customer) executed the trade. We construct OBC/T as the ratio of
the trading volume due to investors' open buy trades on OTM calls to the trading
volume due to investors' open buy trades on both OTM call and put options.
OBC/T ranges from 0% to 100%. On a given trading day and for a given stock,
it equals 0% (100%) if investors only executed trades to open new positions on
OTM put (call) options. If investors did not execute any open buy orders on OTM
call or put option contracts, the ratio is not available. The sample of stocks that
have available both RNS and OBC/T values ranges from May 2005 to June 2014,
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containing, on average, 405 individual stocks per day. We follow Ge et al. (2016)
and exclude the last quarter of 2008 from our sample that includes the short-sale
ban during the nancial crises and could potentially distort the results.
To assess the interaction between RNS, OBC/T, and subsequent stock perfor-
mance, we construct independent double-sorted portfolios on the basis of RNS
and OBC/T. In particular, we sort stocks every Wednesday, at market close, to
three portfolios according to their OBC/T values: i) Low, if the OBC/T value is
below the 40th percentile, ii) Medium, if the OBC/T value is between the 40th
and 60th percentiles, and iii) High, if the OBC/T value is above the 60th per-
centile of the corresponding cross-sectional distribution. We chose the 40th and
60th percentiles as breaking points as they can uniquely classify stocks to three
well-populated portfolios for every cross-sectional distribution in the sample. Fur-
thermore, we also sort stocks in ascending order according to their RNS values and
assign them to tercile portfolios. Finally, we construct the double-sorted portfolios
as the intersections of the portfolios formed during the aforementioned indepen-
dent univariate sorts.
Panel A of Table 1.12 reports the weekly post-ranking performance of the low-
est and highest univariate OBC/T-sorted portfolios. Panel B reports the weekly
post-ranking performance of the independent double-sorted RNS-OBC/T portfo-
lios involving the highest and lowest RNS and OBC/T portfolios. We nd that
there is a strong cross-sectional relationship between OBC/T and subsequent stock
outperformance, as the spread portfolio produces a highly statistically signicant
FFC alpha equal to 13 bps (t-stat: 3.85). Furthermore, Portfolio OBC/T-1 that
contains the stocks whose open buy trading volume on OTM options is mainly due
to trades on OTM puts, 16% on puts versus 84% on calls, on average, produces
a negative alpha equal to -0.05 which, is though, statistically indistinguishable
to zero. Portfolio OBC/T-3 that contains the stocks were the traded volume is
virtually exclusively due to trades on OTM call options, 97% of the volume, on
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average, produces a subsequent statistically signicant outperformance equal to 8
bps with a t-stat of 2.17.
The performance of the bivariate independent-sorted portfolios conrms the hy-
pothesis of the study. It shows that investors' trading activity on OTM options
drives the outperformance signalled by RNS. In particular, among the stocks with
a relatively high RNS, only stocks for which investors have almost exclusively
opened new positions on their OTM call options subsequently outperform. In par-
ticular, only the portfolio with the highest RNS & highest OBC/T values yields a
statistically signicant outperformance equal to 16 bps with a t-stat of 2.63. The
portfolios with the highest RNS values but with low or medium OBC/T values
produce an alpha that is statistically indistinguishable to zero. Similarly, we nd
that among the stocks with the lowest RNS values, only the ones with the low-
est OBC/T ratio subsequently underperform producing an alpha equal to -14 bps
with a t-stat of -3.55.
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1.9 Conclusions
This study provides and tests a possible mechanism to explain the positive relation
between RNS and future stock returns by focusing on stocks with high RNS.
The mechanism is the following. Speculators may choose to trade on their opti-
mistic beliefs or positive information in the option market, setting up leveraged
long positions on stocks that they perceive to be relatively underpriced but at the
same time entail substantial downside risk. In fact, we nd that a portfolio of
stocks that exhibit relatively high RNS (or ∆RNS) values, are underpriced, but
are also exposed to pronounced downside risk subsequently yields strong outper-
formance.
Our ndings are consistent with the theoretical arguments of Easley et al. (1998)
and An et al. (2014) on cross-market predictability. Moreover, we conrm that
the positive relation between RNS and future stock returns is not an artefact of a
return reversal eect following stock price pressure.
Since RNS is computed from publicly observable option prices and long-only strate-
gies face negligible limits-to-arbitrage relative to strategies involving short selling,
this evidence poses a challenge to the ecient market framework. We rationalize
our ndings by showing that the stock outperformance predicted by a relatively
high RNS (or ∆RNS) value is very short-lived. In particular, most of the docu-
mented abnormal return is earned overnight, indicating a speedy price correction
process in the stock market.
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1.A Denitions of Variables
Book-to-Market Value ratio (B/M)
B/M for rm i in month t is given by the ratio of Common Equity (CEQ) to
Market Value. CEQ is obtained from Compustat; we use December values of year
y−1 for the period from June of year y until May of year y+ 1. B/M is computed
only for positive CEQ values.
Distance between Stock Price and Option-Implied Stock Value (DOTS)
Following Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016), DOTSi,j,d is computed for stock i on day
d using a pair j of American-style call and put options written on the stock i with









where i) Si,d is the actual price of stock i on day d, ii) S
U
i,j,d is the no-arbitrage




i,j,d +Ki,j + PVd(DIVi)− P bidi,j,d,
where Caski,j,d is the ask price of the call option of the pair j on day d, PVd(DIVi)
is the present value of the dividends to be paid on stock i until option expiry,
and P bidi,j,d is the bid price of the put option of the pair j, and iii) S
L
i,j,d is the
no-arbitrage lower bound on stock's i ask price implied by the option pair j on




−rT − P aski,j,d,
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where Cbidi,j,d is the bid price of the call option of the pair j on day d, r is the
risk-free rate, and P aski,j,d is the ask price of the put option of the pair j.
Finally, DOTSi,d for stock i on day d is given by the following weighted-average










Caski,j,d − Cbidi,j,d + P aski,j,d − P bidi,j,d
)−1
Estimated Shorting Fee (ESF)
To compute the ESF for rm i in month m, we use the tted regression model of
Boehme et al. (2006):
Fee = 0.07834 + 0.05438VRSI− 0.00664VRSI2 + 0.000382VRSI3 − 0.5908Option +
0.2587Option · VRSI− 0.02713Option · VRSI2 + 0.0007583Option · VRSI3,
where RSI is the relative short interest and VRSI is the vicile rank of RSI (i.e.
it takes the value 1 if the rm's RSI is below the 5th percentile of all rms' RSI
distribution, 2 if the rm is between the 5th and 10th percentile, etc.). We obtain
the short interest data from Compustat. Option is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if there is non-zero trading volume for the rms' options in the month
and 0 otherwise. Trading volume data for options are sourced from OptionMetrics.
Expected Idiosyncratic Skewness under the physical measure (EISP )
Following Boyer et al. (2010), to estimate EISP for rm i in month m, we use the
tted part of the following regression model:




i,m−60 + γ3MOMi,m−60 + γ4TURNi,m−60 +
+γ5NASDi,m−60 + γ6SMALLi,m−60 + γ7MEDi,m−60 + Γ INDi,m−60 + εi,m
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This cross-sectional regression is estimated every month. ISKEWPi and IVOL
P
i
denote, respectively, the idiosyncratic skewness and idiosyncratic volatility for rm
i under the physical measure, computed from daily rm-level residuals of the Fama
and French (1993) three-factor model over the past 60 months. MOM denotes the
cumulative stock return from month m− 12 to month m− 1. Turn is the average
monthly turnover in the past year calculated as the trading volume divided by the
number of shares outstanding. Trading volume and number of shares outstanding
are both obtained from CRSP. To calculate average monthly turnover, 5 valid
monthly observations are required in each year. NASDAQ volume is adjusted for
the double counting following Gao and Ritter (2010); NASDAQ volume is divided
by 2 for the period from 1983 to January 2001, by 1.8 for the rest of 2001, by 1.6
for 2002-2003, and is unchanged from January 2004 to December 2012. NASD
takes the value 1 if the rm is listed on NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. SMALL takes
the value 1 if the rm is in the bottom three size deciles and 0 otherwise. MED
takes the value 1 if the rm is in one of the size deciles between the fourth and
the seventh and 0 otherwise. IND are a series of industry classication dummies.
We use the 30 industry classications of Fama and French (1997).
Idiosyncratic Skewness under the physical measure (ISKEWP )










where εi,d is the daily rm-level residual of the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model regression over the past 60 months, D is the set of non-missing daily
returns in the past 60 months and N(d) denotes the number of days in D. We
require at least 15 observations in the past 60 months to compute ISKEWPi .
Idiosyncratic Volatility under the physical measure (IVOLP )
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where εi,d is the daily rm-level residual of the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model regression over the past 60 months, D is the set of non-missing daily
returns in the past 60 months and N(d) denotes the number of days in D. We
require at least 15 observations in the past 60 months to compute IVolPi .
Momentum (MOM)
MOM for rm i in month m is dened as its cumulative stock return from month
m− 12 to month m− 1.
Option Relative Bid-Ask Spread (RSPREAD)





The average RSPREAD on day d across the OTM options j = 1, 2, ..., J used to






where #options is the number of the OTM options used.
Option-to-Stock Trading Volume Ratio (O/S)
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where OPTION_VOLUMEi,d is the total number of option contracts traded on
day d, with each contract pertaining to 100 shares of rm i, and STOCK_VOLUMEi,d
is the number of shares of rm i traded on day d. To compute OPTION_VOLUMEi,d,
we use all options expiring from 10 to 180 days. We then compute the average daily
O/S ratio using a 12-month rolling window. To compute OPTION_VOLUMEi,d,
we use all options expiring from 10 to 180 days. We then compute the average
daily O/S ratio using a 12-month rolling window.
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1.B Supplementary Appendix
1.B.1 Five-Factor Alphas
In the main body of the study, we measure risk-adjusted performance using FFC
alphas. To address the potential concern that our benchmark results may be driven
by the choice of factors to perform this risk-adjustment, this Section alternatively
reports alphas estimated from the 5-factor Fama and French (2015) asset pricing
model (FF5).
Similar to our benchmark analysis, we sort stocks in ascending order according
to their RNS or ∆RNS values at market close every Wednesday and assign them
to quintile portfolios. Their weekly equally-weighted returns are computed by
compounding the corresponding daily portfolio returns from the sorting Wednes-
day market close until the following Wednesday market close. Table 1.A1 reports
the weekly post-ranking FF5 alphas of RNS-sorted (Panel A) and ∆RNS-sorted
(Panel B) quintiles.
We nd that the quintile portfolio that goes long the stocks with the highest RNS
(∆RNS) values yields a signicant FF5 alpha of 18 (14) bps in the post-ranking
week with a NW t-stat of 4.93 (4.54). This abnormal performance corresponds
to an annualized FF5 alpha of 9.8% (7.55%). Hence, the stock outperformance
predicted by relatively high RNS and ∆RNS values is much more signicant,
both statistically and economically, if the FF5 model is used to perform the risk-
adjustment. This result derives from the fact that the highest RNS and ∆RNS
quintiles actually exhibit a negative loading to the protability (RMW ) and in-
vestment (CMA) factors that the FF5 model introduces. Concluding, we conrm
that the stock outperformance documented in our benchmark analysis cannot be
attributed to potentially omitted risk factors.
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Finally, Panel C of Table 1.A1 reports the corresponding FF5 alphas of two bivari-
ate stock portfolios constructed as the intersections of the lowest (highest) RNS
and the lowest (highest) ∆RNS independently-sorted quintiles. In line with the
results from the univariate portfolios, we nd that the portfolio of stocks with
the highest RNS and the highest ∆RNS values yields an FF5 alpha of 27 bps in
the post-ranking week (NW t-stat: 5.21), which is greater than the corresponding
FFC alpha reported in the main body of the study.
1.B.2 Friday Sorts
In our benchmark analysis, we construct portfolios on the basis of RNS and ∆RNS
values at market close every Wednesday, and compute their weekly post-ranking
returns until the following Wednesday market close. To examine whether the
choice of the portfolio sorting day may aect our results, we alternatively construct
portfolios using the corresponding RNS and ∆RNS values at market close every
Friday, and compute their weekly returns by compounding the corresponding daily
portfolio returns until the following Friday market close. Panel A (B) of Table 1.A2
reports the post-ranking performance of RNS-sorted (∆RNS-sorted) quintiles.
We nd that the quintile portfolio that goes long the stocks with the highest RNS
(∆RNS) values yields an FFC alpha of 13 (10) bps in the post-ranking week,
with a NW t-stat of 3.46 (2.99). If anything, the abnormal performance of the
stock portfolio with the highest RNS values becomes stronger using Friday sorts.
Hence, we conclude that our benchmark results are not driven by the choice of the
portfolio sorting day.
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1.B.3 Options with Positive Total Trading Volume
Following prior studies in the literature (see, inter alia, Rehman and Vilkov (2012),
Stilger et al. (2017)), our benchmark analysis utilizes RNS values that are com-
puted from OTM option prices associated with positive open interest. There is
no requirement that each of these OTM options should exhibit positive trading
volume. As a result, a portion of the daily RNS values in our sample have been
extracted from the prices of OTM options exhibiting zero total trading volume
on the corresponding day. We still expect the quoted bid-ask prices to be rather
informative due to the sizeable open interest associated with these options.
Nevertheless, to alleviate the potential concern that our results may be aected by
RNS values that are extracted from OTM option prices associated with zero total
trading volume, we repeat the benchmark portfolio analysis excluding these RNS
values. Table 1.A3 reports the weekly post-ranking performance of RNS-sorted
quintile portfolios constructed at market close every Wednesday. Reecting the
exclusion of RNS values associated with zero OTM option total trading volume,
each RNS-sorted quintile now consists of 109 stocks, on average, i.e., 24 fewer
stocks relative to the benchmark analysis.
We nd that the quintile portfolio that goes long the stocks with the highest RNS
values yields an even higher FFC alpha relative to the benchmark results, which is
equal to 13 bps, and is strongly signicant (NW t-stat: 3.03). Hence, we conclude
that the stock outperformance signalled by relatively high RNS values becomes
even more pronounced when these RNS values are computed from OTM options
with positive total trading volume.
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1.B.4 Options Maturing in Less than Three Months
We have calculated the daily RNS for each stock in line with the studies of Rehman
and Vilkov (2012), Conrad et al. (2013), and Stilger et al. (2017). In particular,
we use daily prices of OTM options with 10 to 180 days-to-maturity. We discard
options with zero open interest, zero bid price, negative strike, price less than
$0.50, missing implied volatility, and non-standard settlement. Furthermore, we
discard horizons that do not have available at least two OTM puts and two OTM
calls. Among the eligible sets of options that satisfy the above criteria, we calculate
the RNS using the one with the shortest maturity.
The above methodology leads to a suciently large cross-section of stocks on a
given day, with an average (median) of 607 (671) stocks. The average (median)
RNS maturity equals 91 (94) days. In this section, we test whether our benchmark
portfolio analysis holds when we consider a signicantly smaller cross-section. In
particular, we focus on stocks whose RNS has a horizon that is approximately less
or equal to three months, excluding eectively half of our initial sample.
Table 1.A4 reports the weekly post-ranking performance of the RNS-sorted quin-
tile portfolios constructed at the market close every Wednesday. Each portfolio
contains approximately 70 stocks on average rather than 133 stocks as in our
benchmark analysis. We nd that the quintile portfolio that goes long the stocks
with the highest RNS values yields a FFC alpha equal to 10 bps. Furthermore,
even in this considerably smaller cross-section, the outperformance remains sta-
tistically signicant at the ve percent signicance level (NW t-stat: 2.27).
Chapter 1. Positive Stock Information In OTM Options 58
1.B.5 Non-Parametric Risk-Neutral Skewness
Throughout this study, we claim that RNS captures the expensiveness of OTM
calls relative to OTM puts. Hence, the ability of a relatively high RNS value
to predict stock outperformance arises from the fact that the former indicates
relatively expensive OTM calls due to transient price pressure in the option market.
To conrm the validity of this argument, this Section uses an alternative, direct
measure of relative expensiveness between OTM calls and puts. In particular, fol-
lowing Bali et al. (2017), we compute a "non-parametric" proxy for RNS (NPRNS).




− PIV−20 + PIV−25
2
,
where CIV20 (CIV25) is the implied volatility of the 0.20 (0.25) delta call and
PIV−20 (PIV−25) is the implied volatility of the −0.20 (−0.25) delta put. To
compute NPRNS, we use the corresponding 30-day implied volatilities sourced
from OptionMetrics' Volatility Surface le.
Apart from using a direct measure of relative expensiveness between OTM calls
and puts, this approach serves two additional purposes. First, by alternatively us-
ing this "non-parametric" measure, we ensure that the conclusions of our bench-
mark analysis are not driven by the methodological choices made to compute
the RNS measure of Bakshi et al. (2003). Second, by utilizing 30-day implied
volatilities, we alleviate the potential concern that our benchmark results may be
aected by the fact that RNS values are not computed from constant maturity
OTM options.
We sort stocks in ascending order according to their NPRNS values at market close
every Wednesday, and assign them to quintile portfolios. For comparability with
our benchmark results, this portfolio analysis utilizes only those stocks that also
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have valid RNS values on the corresponding day. Table 1.A5 reports the weekly
post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of the NPRNS-sorted portfolios.
In line with our benchmark results, we nd a clear positive gradient in the post-
ranking premia and FFC alphas as we move from the lowest NPRNS quintile to
the highest NPRNS quintile. Most importantly for the focus of our study, we nd
that the quintile portfolio containing the stocks with the highest NPRNS values
yields a signicant FFC alpha of 9 bps in the post-ranking week, with a NW t-stat
of 2.64. Hence, using this "non-parametric" measure, we conrm the conclusion
of our benchmark analysis that the stocks with the most expensive OTM calls
relative to OTM puts subsequently outperform.
We also note that the lowest NPRNS quintile subsequently yields a signicant
negative FFC alpha, conrming the conjecture that the relatively most expen-
sive OTM puts predict stock underperformance. Finally, the spread between the
highest and the lowest NPRNS quintiles yields an economically and statistically
signicant FFC alpha of 29 bps in the post-ranking week.
In unreported results, which are available upon request, we have additionally ex-
amined whether a measure of expensiveness of OTM calls relative to ATM options
can also capture the positive stock information that is embedded in RNS. We term
this measure R(ight)SKEW. In particular, RSKEW is dened as the dierence be-
tween the implied volatility of OTM calls (deltas = 0.20 and 0.25) and the average
implied volatility of ATM calls and puts (deltas = {0.5, 0.55} and {−0.45,−0.5},
respectively).
Repeating the portfolio analysis described above, but now using RSKEW instead
of NPRNS as a sorting variable, we nd no evidence that the portfolio of stocks
with the highest RSKEW values subsequently outperforms. This is because a
relatively high RSKEW value is typically a manifestation of high Risk-Neutral
Kurtosis, but it may also be associated with substantially negative RNS. The most
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obvious example of this pattern is the case of an asymmetric volatility smile, where
OTM calls are more expensive than ATM options, but they are also substantially
cheaper than OTM puts.
Taken together, the results of this Section conrm that it is the expensiveness of
OTM calls relative to OTM puts (not ATM options) that can reveal positive infor-
mation regarding the underlying stock. Since, by construction, a high RNS value
reects this relative expensiveness, it can also embed positive stock information.
1.B.6 Value-Weighted Portfolios
Throughout the main body of this study, we have chosen to report the results
obtained from the equally-weighted portfolios rather the value-weighted portfolios
as the former is indicative for the average stock, whereas the latter is mainly
representative for a small number of stocks with the greatest market capitalisation
in the portfolio. In our sample, consisting of 4,959 stocks, the total average market
capitalisation of the top three percent (in terms of capitalisation) of the stocks is
approximately equal to the average market capitalisation of the rest of the stocks.
Nevertheless, to alleviate the potential concern that this choice drives our results,
we repeat our benchmark analysis by forming value weighted portfolios.
In particular, every Wednesday, at market close, we sort stocks in ascending order
according to their RNS values and assign them to quintile portfolios. We form
value-weighted portfolios by weighing each stock in the quintile by its relative
market value within the quintile. Subsequently, we compute the value-weighted
return of each portfolio at market close of the following Wednesday. Table 1.A6
reports the results. We nd that the results remain quantitatively and qualitatively
similar to the equally-weighted portfolio sorts. In particular, the outperformance
of the portfolio containing the stocks with the highest RNS values equals 13 bps
(t-stat = 3.68).
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1.B.7 Daily Rebalancing
Our benchmark analysis shows that a relatively high RNS or ∆RNS value, re-
ecting transient price pressure in the option market, predicts subsequent stock
outperformance at the weekly frequency. Consistent with speedy price correction
in the stock market, we nd that this outperformance is short-lived. It is mainly
earned on the rst post-ranking day and, more specically, overnight. A corollary
of these ndings is that, with daily rebalancing, the portfolio with the highest
RNS or ∆RNS values should yield an even stronger outperformance. This Section
examines the validity of this argument.
We sort stocks in ascending order according to their RNS or ∆RNS values at
market close on each trading day of our sample period (i.e., a total of 4,648 trading
days), and assign them to quintile portfolios. We then compute their equally-
weighted returns on the next trading day. Panel A (B) of Table 1.A7 reports the
daily post-ranking FFC alphas of RNS-sorted (∆RNS-sorted) quintiles.
We nd that the quintile portfolio that goes long the stocks with the highest RNS
(∆RNS) values yields a signicant FFC alpha of 10 (9) bps on the post-ranking
day, with a NW t-stat of 10.25 (11.49). Highlighting its economic signicance, this
abnormal performance corresponds to an annualized FFC alpha of approximately
28% (25%). Moreover, Panel C of Table 1.A7 shows that the intersection of the
stocks in the highest RNS and the highest ∆RNS quintiles yields an FFC alpha
of 18 bps on the post-ranking day (NW t-stat: 13.95).
These results conrm, at the daily frequency, the ability of relatively high RNS and
∆RNS values to predict stock outperformance. Additionally, these ndings vali-
date the conjecture that the documented outperformance becomes much stronger
when portfolio rebalancing becomes more frequent, and hence they are consistent
with the argument that it is short-lived due to speedy price correction in the stock
market.
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1.B.8 ∆RNS and Stock Underpricing
This Section repeats the analysis of Section IV.A in the main body of the study re-
garding the role of stock underpricing, using ∆RNS instead of RNS. We construct
double-sorted portfolios on the basis of ∆RNS and each of the stock mispricing
proxies (DOTS & MISP). To begin with, we construct bivariate conditional port-
folios, where we rstly sort stocks into tercile portfolios according to their ∆RNS
values at market close every Wednesday, and then, within each ∆RNS tercile, we
further sort stocks into terciles according to their mispricing proxy values. Panel
A.1 (B.1) of Table 1.A8 reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance
for selected equally-weighted portfolios when DOTS (MISP) is used as a mispricing
proxy.
The results conrm the conclusions derived in the main body of the study. Regard-
less of the mispricing proxy used, we nd that the outperformance of the stocks
with the highest ∆RNS values is mainly driven by those stocks that are perceived
to be the most underpriced. For example, the lowest DOTS tercile within the
highest ∆RNS tercile yields a highly signicant FFC alpha of 21 bps in the post-
ranking week (NW t-stat: 4.82). To the contrary, the highest DOTS tercile within
the highest ∆RNS tercile signicantly underperforms. In fact, for both proxies,
the spread between the most underpriced and the most overpriced stocks within
the highest ∆RNS tercile yields a signicant FFC alpha in the post-ranking week.
To further examine the interaction between ∆RNS and stock underpricing, we
alternatively construct independent double-sorted portfolios. Panel A.2 (B.2) of
Table 1.A8 reports the post-ranking performance of the corresponding portfolios
when DOTS (MISP) is used as a stock mispricing proxy. The reported results
corroborate the argument that the combination of a high ∆RNS value and stock
underpricing strengthens subsequent outperformance. For example, we nd that
the intersection of the stocks with the highest ∆RNS & lowest DOTS values yields
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an FFC alpha of 18 bps (NW t-stat: 4.85) in the post-ranking week. To the
contrary, the portfolio of stocks with the highest ∆RNS & highest DOTS values
yields a highly signicant negative FFC alpha.
1.B.9 ∆RNS and Stock Downside Risk
This Section repeats the analysis of Section IV.B in the main body of the study re-
garding the role of stock downside risk, using ∆RNS instead of RNS. We construct
double-sorted portfolios on the basis of ∆RNS and each of the stock downside
risk proxies (EISP & ESF). We initially construct bivariate conditional portfolios,
where we rstly sort stocks into tercile portfolios according to their ∆RNS values
at market close every Wednesday, and then, within each ∆RNS tercile, we fur-
ther sort stocks into terciles according to their downside risk proxy values. Panel
A.1 (B.1) of Table 1.A9 reports the weekly post-ranking FFC alphas for selected
equally-weighted portfolios when EISP (ESF) is used as a downside risk proxy.
The results reported in Table 1.A9 are in line with the ones presented in the main
body of the study. We nd that the outperformance signalled by a high ∆RNS
value is mainly driven by those stocks that exhibit the most pronounced downside
risk. Within the highest ∆RNS tercile, the portfolio of stocks that are the most
exposed to downside risk according to EISP (ESF) yields an FFC alpha of 14 (10)
bps in the post-ranking week, with a NW t-stat of 3.64 (2.47). To the contrary,
within the highest ∆RNS tercile, the portfolio of stocks characterized by the lowest
exposure to downside risk does not subsequently yield signicant outperformance.
We also construct independent double-sorted portfolios on the basis of ∆RNS and
each of the downside risk proxies. Panel A.2 (B.2) of Table S7 reports the post-
ranking performance of these independent double-sorted portfolios when EISP
(ESF) is used as a downside risk proxy. The conclusions derived from the in-
dependent double-sorted portfolios are very similar to the ones derived from the
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conditional portfolio sorting approach. Regardless of the proxy used, we conrm
that it is the intersection of stocks that exhibit the highest ∆RNS values and
are the most exposed to downside risk which yields the strongest subsequent out-
performance. To the contrary, the intersection of stocks with the highest ∆RNS
values and the least pronounced downside risk does not signicantly outperform.
1.B.10 ∆RNS, Stock Underpricing, and Downside Risk
This Section repeats the analysis of Section IV.C in the main body of the study,
using ∆RNS instead of RNS. To this end, we construct independent triple-sorted
portfolios. In particular, at market close every Wednesday, we independently sort
stocks on the basis of their: i) ∆RNS value, ii) mispricing proxy value, and iii)
downside risk proxy value, and classify them as high or low relative to the corre-
sponding median value. The intersection of these three independent classications
yields 8 portfolios. Table 1.A10 reports their weekly post-ranking FFC alphas.
These results lead to conclusions that are similar to the ones we derived in our
benchmark analysis, lending further support to the proposed trading mechanism.
We nd that the intersection of stocks that exhibit high ∆RNS values, are rel-
atively underpriced, and are more exposed to downside risk (i.e., portfolio P5)
yields the strongest outperformance in the post-ranking week. This pattern is ro-
bust for both mispricing proxies and both downside risk proxies. For example, the
long-only portfolio of stocks with higher than median ∆RNS values, lower than
median DOTS values, and lower than median EISP values yields an FFC alpha
of 18 bps in the post-ranking week, with a NW t-stat of 4.54. To the contrary, if
even one of the conditions laid out by the conjectured trading mechanism is not
met, stock outperformance becomes either weaker or insignicant (see portfolios
P1, P6, and P7).
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1.B.11 Non Synchroneity Bias
This Section examines whether our results are aected by a non-synchronicity bias.
In line with the criticism of Battalio and Schultz (2006), there is the potential
concern that the RNS values that we use to form portfolios at the end of the
trading day may not be available to investors in a timely manner that allows them
to form the portfolios in the equities market. Firstly, the non-synchronicity issue
is not as important for equity options as it is for options written on an index. The
CBOE equity options market closes virtually simultaneously with the underlying
stock market at 4 pm (EST). This is in contrast to the S&P 500 option market,
which closes at 4.15 pm (EST). Furthermore, since March 5, 2008, OptionMetrics
reports the best (or highest) 3:59pm (EST) bid and oer prices across all exchanges
on which the option trades. Hence, after March 5, 2008, the RNS values we use
are available to investors one minute before the close of the equities market.
In the main body of the study, we nd that the outperformance that is signalled
by a relatively high RNS is earned predominantly overnight. To test whether the
change of the data recording time aects this result, we repeat the decomposition of
the rst post-ranking day return for two sub periods. The rst period ranges from
January 1996 to February 2008, and the second period ranges from April 2008 to
June 2014. The second period starts one month after OptionMetrics changed the
data recording time. Table A.11 presents the results. We nd that the overnight
FF4 alpha of the portfolio containing the stocks with the highest RNS values is
highly statistically signicant in both periods. In particular, the performance of
the portfolio containing the stocks with the highest RNS values before March 2008
equals 16 bps (t-stat = 9.93) and after March 2008 equals 5 bps (t-stat = 4.01).
We believe that the lower performance of the portfolio during the second period is
likely due to the electrication of the nancial markets. The rst period coincides
with a period where the United States trading volume due to algorithmic trading
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rises from a point near zero to 73 percent (see Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld,





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: RNS and ΔRNS-sorted Weekly Quintile Portfolio Sorts 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed every 
Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates (Panel A), and the change in their 
RNS (ΔRNS) estimates relative to previous trading day (Panel B). The sample period is January 1996–June 
2014. Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their RNS values 
(Panel A) or their ΔRNS values (Panel B), and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. The corresponding 
equally-weighted portfolio returns are computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-
ranking weekly returns). Ex Ret denotes the average weekly portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate. 
αFFC denotes the weekly portfolio alpha estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. 
Excess returns and alphas are expressed in percentages. Portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect to the market 
(MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC model and its 
adjusted R2 (R2 adj.) are also reported. N denotes the average number of stocks per portfolio. The pre-last 
line in Panel A (Panel B) reports the spread between the portfolio with the highest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks and 
the portfolio with lowest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks. Panel C reports the corresponding results for two bivariate 
stock portfolios, constructed as the intersections of the lowest (highest) RNS and the lowest (highest) ΔRNS 
independently-sorted quintiles. The pre-last line in Panel C reports the spread between these two portfolios. 
t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: RNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest RNS) 0.04 -0.12** 1.08** 0.30** -0.07* -0.04 0.93 134 
(-4.57) 
2 0.11 -0.07* 1.16** 0.38** -0.13** -0.04* 0.94 133 
(-2.45) 
3 0.13 -0.05 1.22** 0.53** -0.18** -0.06** 0.93 133 
(-1.73) 
4 0.21 0.01 1.29** 0.63** -0.23** -0.08** 0.92 133 
(0.47) 
5 (Highest RNS) 0.32* 0.12** 1.35** 0.78** -0.28** -0.14** 0.90 134 
(3.11) 
Spread (5-1) 0.27** 0.24** 0.27** 0.47** -0.20** -0.09 0.39  
t(5-1) (4.34) (5.03) (11.78) (8.73) (-4.05) (-1.93)   
Panel B: ΔRNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
1 (Lowest ΔRNS) 0.03 -0.16** 1.23** 0.55** -0.24** -0.06** 0.92 125 
(-4.50) 
2 0.12 -0.07* 1.21** 0.53** -0.14** -0.06* 0.93 125 
(-2.34) 
3 0.15 -0.03 1.22** 0.50** -0.17** -0.08** 0.93 125 
(-1.18) 
4 0.20 0.01 1.22** 0.50** -0.17** -0.07** 0.93 125 
(0.49) 
5 (Highest ΔRNS) 0.29* 0.10** 1.25** 0.50** -0.22** -0.06* 0.92 125 
(3.15) 
Spread (5-1) 0.26** 0.25** 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01  
t(5-1) (6.60) (6.65) (1.09) (-1.54) (0.72) (0.16)   
         
         
         
         
         




Table 4: (Continued) 
Panel C: Bivariate RNS & ΔRNS Independently-sorted Portfolios 
RNS 1 (Lowest) & 
ΔRNS 1 (Lowest) 
-0.02 -0.19** 1.12** 0.41** -0.13** -0.04 0.85 41 
(-4.41) 
RNS 5 (Highest) 
& 
ΔRNS 5 (Highest) 




0.43** 0.40** 0.23** 0.28** -0.16* -0.05 0.17  




Table 1.5: Bivariate Portfolio Sorts: Risk-Neutral Skewness and Stock Mispricing 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of bivariate stock portfolios constructed 
on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates and each of the two stock mispricing proxies 
used. The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. We use the following two proxies for stock mispricing: 
i) the distance between the actual stock price and the option-implied stock value (DOTS) of Goncalves-Pinto 
et al. (2016) in Panel A, and ii) the composite mispricing rank (MISP) of Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) in Panel 
B. A low (high) value of DOTS or MISP indicates that the stock is relatively underpriced (overpriced). For the 
conditional portfolios (Panels A.1 and B.1), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are sorted in ascending 
order according to their RNS estimates and they are assigned to tercile portfolios. Within each RNS tercile 
portfolio, we further sort stocks according to their Wednesday DOTS values (Panel A.1) or their end-of-month, 
prior to the sorting Wednesday, MISP values (Panel B.1), and construct again tercile portfolios. For the 
independent portfolios (Panels A.2 and B.2), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are independently sorted 
in ascending order according to their RNS estimates and their Wednesday DOTS values (Panel A.2) or their 
end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, MISP values (Panel B.2), and they are assigned to tercile 
portfolios. The intersections of these RNS- and stock mispricing-sorted terciles yield the independent 
portfolios. The average number of stocks per portfolio is reported in square brackets. In both approaches, 
equally-weighted returns of the corresponding portfolios are computed at market close of the following 
Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). We report weekly portfolio alphas (in percentages) estimated 
from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors 
with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: DOTS 



















0.02 -0.29** 0.32**  RNS 1 
(Lowest) 
0.06 -0.23** 0.29** 
(0.82) (-6.48) (6.48)  (1.35) (-6.08) (5.96) 
      [44] [95]  
RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.29** -0.14** 0.43**  RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.23** -0.18** 0.40** 
(5.98) (-3.34) (7.90)  (5.85) (-3.33) (7.14) 
      [106] [47]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.27** 0.15**   Spread  
(3-1) 
0.17** 0.05  
(5.15) (2.61)   (3.22) (0.82)  
Panel B: MISP 




















-0.01 -0.25** 0.24**  RNS 1 
(Lowest) 
-0.01 -0.26** 0.25** 
(-0.50) (-5.85) (5.06)  (-0.50) (-6.03) (5.36) 
      [81] [59]  
RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.15** 0.01 0.14*  RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.15** 0.05 0.10 
(3.94) (0.10) (2.35)  (4.00) (0.93) (1.84) 
      [57] [83]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.16** 0.25**   Spread 
(3-1) 
0.16** 0.31**  








Table 1.6: Bivariate Portfolio Sorts: Risk-Neutral Skewness and Downside Risk 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of bivariate stock portfolios constructed 
on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates and each of the two proxies used for stock 
downside risk. The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. We use the following two proxies for stock 
downside risk: i) the expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISP) of daily stock returns under the physical measure 
of Boyer et al. (2010) in Panel A, and ii) the estimated stock shorting fee (ESF) of Boehme et al. (2006) in 
Panel B. A low (high) value of EISP or ESF indicates that the stock is exposed to greater (lower) downside risk. 
For the conditional portfolios (Panels A.1 and B.1), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are sorted in 
ascending order according to their RNS estimates and they are assigned to tercile portfolios. Within each RNS 
tercile portfolio, we further sort stocks according to their end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, EISP 
(Panel A.1) or ESF values (Panel B.1), and construct again tercile portfolios. For the independent portfolios 
(Panels A.2 and B.2), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are independently sorted in ascending order 
according to their RNS estimates and their end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, EISP (Panel A.2) or 
ESF values (Panel B.2), and they are assigned to tercile portfolios. The intersections of these RNS- and stock 
downside risk-sorted terciles yield the independent portfolios. The average number of stocks per portfolio is 
reported in square brackets. In both approaches, equally-weighted returns of the corresponding portfolios are 
computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). We report weekly 
portfolio alphas (in percentages) estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. t-values 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: EISP 



















0.01 -0.15** 0.16**  RNS 1 
(Lowest) 
-0.00 -0.17** 0.16** 
(0.29) (-4.12) (3.16)  (-0.05) (-4.28) (2.94) 
      [59] [48]  
RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.17** -0.01 0.17**  RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.17** 0.01 0.16** 
(3.77) (-0.15) (3.05)  (3.60) (0.27) (2.92) 
      [51] [68]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.16** 0.15*   Spread  
(3-1) 
0.17** 0.18**  
(3.41) (2.43)   (3.48) (3.08)  
Panel B: ESF 




















-0.02 -0.19** 0.17**  RNS 1 
(Lowest) 
-0.02 -0.22** 0.20** 
(-0.71) (-4.35) (4.03)  (-0.67) (-4.57) (4.35) 
      [73] [48]  
RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.11* -0.05 0.16**  RNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.10* -0.02 0.12* 
(2.35) (-0.89) (2.92)  (2.17) (-0.36) (2.30) 
      [58] [64]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.13** 0.14**   Spread 
(3-1) 
0.12** 0.20**  





Table 1.7: Trivariate Independent Portfolio Sorts: RNS, Stock Mispricing and 
Downside Risk 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of trivariate stock portfolios 
constructed on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates, each of the two proxies used for 
stock mispricing, and each of the two proxies used for stock downside risk. The sample period is January 
1996–June 2014. We use the following two proxies for stock mispricing: i) the distance between the actual 
stock price and the option-implied stock value (DOTS) of Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016), and ii) the 
composite mispricing rank (MISP) of Stambaugh and Yuan (2016). A low (high) value of DOTS or MISP 
indicates that the stock is relatively underpriced (overpriced). We use the following two proxies for stock 
downside risk: i) the expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISP) of daily stock returns under the physical 
measure of Boyer et al. (2010), and ii) the estimated stock shorting fee (ESF) of Boehme et al. (2006). A 
low (high) value of EISP or ESF indicates that the stock is exposed to greater (lower) downside risk. Every 
Wednesday, at market close, stocks are independently sorted in ascending order according to: 1) their RNS 
estimates, 2) their Wednesday DOTS values or their end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, MISP 
values, and 3) their end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, EISP or ESF values, and they are 
classified for each sorting criterion as Low (L) or High (H) relative to the corresponding median value. The 
intersections of these three classifications yield 8 portfolios. The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio 
returns are computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). We 
report weekly portfolio alphas (in percentages) estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor 
model. The average number of stocks per portfolio is reported in square brackets. t-values calculated using 
Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
 Stock Mispricing Proxy  DOTS  MISP 
 Downside Risk Proxy  EISP ESF  EISP ESF 
P1 
RNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














RNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














RNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 














RNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 














RNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














RNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














RNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 














RNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 

















Table 1.8: Bivariate Portfolio Sorts: Risk-Neutral Skewness and Option Liquidity 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of bivariate stock portfolios 
constructed on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates and each of the two proxies used 
for option liquidity. The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. We use the following two proxies for 
option liquidity: i) the average relative bid-ask spread (RSPREAD) of the OTM options used to compute 
these RNS estimates in Panel A, and ii) the average daily option-to-stock trading volume ratio (O/S) over 
the previous 12 months in Panel B. A high value of RSPREAD indicates that the OTM options are illiquid. 
A low value of O/S indicates that the options are illiquid relative to the underlying stock. For the conditional 
portfolios (Panels A.1 and B.1), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are sorted in ascending order 
according to their RNS estimates and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. Within each RNS quintile 
portfolio, we further sort stocks according to their Wednesday RSPREAD values (Panel A.1) or their end-
of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, O/S values (Panel B.1), and classify them into two portfolios: i) 
Low, if the RSPREAD (O/S) value is below the 80th (20th) percentile of the corresponding cross-sectional 
distribution, or ii) High, if the RSPREAD (O/S) value is above the 80th (20th) percentile. Results are reported 
only for the portfolios within the lowest and the highest RNS quintiles. For the independent portfolios 
(Panels A.2 and B.2), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are independently sorted into quintile 
portfolios according to their RNS estimates, and into two portfolios according to their Wednesday 
RSPREAD values (Panel A.2) or their end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, O/S values (Panel 
B.2): i) Low, if the RSPREAD (O/S) value is below the 80th (20th) percentile of the corresponding cross-
sectional distribution, or ii) High, if the RSPREAD (O/S) value is above the 80 th (20th) percentile. The 
intersections of these RNS- and option liquidity-sorted portfolios yield the independent portfolios. Results 
are reported only for the intersections that involve the lowest and the highest RNS quintiles. The average 
number of stocks per portfolio is reported in square brackets. In both approaches, equally-weighted returns 
of the corresponding portfolios are computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking 
weekly returns). We report weekly portfolio alphas (in percentages) estimated from the Fama-French-
Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are 
provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: RSPREAD 














-0.12** -0.14** 0.02  RNS 1 
(Lowest) 
-0.12** -0.16** 0.04 
(-4.37) (-2.90) (0.51)  (-4.26) (-3.17) (0.83) 
      [102] [32]  
RNS 5 
(Highest) 
0.14** 0.03 0.11  RNS 5 
(Highest) 
0.14** 0.05 0.10 
(3.45) (0.41) (1.59)  (3.45) (0.76) (1.35) 
      [103] [31]  
Spread  
(5-1) 
0.26** 0.17*   Spread  
(5-1) 
0.26** 0.21**  
(5.06) (2.21)   (5.05) (2.73)  
Panel B: O/S 













-0.13** -0.09* -0.04  RNS 1 
(Lowest) 
-0.14** -0.08 -0.06 
(-4.50) (-2.08) (-0.85)  (-4.77) (-1.83) (-1.27) 
      [100] [25]  
RNS 5 
(Highest) 
0.12** 0.02 0.10  RNS 5 
(Highest) 
0.13** 0.01 0.12 
(2.84) (0.45) (1.64)  (2.98) (0.14) (1.90) 
      [102] [24]  
Spread  
(5-1) 
0.25** 0.12   Spread 
(5-1) 
0.27** 0.09  




Table 1.9: RNS and ΔRNS-sorted Portfolios: Decomposing Weekly Returns 
This Table reports a decomposition of the weekly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios 
constructed every Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates (Panel A), or 
the change in their RNS (ΔRNS) estimates relative to previous trading day (Panel B). The sample period is 
January 1996–June 2014. Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according 
to their RNS values (Panel A) or their ΔRNS values (Panel B), and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. 
We compute: i) equally-weighted portfolio returns at market close of the first post-ranking trading day, and 
ii) equally-weighted portfolio returns at market close of the following Wednesday skipping the first post-
ranking trading day. Ex Ret denotes the average portfolio return for the corresponding holding period in 
excess of the risk-free rate. αFFC denotes the portfolio alpha for the corresponding holding period estimated 
from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. Excess returns and alphas are expressed in 
percentages. The pre-last line in Panel A (Panel B) shows the spread between the portfolio with the highest 
RNS (ΔRNS) stocks and the portfolio with lowest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks. t-values calculated using Newey-
West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: RNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
 
First Post-Ranking Trading 
Day  
  
Skip First Post-Ranking 
Trading Day 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶   Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  
1 (Lowest 
RNS) 




2 0.03 -0.04**  2 0.08 -0.02 
(-0.92) (-3.31) 
3 0.06 -0.02  3 0.08 -0.03 
(-1.15) (-1.40) 








Spread (5-1) 0.18** 0.14**  Spread (5-1) 0.10 0.10* 
t(5-1) (5.81) (5.86)  t(5-1) (1.85) (2.43) 
Panel B: ΔRNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
 
First Post-Ranking Trading 
Day 
  
Skip First Post-Ranking 
Trading Day 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶   Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  
1 (Lowest 
ΔRNS) 




2 0.04 -0.04**  2 0.08 -0.03 
(-1.14) (-2.67) 
3 0.07 -0.01  3 0.08 -0.02 
(-0.85) (-0.49) 








Spread (5-1) 0.17** 0.17**  Spread (5-1) 0.09** 0.09** 








Table 1.10: RNS and ΔRNS-sorted Portfolios: Decomposing First Post-Ranking 
Day Returns 
This Table reports a decomposition of the first post-ranking trading day performance of quintile stock 
portfolios constructed every Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates 
(Panel A), or the change in their RNS (ΔRNS) estimates relative to previous trading day (Panel B). The 
sample period is January 1996–June 2014. Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in 
ascending order according to their RNS values (Panel A) or their ΔRNS values (Panel B), and they are 
assigned to quintile equally-weighted portfolios. We compute: i) overnight portfolio returns from the 
market close of the ranking day (Wednesday) to the market open of the first post-ranking trading day, and 
ii) intraday portfolio returns from the market open to the market close of the first post-ranking trading day. 
Ex Ret denotes the average portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate. The risk-free rate is deducted 
only from the overnight portfolio return. αFFC denotes the portfolio alpha estimated from the Fama-French-
Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model, using the corresponding overnight and intraday factor returns. Returns and 
alphas are expressed in percentages. The pre-last line in Panel A (Panel B) shows the spread between the 
portfolio with the highest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks and the portfolio with lowest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks. t-values 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: RNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
 Overnight Performance   Intraday Performance 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶   Quintiles Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  
1 (Lowest RNS) -0.02 -0.05**  1 (Lowest RNS) 0.03 -0.01 
(-0.58) (-6.59) 
2 0.00 -0.03**  2 0.03 -0.01 
(-1.07) (-3.94) 
3 0.03 -0.00  3 0.03 -0.02 
(-1.36) (-0.52) 
4 0.08** 0.05**  4 0.04 -0.02 
(-1.01) (5.01) 
5 (Highest RNS) 0.18** 0.13**  5 (Highest RNS) 0.01 -0.05** 
(-2.64) (9.69) 
Spread (5-1) 0.20** 0.18**  Spread (5-1) -0.02 -0.04* 
t(5-1) (10.67) (10.94)  t(5-1) (-0.86) (-2.01) 
Panel B: ΔRNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
 Overnight Performance   Intraday Performance 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶   Quintiles Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  
1 (Lowest ΔRNS) -0.01 -0.05**  1 (Lowest ΔRNS) 0.02 -0.03* 
(-2.15) (-4.56) 
2 0.02 -0.01  2 0.02 -0.03* 
(-2.32) (-1.28) 
3 0.05 0.01  3 0.03 -0.02 
(-1.63) (1.94) 
4 0.07** 0.04**  4 0.03 -0.01 
(-1.03) (5.12) 
5 (Highest ΔRNS) 0.13** 0.10**  5 (Highest ΔRNS) 0.04 -0.01 
(-0.69) (8.30) 
Spread (5-1) 0.14** 0.15**  Spread (5-1) 0.02 0.02 






Table 1.11: Bivariate Conditional Portfolio Sorts: Return Reversals and Risk-
Neutral Skewness 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of bivariate stock portfolios 
constructed on the basis of their cumulative returns up to the sorting day and their Risk-Neutral Skewness 
(RNS) estimates. The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks 
are sorted in ascending order according to their: i) Wednesday return (RET(1)) in Panel A, ii) cumulative 
3-day return up to Wednesday (RET(3)) in Panel B, and iii) cumulative 5-day return up to Wednesday 
(RET(5)) in Panel C, and they are assigned to tercile portfolios. Within each cumulative stock return tercile 
portfolio, we further sort stocks according to their RNS estimates, and construct quintile portfolios. The 
corresponding equally-weighted portfolio returns are computed at market close of the following Wednesday 
(i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). Weekly portfolio alphas (in percentages) are estimated from the Fama-
French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. Mean RET(1), Mean RET(3), and Mean RET(5) denote the average 
RET(1), RET(3), and RET(5) values, respectively, for the stocks in each cumulative stock return tercile 
portfolio. Alphas are reported for each cumulative stock return tercile across all RNS quintiles as well as 
for the lowest and the highest RNS quintiles within each cumulative stock return tercile. t-values calculated 
using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 












RET(1) Low -0.02** 0.02 -0.16** 0.26** 0.42** 
  (0.72) (-3.77) (4.37) (6.25) 
RET(1) Medium 0.00 -0.02 -0.11** 0.04 0.15** 
  (-1.13) (-3.53) (0.98) (2.92) 
RET(1) High 0.03** -0.06 -0.11** 0.04 0.16* 




0.09 -0.05 0.21**  
  (1.79) (-0.91) (2.68)  












RET(3) Low -0.04** 0.09* -0.07 0.30** 0.37** 
  (2.34) (-1.44) (4.41) (5.03) 
RET(3) Medium 0.00 0.00 -0.09** 0.07 0.16** 
  (0.11) (-2.90) (1.58) (3.14) 
RET(3) High 0.05** -0.16** -0.22** -0.07 0.15* 




0.25** 0.15* 0.37**  
  (4.23) (2.32) (4.19)  
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      




Table 1.11: (Continued) 












RET(5) Low -0.05** 0.10* -0.10 0.34** 0.45** 
  (2.36) (-1.95) (5.54) (6.21) 
RET(5) Medium 0.00* 0.01 -0.07* 0.13** 0.19** 
  (0.28) (-2.55) (2.61) (3.41) 
RET(5) High 0.06** -0.16** -0.21** -0.10 0.11 




0.26** 0.11 0.44**  






Table 1.12: Risk-Neutral Skewness and Option Trading Activity 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking performance of portfolios constructed on the basis of their Risk-
Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates and their ratio of the International Securities Exchange (ISE) open buy 
out-of-the-money call option’s volume to total ISE OTM option’s volume (OBC/T). The sample period is 
May 2005 – June 2014, excluding the last quarter of 2008 covering the short-sale ban during the financial 
crisis. In Panel A, every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted into three portfolios according to 
their OBC/T values: i) Low, if the OBC/T value is below the 40th percentile, ii) Medium, if the OBC/T 
value is between the 40th and 60th, and iii) High, if the OBC/T value is above the 60th percentile of the 
corresponding cross-sectional distribution. In Panel B, stocks are assigned to the intersections of the 
aforementioned OBC/T portfolios and RNS tercile portfolios. Results are reported only for the 
lowest/highest and the intersections involving the lowest/highest RNS- and OBC/T-sorted portfolios. For 
each portfolio, the corresponding equally-weighted portfolio returns are computed at market close of the 
following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). (OBC/T̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) denotes the average OBC/T value of 
the stocks in the corresponding portfolio. Ex Ret denotes the average weekly portfolio return in excess of 
the risk-free rate during the examined period. αFFC denotes the weekly portfolio alpha estimated from the 
Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. Excess returns and alphas are expressed in percentages. We 
also report portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and 
momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC model as well as its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.). N denotes 
the average number of stocks in each portfolio. The pre-last line in Panels A shows the spread between the 
portfolio with the highest OBC/T stocks and the portfolio with lowest OBC/T stocks. t-values calculated 
using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: OBC/T-sorted portfolios 
Quintiles OBC/T̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
OBC/T 1 
(Lowest) 




97% 0.29* 0.08* 1.25** 0.38** -0.09 -0.04 0.83 161 
(2.17) 
Spread (3-1)  0.14** 0.13** 0.08** 0.02 -0.11 0.02 0.25  
t(3-1)  (4.11) (3.85) (2.79) (0.42) (-1.89) (0.63)   
 Panel B: Bivariate Independent RNS and OBC/T sorts 
Portfolio OBC/T̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
RNS 1 – OBC/T 1 15% 0.13 -0.14** 1.07** 0.30** -0.03 -0.08** 0.91 62 
   (-3.55) (-3.55)      
RNS 1 – OBC/T 2 67% 0.18 -0.08 1.06** 0.18** -0.11 -0.04 0.81 24 
   (-1.69)       
RNS 1 – OBC/T 3 97% 0.24 -0.02 1.04** 0.30** -0.11** -0.03 0.92 47 
   (-0.55)       
RNS 3 – OBC/T 1 19% 0.38** 0.06 1.24** 0.42** 0.24** -0.01 0.85 44 
   (0.86)       
RNS 3 – OBC/T 2 69% 0.39** 0.05 1.39** 0.29** -0.06 0.05 0.77 30 
   (0.59)       
RNS 3 – OBC/T 3 97% 0.50** 0.16** 1.39** 0.52** -0.00 0.03 0.84 59 





Table 1.A1: RNS and ΔRNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios: Five-factor Alphas 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of quintile stock portfolios 
constructed every Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates (Panel A), or 
the change in their RNS (ΔRNS) estimates relative to previous trading day (Panel B). The sample period is 
January 1996–June 2014. Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according 
to their RNS values (Panel A) or their ΔRNS values (Panel B), and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. 
The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio returns are computed at market close of the following 
Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). αFF5 denotes the weekly portfolio alpha estimated from the 
Fama-French 5-factor (FF5) model. Alphas are expressed in percentages. We also report portfolio loadings 
(𝛽’s) with respect to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW) and investment 
(CMA) factors estimated from the FF5 model as well as its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.). The pre-last line in Panel 
A (Panel B) shows the spread between the portfolio with the highest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks and the portfolio 
with lowest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks. Panel C reports the corresponding results for two bivariate stock 
portfolios, constructed as the intersections of the lowest (highest) RNS and the lowest (highest) ΔRNS 
independently-sorted quintiles. The pre-last line in Panel C reports the spread between these two portfolios. 
t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: RNS-sorted quintile portfolios 
Quintiles 𝛼𝐹𝐹5 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊  𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴 R
2 adj. 
RNS 1 -0.12** 1.07** 0.29** -0.01 -0.05 -0.11* 0.93 
(-4.34)  
2 -0.06* 1.15** 0.36** -0.04 -0.05 -0.16** 0.94 
(-2.22)  
3 -0.02 1.17** 0.47** -0.03 -0.18** -0.26** 0.93 
(-0.78)  
4 0.05 1.23** 0.55** -0.03 -0.24** -0.31** 0.93 
(1.61)  
RNS 5 0.18** 1.25** 0.63** 0.01 -0.46** -0.41** 0.92 
(4.93)  
Spread (5-1) 0.29** 0.18** 0.34** 0.02 -0.42** -0.30** 0.45 
t(5-1) (6.29) (7.30) (7.24) (0.21) (-4.72) (-3.25)  
 Panel B: ΔRNS-sorted quintile portfolios 
ΔRNS 1 -0.12** 1.17** 0.48** -0.07* -0.22** -0.27** 0.93 
(-3.66)  
2 -0.04 1.17** 0.46** -0.01 -0.20** -0.21** 0.94 
(-1.52)  
3 -0.01 1.17** 0.44** -0.01 -0.19** -0.26** 0.94 
(-0.24)  
4 0.04 1.16** 0.43** -0.01 -0.22** -0.25** 0.93 
(1.73)  
ΔRNS 5 0.14** 1.18** 0.43** -0.03 -0.24** -0.30** 0.93 
(4.54)  
Spread (5-1) 0.26** 0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 
t(5-1) (6.72) (0.58) (-1.57) (1.19) (-0.43) (-0.74)  
Panel C: Bivariate RNS & ΔRNS Independently-sorted Portfolios 
RNS 1 (Lowest) & 
ΔRNS 1 (Lowest) 
-0.18** 
(-4.06) 
1.09** 0.38** -0.05 -0.09 -0.15 0.86 
 
RNS 5 (Highest) & 
ΔRNS 5 (Highest) 
0.27** 
(5.21) 
1.25** 0.56** -0.05 -0.39** -0.38** 0.86 
 
Spread (5&5- 1&1) 0.45** 0.15** 0.18** -0.00 -0.30** -0.24* 0.20 




Table 1.A2: RNS and ΔRNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios: Friday Sorts 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed every Friday 
on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates (Panel A), or the change in their RNS (ΔRNS) 
estimates relative to previous trading day (Panel B). The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. Every 
Friday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their RNS values (Panel A) or their 
ΔRNS values (Panel B), and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. The corresponding equally-weighted 
portfolio returns are computed at market close of the following Friday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). Ex 
Ret denotes the average weekly portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate during the examined period. 
αFFC denotes the weekly portfolio alpha estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. 
Excess returns and alphas are expressed in percentages. We also report portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect 
to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC 
model as well as its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.). N denotes the average number of stocks in each portfolio. The pre-
last line in Panel A (Panel B) shows the spread between the portfolio with the highest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks 
and the portfolio with lowest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks. t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors 
with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: RNS-sorted quintile portfolios 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest RNS) -0.00 -0.17** 1.07** 0.29** -0.06 -0.03 0.92 133 
(-5.84) 
2 0.13 -0.05* 1.14** 0.39** -0.09** -0.05* 0.94 133 
(-1.98) 
3 0.14 -0.05 1.20** 0.57** -0.14** -0.06* 0.93 133 
(-1.95) 
4 0.21 0.01 1.25** 0.68** -0.18** -0.08** 0.92 133 
(0.42) 
5 (Highest RNS) 0.33* 0.13** 1.34** 0.81** -0.27** -0.18** 0.90 133 
(3.46) 
Spread (5-1) 0.33** 0.30** 0.27** 0.52** -0.20** -0.15** 0.41  
t(5-1) (5.18) (5.94) (8.27) (9.39) (-3.40) (-3.11)   
Panel B: ΔRNS-sorted quintile portfolios 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest ΔRNS) -0.01 -0.19** 1.21** 0.55** -0.24** -0.07** 0.92 125 
(-5.37) 
2 0.08 -0.10** 1.18** 0.58** -0.15** -0.09** 0.93 124 
(-3.71) 
3 0.19 0.01 1.20** 0.51** -0.11** -0.08** 0.93 124 
(0.18) 
4 0.25* 0.07* 1.20** 0.52** -0.12** -0.07** 0.93 124 
(2.23) 
5 (Highest ΔRNS) 0.28* 0.10** 1.21** 0.52** -0.19** -0.10** 0.92 124 
(2.99) 
Spread (5-1) 0.28** 0.28** 0.00 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.01  








Table 1.A3: RNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios: OTM Options with Positive Trading 
Volume 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed every 
Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates, excluding those estimates 
derived from OTM options with zero total trading volume. The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. 
Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their RNS values 
and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio returns are 
computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). Ex Ret denotes 
the average weekly portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate during the examined period. αFFC 
denotes the weekly portfolio alpha estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. 
Excess returns and alphas are expressed in percentages. We also report portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with 
respect to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM) factors estimated from 
the FFC model as well as its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.). N denotes the average number of stocks in each 
portfolio. The pre-last line shows the spread between the portfolio with the highest RNS stocks and the 
portfolio with lowest RNS stocks. t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are 
provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest 
RNS) 
0.03 -0.13** 1.09** 0.29** -0.12** -0.04 0.92 109 
(-4.63) 
2 0.12 -0.06* 1.19** 0.35** -0.19** -0.04 0.93 109 
(-2.09) 
3 0.13 -0.05 1.25** 0.50** -0.23** -0.05* 0.92 109 
(-1.70) 




0.33* 0.13** 1.38** 0.75** -0.37** -0.16** 0.88 109 
(3.03) 
Spread (5-1) 0.30** 0.26** 0.29** 0.46** -0.24** -0.12* 0.36  




Table 1.Α4: Short Horizon RNS-sorted Weekly Quintile Portfolio Sorts 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed every 
Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates (Panel A). The sample ranges 
from January 1996 to June 2014 and contains only stocks whose RNS horizon is less or equal to 95 days. 
Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their RNS values 
and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio returns are 
computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). Ex Ret denotes 
the average weekly portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate. αFFC denotes the weekly portfolio alpha 
estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. Excess returns and alphas are expressed 
in percentages. Portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and 
momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC model and its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.) are also reported. 
N denotes the average number of stocks per portfolio. The pre-last line reports the spread between the 
portfolio with the highest RNS stocks and the portfolio with lowest RNS stocks. t-values calculated using 
Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest RNS) -0.01 -0.18** 1.18** 0.42* -0.15* -0.04 0.88 71 
(-4.58) 
2 0.11 -0.07 1.26** 0.41** -0.26** -0.03 0.90 70 
(-1.73) 
3 0.14 -0.04 1.29** 0.52** -0.31** -0.04 0.89 70 
(-1.24) 
4 0.21 0.02 1.37** 0.61** -0.36** -0.04 0.98 70 
(0.41) 
5 (Highest RNS) 0.30* 0.10* 1.38** 0.68** -0.41** -0.05 0.85 71 
(2.27) 
Spread (5-1) 0.27** 0.29** 0.20** 0.27** -0.26** -0.01 0.16  













Table 1.A5: Non-Parametric RNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed every 
Wednesday on the basis of their Non-Parametric Risk-Neutral Skewness (NPRNS) estimates. NPRNS is 
defined as the difference between the 30-day implied volatilities of OTM calls (deltas=0.20 and 0.25) and 
OTM puts (deltas=−0.20 and −0.25). The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. Every Wednesday, at 
market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their NPRNS values and they are assigned to 
quintile portfolios. The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio returns are computed at market close of the 
following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). Ex Ret denotes the average weekly portfolio return 
in excess of the risk-free rate during the examined period. αFFC denotes the weekly portfolio alpha estimated 
from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. Excess returns and alphas are expressed in percentages. 
We also report portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and 
momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC model as well as its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.). N denotes the 
average number of stocks in each portfolio. The pre-last line shows the spread between the portfolio with the 
highest NPRNS stocks and the portfolio with lowest NPRNS stocks. t-values calculated using Newey-West 
standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
and 5% level, respectively. 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest NPRNS) -0.02 -0.20** 1.42** 0.76** -0.26** -0.32** 0.90 134 
(-4.37) 
2 0.14 -0.04 1.29** 0.49** -0.20** -0.11** 0.93 133 
(-1.31) 
3 0.20* 0.01 1.17** 0.40** -0.10** -0.01 0.94 133 
(0.40) 
4 0.21* 0.04 1.08** 0.39** -0.11** 0.04 0.94 133 
(1.88) 
5 (Highest NPRNS) 0.27* 0.09** 1.13** 0.57** -0.21** 0.04 0.90 134 
(2.64) 
Spread (5-1) 0.29** 0.29** -0.29** -0.19** 0.05 0.36** 0.44  
















Table 1.Α6: Value Weighted RNS-sorted Weekly Quintile Portfolio Sorts 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed every 
Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates (Panel A). The sample ranges 
from January 1996 to June 2014 and contains only stocks whose RNS horizon is less or equal to 95 days. 
Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their RNS values 
and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. The corresponding value-weighted portfolio returns are 
computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). Ex Ret denotes 
the average weekly portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate. αFFC denotes the weekly portfolio alpha 
estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. Excess returns and alphas are expressed 
in percentages. Portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and 
momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC model and its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.) are also reported. 
N denotes the average number of stocks per portfolio. The pre-last line reports the spread between the 
portfolio with the highest RNS stocks and the portfolio with lowest RNS stocks. t-values calculated using 
Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest RNS) 0.08 -0.09** 1.07** 0.25** -0.15** 0.05 0.92 134 
(-3.26) 
2 0.16 -0.02 1.14** 0.30** -0.16** 0.07** 0.94 133 
(-0.63) 
3 0.18 -0.01 1.20** 0.44** -0.22** 0.06** 0.93 133 
(-0.51) 
4 0.26* 0.06 1.26** 0.52** -0.25** 0.07** 0.91 133 
(1.83) 
5 (Highest RNS) 0.34** 0.13** 1.28** 0.66** -0.26** 0.04 0.89 134 
(3.68) 
Spread (5-1) 0.26** 0.22** 0.22** 0.41** -0.11** -0.01 0.16  





Table 1.A7: RNS and ΔRNS-sorted Daily Quintile Portfolio Sorts 
This Table reports the daily post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed on the basis of 
their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates (Panel A), and the change in their RNS (ΔRNS) estimates 
relative to previous trading day (Panel B). The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. Each trading day, 
at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their RNS values (Panel A) or their ΔRNS 
values (Panel B), and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio 
returns are computed at market close of the following trading day (i.e., post-ranking daily returns). Ex Ret 
denotes the average daily portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate. αFFC denotes the daily portfolio alpha 
estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. Excess returns and alphas are expressed in 
percentages. Portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect to the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and 
momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC model and its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.) are also reported. N 
denotes the average number of stocks per portfolio. The pre-last line in Panel A (Panel B) reports the spread 
between the portfolio with the highest RNS (ΔRNS) stocks and the portfolio with lowest RNS (ΔRNS) 
stocks. Panel C reports the corresponding results for two bivariate stock portfolios, constructed as the 
intersections of the lowest (highest) RNS and the lowest (highest) ΔRNS independently-sorted quintiles. The 
pre-last line in Panel C reports the spread between these two portfolios. t-values calculated using Newey-
West standard errors with 9 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: RNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 R
2 adj. N 
1 (Lowest 
RNS) 
-0.04 -0.07** 1.04** 0.28** -0.05* -0.05** 0.93 134 
(-11.96) 
2 -0.01 -0.04** 1.11** 0.40** -0.12** -0.05** 0.94 133 
(-7.38) 
3 0.01 -0.03** 1.18** 0.54** -0.19** -0.06** 0.93 133 
(-4.23) 








0.18** 0.17** 0.27** 0.49** -0.23** -0.07* 0.36  
t(5-1) (12.18) (14.00) (15.93) (12.97) (-6.50) (-2.18)   
Panel B: ΔRNS-sorted Quintile Portfolios 
1 (Lowest 
ΔRNS) 
-0.06* -0.10** 1.18** 0.54** -0.22** -0.08** 0.92 125 
(-13.73) 
2 -0.01 -0.05** 1.17** 0.52** -0.16** -0.06** 0.93 124 
(-7.04) 
3 0.03 -0.01 1.17** 0.51** -0.16** -0.06** 0.93 124 
(-1.04) 








0.19** 0.19** 0.04** -0.05* -0.02 0.01 0.01  







Table 1.A5: (Continued) 
Panel C: Bivariate RNS & ΔRNS Independently-sorted Portfolios 
RNS 1 & 
ΔRNS 1 
-0.09** -0.13** 1.07** 0.35** -0.10** -0.06** 0.85 42 
(-14.31) 
RNS 5 & 
ΔRNS 5 




0.31** 0.31** 0.24** 0.31** -0.22** -0.03 0.16  
t(5&5- 
1&1) 




Table 1.A8: Bivariate Portfolio Sorts: ΔRNS and Stock Mispricing 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of bivariate stock portfolios 
constructed on the basis of the change in their Risk-Neutral Skewness (ΔRNS) estimates relative to the 
previous trading day and each of the two stock mispricing proxies used. The sample period is January 
1996–June 2014. We use the following two proxies for stock mispricing: i) the distance between the 
actual stock price and the option-implied stock value (DOTS) of Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016) in Panel A, 
and ii) the composite mispricing rank (MISP) of Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) in Panel B. A low (high) 
value of DOTS or MISP indicates that the stock is relatively underpriced (overpriced). For the conditional 
portfolios (Panels A.1 and B.1), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are sorted in ascending order 
according to their ΔRNS estimates and they are assigned to tercile portfolios. Within each ΔRNS tercile 
portfolio, we further sort stocks according to their Wednesday DOTS values (Panel A.1) or their end-of-
month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, MISP values (Panel B.1), and construct again tercile portfolios. 
For the independent portfolios (Panels A.2 and B.2), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are 
independently sorted in ascending order according to their ΔRNS estimates and their Wednesday DOTS 
values (Panel A.2) or their end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, MISP values (Panel B.2), and 
they are assigned to tercile portfolios. The intersections of these ΔRNS- and stock mispricing-sorted 
terciles yield the independent portfolios. The average number of stocks per portfolio is reported in square 
brackets. In both approaches, equally-weighted returns of the corresponding portfolios are computed at 
market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). We report weekly portfolio 
alphas (in percentages) estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. t-values 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: DOTS 



















0.03 -0.34** 0.36**  ΔRNS 1 
(Lowest) 
0.04 -0.27** 0.31** 
(0.75) (-6.97) (7.11)  (0.83) (-6.65) (6.06) 
      [40] [94]  
ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.21** -0.13** 0.34**  ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.18** -0.20** 0.37** 
(4.82) (-3.47) (6.73)  (4.85) (-4.05) (6.84) 
      [98] [44]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.19** 0.21**   Spread  
(3-1) 
0.14** 0.07  
(3.93) (4.43)   (2.85) (1.43)  
Panel B: MISP 




















-0.04 -0.24** 0.20**  ΔRNS 1 
(Lowest) 
-0.05 -0.24** 0.19** 
(-1.13) (-4.91) (3.45)  (-1.34) (-4.98) (3.36) 
      [64] [65]  
ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.13** -0.00 0.13*  ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.13** -0.01 0.14* 
(3.89) (-0.10) (2.23)  (4.20) (-0.12) (2.37) 
      [64] [65]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.17** 0.24**   Spread 
(3-1) 
0.18** 0.23**  








Table 1.A9: Bivariate Portfolio Sorts: ΔRNS and Downside Risk 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of bivariate stock portfolios 
constructed on the basis of the change in their Risk-Neutral Skewness (ΔRNS) estimates relative to the 
previous trading day and each of the two proxies used for stock downside risk. The sample period is 
January 1996–June 2014. We use the following two proxies for stock downside risk: i) the expected 
idiosyncratic skewness (EISP) of daily stock returns under the physical measure of Boyer et al. (2010) in 
Panel A, and ii) the estimated stock shorting fee (ESF) of Boehme et al. (2006) in Panel B. A low (high) 
value of EISP or ESF indicates that the stock is exposed to greater (lower) downside risk. For the 
conditional portfolios (Panels A.1 and B.1), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are sorted in 
ascending order according to their ΔRNS estimates and they are assigned to tercile portfolios. Within 
each ΔRNS tercile portfolio, we further sort stocks according to their end-of-month, prior to the sorting 
Wednesday, EISP (Panel A.1) or ESF values (Panel B.1), and construct again tercile portfolios. For the 
independent portfolios (Panels A.2 and B.2), at market close every Wednesday, stocks are independently 
sorted in ascending order according to their ΔRNS estimates and their end-of-month, prior to the sorting 
Wednesday, EISP (Panel A.2) or ESF values (Panel B.2), and they are assigned to tercile portfolios. The 
intersections of these ΔRNS- and stock downside risk-sorted terciles yield the independent portfolios. The 
average number of stocks per portfolio is reported in square brackets. In both approaches, equally-
weighted returns of the corresponding portfolios are computed at market close of the following 
Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). We report weekly portfolio alphas (in percentages) 
estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. t-values calculated using Newey-West 
standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: EISP 



















-0.01 -0.20** 0.19**  ΔRNS 1 
(Lowest) 
0.00 -0.20** 0.21** 
(-0.19) (-4.18) (3.32)  (0.11) (-4.35) (3.58) 
      [53] [54]  
ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.14** 0.05 0.10  ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.15** 0.06 0.10 
(3.64) (1.18) (1.74)  (3.79) (1.40) (1.74) 
      [52] [54]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.15** 0.25**   Spread  
(3-1) 
0.15** 0.26**  
(3.70) (4.74)   (3.46) (4.88)  
Panel B: ESF 




















0.01 -0.21** 0.21**  ΔRNS 1 
(Lowest) 
-0.00 -0.22** 0.21** 
(0.17) (-3.77) (4.08)  (-0.10) (-4.09) (4.21) 
      [62] [52]  
ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.10* 0.01 0.08  ΔRNS 3 
(Highest) 
0.09* -0.01 0.11* 
(2.47) (0.26) (1.66)  (2.40) (-0.28) (2.19) 
      [62] [52]  
Spread  
(3-1) 
0.09** 0.22**   Spread 
(3-1) 
0.10** 0.21**  








Table 1.A10: Trivariate Independent Portfolio Sorts: ΔRNS, Stock Mispricing and 
Downside Risk 
This Table reports the weekly post-ranking risk-adjusted performance of trivariate stock portfolios 
constructed on the basis of the change in their Risk-Neutral Skewness (ΔRNS) estimates relative to the 
previous trading day, each of the two proxies used for stock mispricing, and each of the two proxies used 
for stock downside risk. The sample period is January 1996–June 2014. We use the following two proxies 
for stock mispricing: i) the distance between the actual stock price and the option-implied stock value 
(DOTS) of Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2016), and ii) the composite mispricing rank (MISP) of Stambaugh 
and Yuan (2016). A low (high) value of DOTS or MISP indicates that the stock is relatively underpriced 
(overpriced). We use the following two proxies for stock downside risk: i) the expected idiosyncratic 
skewness (EISP) of daily stock returns under the physical measure of Boyer et al. (2010), and ii) the 
estimated stock shorting fee (ESF) of Boehme et al. (2006). A low (high) value of EISP or ESF indicates 
that the stock is exposed to greater (lower) downside risk. Every Wednesday, at market close, stocks are 
independently sorted in ascending order according to: 1) their ΔRNS estimates, 2) their Wednesday 
DOTS values or their end-of-month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, MISP values, and 3) their end-of-
month, prior to the sorting Wednesday, EISP or ESF values, and they are classified for each sorting 
criterion as Low (L) or High (H) relative to the corresponding median value. The intersections of these 
three classifications yield 8 portfolios. The corresponding equally-weighted portfolio returns are 
computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking weekly returns). We report 
weekly portfolio alphas (in percentages) estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. 
The average number of stocks per portfolio is reported in square brackets. t-values calculated using 
Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
 Stock Mispricing Proxy  DOTS  MISP 
 Downside Risk Proxy  EISP ESF  EISP ESF 
P1 
ΔRNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














ΔRNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














ΔRNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 














ΔRNS Low & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 














ΔRNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














ΔRNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP Low & 














ΔRNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 














ΔRNS High & 
DOTS/ MISP High & 



















Table 1.A11: RNS-sorted Portfolios: Decomposing First Post-Ranking Day 
Returns in Subperiods 
This Table reports a decomposition of the first post-ranking trading day performance of quintile stock 
portfolios constructed every Wednesday on the basis of their Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) estimates for 
the sample period January 1996-February 2008 (Panel A) and April 2008-June 2014 (Panel B). Every 
Wednesday, at market close, stocks are sorted in ascending order according to their RNS values (Panel A) 
or their ΔRNS values (Panel B), and they are assigned to quintile portfolios. The corresponding equally-
weighted portfolio returns are computed at market close of the following Wednesday (i.e., post-ranking 
weekly returns). Ex Ret denotes the average weekly portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate. αFFC 
denotes the weekly portfolio alpha estimated from the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model. 
Excess returns and alphas are expressed in percentages. Portfolio loadings (𝛽’s) with respect to the 
market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM) factors estimated from the FFC model 
and its adjusted R2 (R2 adj.) are also reported. N denotes the average number of stocks per portfolio. The 
pre-last line reports the spread between the portfolio with the highest RNS stocks and the portfolio with 
lowest RNS stocks. t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are provided in 
parentheses. **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A: January 1996 – February 2008 
 Overnight Performance   Intraday Performance 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶   Quintiles Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  
1 (Lowest RNS) -0.05 -0.06**  1 (Lowest RNS) 0.03 -0.01 
(-0.68) (-5.36) 
2 -0.02 -0.03**  2 0.02 -0.03 
(-1.90) (-3.19) 
3 0.02 0.00  3 0.02 -0.03 
(-2.04) (0.48) 
4 0.09* 0.06**  4 0.03 -0.03 
(-1.43) (5.23) 
5 (Highest RNS) 0.20** 0.16**  5 (Highest RNS) 0.01 -0.05** 
(-2.33) (9.93) 
Spread (5-1) 0.25** 0.22**  Spread (5-1) -0.02 -0.02 
t(5-1) (10.67) (10.61)  t(5-1) (-0.73) (-1.82) 
Panel B: April 2008 – June 2014 
 Overnight Performance   Intraday Performance 
Quintiles Ex Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶   Quintiles Ret 𝛼𝐹𝐹𝐶  
1 (Lowest ΔRNS) 0.03 -0.04**  1 (Lowest ΔRNS) 0.03 -0.01 
(-0.30) (-5.47) 
2 0.05 -0.02**  2 0.06 -0.02 
(-1.30) (-3.91) 
3 0.05 -0.02**  3 0.06 -0.01 
(-0.92) (-4.06) 
4 0.08 -0.00  4 0.06 -0.01 
(-0.41) (-0.36) 
5 (Highest ΔRNS) 0.11** 0.05**  5 (Highest ΔRNS) 0.01 -0.04 
(-1.67) (4.01) 
Spread (5-1) 0.11** 0.09**  Spread (5-1) 0.02 0.03 




Uncertainty around US Presidential
Elections: Cross-Sectional Evidence
from the Option Market
2.1 Introduction
Democratic political processes can exert a signicant impact on nancial markets
(see Bernhard and Leblang, 2006; Fowler, 2006; Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz,
2007, and references therein). In fact, there is a growing interest in understanding
how market participants react to episodes of political uncertainty, primarily around
elections, and how this type of uncertainty aects rm operations, value, and
risk (see, inter alia Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle, 2000; Li and Born, 2006;
Bialkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisniewski, 2008; Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and
Molchanov, 2012; Julio and Yook, 2012; Durnev, 2012; Goodell and Vahamaa,
2013; Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi, 2016; Colak, Durnev, and Qian, 2017; Jens,
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2017; Chan and Marsh, 2018; Brogaard, Dai, Ngo, and Zhang, 2019). Though
political uncertainty is a recurring theme in the media and the public debate, as
Kelly et al. (2016, p. 2417) state: our understanding of its eects on the economy
and nancial markets is only beginning to emerge. To this end, our study provides
comprehensive evidence with respect to the manifestations of political uncertainty
around US presidential elections, both at the aggregate level and across rms with
dierent political characteristics. In particular, our study utilizes information
from the option market to examine whether political uncertainty, caused by the
occurrence of US presidential elections, leads to an increase in stock price and tail
risk as well as the equity premium, and whether it gives rise to an increased trading
activity and dispersion in investor beliefs. Moreover, we test the conjecture that
these eects should be more pronounced for rms that are particularly exposed to
various dimensions of political risk.
US presidential elections provide a unique setting to identify the eects of politi-
cal uncertainty because they take place on regular, xed dates, which are publicly
known well in advance. Hence, their regular occurrence constitutes an exogenous
episode of political uncertainty, the timing of which is independent of the pre-
vailing macroeconomic and nancial conditions or corporate political activity and
characteristics, sidestepping concerns related to reverse causality or omitted vari-
ables. In contrast, other well-studied political events, such as elections in other
countries, referenda, and international summits, may be the result, rather than
the cause, of developments in nancial markets and the macroeconomy, or cor-
porate political activity. The presidential election is the most important global
political event, it is extensively covered by the media, and it is closely followed
by market participants because it could result in major policy shifts. Hence, it
is highly unlikely that, during the narrow period around the presidential election,
asset prices may alternatively reect a confounding event.
Chapter 2. Manifestations of Political Uncertainty 96
Interestingly, US presidential elections provide an additional feature that we ex-
ploit in our empirical analysis. Though the uncertainty regarding the outcome is
immediately resolved on the election night (with the infamous exception of the
2000 Gore vs. Bush contest), the uncertainty regarding the composition, orienta-
tion, and policies of the new administration, in conjunction with the potentially
new majorities in the Senate and the House of Representatives, is not immediately
resolved. As a result, the eects of uncertainty regarding future government policy,
as in Pastor and Veronesi (2013), may actually persist during the transition period
between the presidential election in November and the inauguration in January.
Similar to Kelly et al. (2016), we conduct our empirical analysis using information
from the equity option market. Option-based information enables our inference
for a number of reasons. Options come with dierent strike prices, allowing us
to capture dierent dimensions of rm risk, even if these do not subsequently
materialize. In particular, we capture equity price risk via the implied volatility
of at-the-money options, and downside tail risk (i.e., the risk of a large stock
price drop) via the expensiveness of deep out-of-the-money (OTM) puts relative
to at-the-money options. This feature also allows us to compute a measure of
expected stock return that has been recently proposed by Martin and Wagner
(2019). Moreover, examining the trading activity of options with dierent levels
of moneyness, we can make inferences regarding the underlying trading motives of
market participants and the degree of dispersion of their beliefs.
In addition, short-maturity options can help us isolate the eects of political uncer-
tainty due to the presidential election. In particular, comparing the information
embedded in options whose life spans the presidential election with the corre-
sponding information embedded in similar options that expire before the election,
we can attribute any dierences to the uncertainty caused by the election. Fur-
thermore, the option-based variables we utilize are typically available on a daily
basis, enabling identication; we can measure the eects of political uncertainty
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relying on very short windows around the presidential election, instead of using
long estimation windows that could be contaminated with other market-wide or
rm-level confounding events.
An innovative feature of our study is that it examines the dierential eects of
political uncertainty across rms with dierent political characteristics.1 We focus
on the following four dimensions. First, we consider rm sensitivity to economic
policy uncertainty, as proxied by the index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016).
Policy uncertainty can have a real eect on corporate policies (Gulen and Ion, 2016,
see, for example), and more sensitive rms may command a higher risk premium
(Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). Akey and Lewellen (2017) argue that sensitivity to
policy uncertainty can also motivate corporate political activity, such as lobbying
and donations to politicians. In fact, the presidential election constitutes a primary
source of uncertainty regarding future government policy, in the spirit of the model
of Pastor and Veronesi (2013).
Second, we examine the eect of stock return exposure to the party aliation of
the US President. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) document systematic patterns
in stock returns depending on the presidential party, whereas Addoum and Kumar
(2016) argue that certain industries can be favorably or adversely exposed to a
Republican or Democrat administration, and that investors attempt to exploit
these patterns. Naturally, there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the
winners and losers of each presidential election, so the eects we examine may
be more pronounced during this period for rms whose stock returns are politically
exposed in the rst place. For example, rms that are favourably exposed to the
incumbent presidential party are expected to feature a larger increase in their level
of risk and their equity premium, as a result of the political uncertainty triggered
by the presidential election.
1It should be noted that these characteristics are measured well before the election period,
sidestepping any endogeneity concerns.
Chapter 2. Manifestations of Political Uncertainty 98
The third feature we study is the political alignment of rms with the presidential
party on the basis of their headquarters' state. Kim, Pantzalis, and Chul Park
(2012) show that geographical proximity to the political power of the ruling party
has a pervasive eect on stock returns, possibly because it reects exposure to
policy risk. The location of a rm's headquarters can also lead to an indirect
form of connectedness with politicians, who may have the incentives and power to
favor "local" rms (see Faccio and Parsley, 2009). Since presidential elections are
expected to cause shifts in the political map, the eects of political uncertainty
during this period may be exacerbated for rms that are strongly aligned with the
incumbent or contender party.
Last but not least, we examine the eect of direct political connectedness through
contributions to federal candidates' election campaigns (see Ansolabehere, De
Figueiredo, and Snyder, 2003, for an introduction) Campaign contributions are
regarded as a form of "political capital" to the benet of shareholders via rent
seeking or to hedge background risks, such as sensitivity to policy uncertainty.
More generally, they are viewed as a proxy for engaging in the political process.2
Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) document a strong positive correlation
between campaign contributions and future stock returns, but remain agnostic on
whether this nding indicates mispricing or compensation for exposure to polit-
ical risk. Akey (2015) estimates large positive abnormal returns for rms that
have donated "hard money" to marginally winning candidates relative to losing
ones. More recently, Akey and Lewellen (2017) show that rms connected with
marginally winning candidates exhibit an improvement in their operating perfor-
mance and a reduction in their risk-taking. During presidential elections, which
coincide with elections for the House and (approximately a third of) Senate seats,
2Beyond campaign contributions, there is a growing literature on the eects of alternative
forms of direct political connectedness (see, inter alia Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and Mc-
connell, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Van Ness, 2013;
Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta, 2016; Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak, and Mitton, 2016,
and references therein).
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new connections are being established and existing connections can be lost, po-
tentially aggravating the eect of political uncertainty.
Our empirical analysis yields a number of interesting results. We estimate a sig-
nicant average increase in price and tail risk as well as the expected return across
rms, regardless of their political features, in the narrow period prior to the pres-
idential election, relative to a carefully dened benchmark period. In particular,
the annualized implied volatility of at-the-money options exhibits an average in-
crease of approximately 5.5%. In addition, the wedge between the annualized
implied volatilities of deep OTM puts and at-the-money options further increases
by more than 0.8%. This increase in stock price and tail risk is associated with an
average increase in the expected return on equity of approximately 40 basis points
(bps) per month. Interestingly, we also document that the eects of political un-
certainty persist in the narrow period after the presidential election. Though the
magnitude of these increases is somewhat smaller relative to the corresponding
increases just before the election, they remain strongly signicant in both eco-
nomic and statistical terms. This nding is consistent with a short delay in the
resolution of uncertainty regarding the new administration's policy priorities and
key appointments, even though the election outcome is known.
Even more interestingly, we nd signicant dierential eects associated with
rms' political characteristics. Specically, in the period prior to the election, we
report a large additional increase in the price and tail risk as well as the expected
return for rms that are sensitive to policy uncertainty. We estimate a dierential
increase of approximately 6.8% in the implied volatility of at-the-money options,
an additional increase of 1% in the dierence between the implied volatilities of
OTM puts and at-the-money options, and a further increase of more than 90 bps
per month in the expected return of sensitive rms. As a result, the eects of po-
litical uncertainty on sensitive rms are estimated to be more than twice as large
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as the corresponding eects on non-sensitive rms. Moreover, these dierential
eects for sensitive rms persist in the rst few days after the election.
We also nd a signicant dierential increase in the risk and expected return of
rms that are exposed (either favorably or adversely) to the presidential party.
Identifying the party to which rms are exposed, we nd that the dierential
eects prior to the election are stronger for rms that are favorably exposed to
the incumbent party. This nding is consistent with the conjecture that these
rms have more to lose from a potential change in the presidential party. We
report signicant dierential eects in the narrow period after the election too. In
particular, we estimate a large dierential increase in the expensiveness of at-the-
money options as well as in the expected return of rms which are exposed to the
party that has just lost the election. To the contrary, we nd no such eects for
rms that are exposed to the winning party.
With respect to geographical political alignment, we report substantial dierential
increases just before the election in the price and tail risk as well as the premium
commanded by rms that are aligned with the presidential party. There is no such
eect for rms that are aligned with the contender party. In the few days after the
election, we estimate an additional increase in the expensiveness of at-the-money
options and the expected return for rms which are aligned with the party that
has just lost the election.
The dierential eects of political uncertainty are much weaker for connected rms.
In fact, we only nd a signicant additional increase in the relative expensiveness of
their OTM puts prior to the presidential election, but this does not translate into a
higher equity premium. Moreover, examining the interaction between sensitivity
to policy uncertainty and political connectedness, we nd no evidence that the
latter acts as a mitigating factor with respect to the eect of political uncertainty.
Similarly, we nd that political hedging, in the form of contributing to candidates
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of both parties in a balanced way, does not lead to a relative reduction in the
equity risk or premium in the run up to the election.
These ndings are robust to alternative denitions of the benchmark, election,
and post-election periods, dierent denitions of rm political characteristics, and
the use of a subsample with big- and mid-cap rms only. Moreover, we conduct
placebo tests to ensure that the magnitude of the estimated eects can be gen-
uinely attributed to the political uncertainty surrounding the actual presidential
election days, and they could not be spuriously caused by "luck" or alternative
combinations of other, non-election events.
We also derive interesting conclusions with respect to option trading activity and
the dispersion of investor beliefs around presidential elections. In particular, we
nd a signicant overall increase in option trading volume prior to the election day,
which is resembled by corresponding increases in the trading volume of both OTM
calls and OTM puts. Hence, the importance of the option market as a trading
venue increases prior to presidential elections. However, we report no consistent
evidence that corporate political characteristics exert signicant dierential eects
on option trading volume during this period. Moreover, we nd that political un-
certainty substantially increases the dispersion of investor beliefs with respect to
future price shifts around presidential elections. Interestingly, we also show that
rm political characteristics can render these beliefs even more disperse. This is
particularly true prior to the election for rms that are sensitive to policy un-
certainty as well as for rms that are exposed to or are geographically politically
aligned with the presidential party.
Our study is related to a number of prior studies. Similar to Kelly et al. (2016),
we examine the pricing of political uncertainty using information from the option
market. However, we focus on US presidential elections, whose exogenous and xed
timing justies the attribution of the estimated eects to the political uncertainty
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caused by the electoral event. More interestingly, we utilize a large cross-section of
rms, rather than the aggregate market portfolio, which allows us to examine the
dierential eects of this type of uncertainty across rms with dierent political
characteristics. We further contribute to the literature by providing comprehensive
evidence on the eects of political uncertainty on expected equity returns, option
trading activity, and the dispersion of investor beliefs.
Our ndings are in line with the conclusions of Boutchkova et al. (2012) regarding
the increase in stock return volatility in election years. They are also consistent
with the global increase in volatility and the price of risk in the six-month period
prior to US federal elections, which is reported in Brogaard et al. (2019). However,
our empirical design and the use of option-implied information allow us to examine
very narrow periods before and after the presidential election, instead of relying on
stock return volatility estimated over long windows. These methodological inno-
vations also enable us to provide a cleaner identication of the eects of political
uncertainty around elections on equity tail risk, expected return, option trading
activity, and the dispersion of investor beliefs, not only volatility. Moreover, dier-
ent from Boutchkova et al. (2012), we estimate cross-sectional dierential eects
on the basis of rm-level political features, rather than operational characteristics
at the industry level.
Similar to Akey and Lewellen (2017), we also examine cross-sectional dierential
eects around election events on the basis of corporate political characteristics.
However, our focus is on the pricing of political uncertainty and its implications for
equity risk, premia, trading activity, and the dispersion of investor beliefs, rather
than the causal eect of election shocks on corporate risk-taking and operating
performance. We further contribute to the literature that examines the relation-
ship between corporate political characteristics and stock returns. Our results
provide support to the arguments of Brogaard and Detzel (2015) and Kim et al.
(2012) that sensitivity to economic policy uncertainty and geographical political
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alignment with the presidential party, respectively, can be regarded as sources of
risk. The same argument holds true particularly for rms whose stock returns are
favourably exposed to the presidential party. To the contrary, our results do not
support the conjecture that political connectedness can be regarded as a missing
risk factor to explain the ndings of Cooper et al. (2010).
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines our data sources
and the construction of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 3
describes in detail the empirical design of the study. Section 4 presents our bench-
mark results regarding the eects of political uncertainty on rm risk and expected
return, whereas Section 5 contains a number of robustness checks. Section 6 ex-
amines the eects on option trading activity and the dispersion of investor beliefs,
and Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Data sources and variables
2.2.1 Data sources
We construct a number of variables for US common stocks (shrcd 10 and 11)
listed on NYSE, NYSE American, and NASDAQ (exchcd 1, 2, 3, 31, 32, 33)
during the period 1996-2016. We use monthly and daily stock returns as well as
daily stock trading volume from CRSP. Option data are sourced from Option-
Metrics. We utilize the 30-day Volatility Surface le to compute the price-related
option variables. We also use information from equity options to compute the
trading activity-related option variables. Information on the state in which cor-
porate headquarters are located as well as S&P 500 and S&P Mid-Cap 400 stock
constituent lists are extracted from COMPUSTAT. We obtain data on campaign
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contributions to Presidential, Senate, and House candidates from the US Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC) database.3 Election results are sourced from the
MIT Election Lab.4 We also use the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index of
Baker et al. (2016), the Political Alignment Index (PAI) of Kim et al. (2012), the
Macroeconomic Uncertainty Index (MUI) of Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015),
and the S&P 500 VIX.5
2.2.2 Option-based variables
2.2.2.1 Price risk, tail risk, and expected stock return
Similar to An et al. (2014) and Bali et al. (2017), we use the 30-day Volatility
Surface le from OptionMetrics to compute three price-related option variables
(ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET ). This le contains implied volatilities for stan-
dardized equity options with 30-day expiry for a grid of the delta space, which is
often used as a measure of option moneyness. The implied volatility surface pro-
vides a standardized way of measuring the expensiveness of equity options with
dierent strikes and maturities.6
3The database with the campaign contributions can be found at: https://www.fec.gov/data.
4The databases containing the election results can be found at:
https://electionlab.mit.edu/data.
5We are grateful to Chris Pantzalis for sharing the PAI data. The EPU Index can
be found at www.policyuncertainty.com. MUI is sourced from Sydney Ludvigson's website:
www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes.
6Firm-level equity options are typically American-style options. OptionMetrics compute the
interpolated volatility surface separately for puts and calls using a kernel smoothing technique.
The underlying implied volatilities of equity options with various strikes and maturities are
computed using an adapted Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model that accounts for the
early exercise premium of the American-style options and dividends that rms are expected to
pay during the lives of the options.
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ATM measures stock price risk and it is computed as the average implied volatility
of at-the-money call and put options:
ATM = (ATMCALL + ATMPUT )/2
= (CIV50 + CIV55 + PIV−45 + PIV−50) /4,
(2.1)
where CIV50 (CIV55) is the implied volatility of the 0.5 (0.55) delta call and PIV−50
(PIV−45) is the implied volatility of the −0.5 (−0.45) delta put.7 A higher ATM
value indicates an increase in stock price risk, which renders at-the-money options
more expensive.8
LSKEW captures stock tail risk and it is computed as the dierence between the
implied volatility of relatively deep OTM puts and ATM :
LSKEW = DOTMPUT − ATM = (PIV−20 + PIV−25) /2− ATM , (2.2)
where PIV−20 (PIV−25) is the implied volatility of the −0.2 (−0.25) delta put.
By measuring the expensiveness of relatively deep OTM puts, which are typically
used by investors for protection against large stock price drops, relative to the
expensiveness of at-the-money options, LSKEW identies stock tail risk on top of
the overall price risk that is captured by ATM. A higher LSKEW value indicates
an increase in stock tail risk, i.e., an increase in the risk of a large stock price
drop.9 LSKEW is very similar to the SKEW measure of Xing et al. (2010) and
7We opt for the average implied volatility using both calls and puts, instead of calls or puts
only, to average out any discrepancies arising due to deviations from put-call parity in American-
style options. In addition, since at-the-money calls (puts) do not exactly correspond to a 0.5
(−0.5) delta, we use the average implied volatility of 0.5 & 0.55 delta calls (similarly, −0.5 &
−0.45 delta puts) since the exact at-the-money point most often lies between these two delta
points. Nevertheless, our empirical results are very similar if we compute ATM using 0.5 (-0.5)
delta calls (puts), as in An et al. (2014).
8To be precise, an increase in ATM may actually reect an increase in volatility under the
physical measure, or an increase in the price of volatility risk under the physical measure, or
their combined eect. To keep the terminology simple, throughout the study we maintain the
interpretation that ATM reects the degree of stock price risk under the risk-neutral measure,
acknowledging that both of the above mechanisms could be in play under the physical measure.
9Similar to the interpretation of ATM, we maintain the interpretation that LSKEW captures
the degree of stock tail risk under the risk-neutral measure, acknowledging that an increase in
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reects the left slope or steepness of the implied volatility curve.10
OIEXRET denotes the option-implied expected excess return of a stock, as dened
by Martin andWagner (2019). OIEXRET is a function of the market's risk-neutral
variance as well as the stock's excess risk-neutral variance relative to the average
stock, with the risk-neutral variances computed from OTM put and call prices. In
























i,t, wi,t is the market value weight of stock i, and αi
is a rm xed eect.11 To compute these risk-neutral variances, we follow the
approach of Martin and Wagner (2019), utilizing implied option prices from the
30-day Volatility Surface le.12
2.2.2.2 Trading activity and dispersion of investor beliefs
We also construct a number of trading activity-related option variables. Consistent
with the empirical design for our benchmark results, which is described in Section
3, we compute these variables using options with expiry between 16 and 60 days
LSKEW may actually reect an increase in the probability of a large stock price drop under
the physical measure, or an increase in the price of tail risk under the physical measure, or their
combined eect.
10Kelly et al. (2016) measure tail risk by directly estimating the left slope of the implied
volatility curve of equity index options, regressing the implied volatilities of OTM puts on their
deltas. Hence, they require at least three OTM puts with the same maturity. However, this
number of OTM puts with the same maturity is not typically available on a daily basis for a
large cross-section of rms. Therefore, our measure of tail risk is based on the standardized
implied volatility surface provided by OptionMetrics. Nevertheless, the two approaches are
equivalent by construction.
11To be precise, we compute 30-day ahead expected excess stock returns up to a rm xed
eect. Our regression model specications always include rm-by-election cycle xed eects,
enabling the correct interpretation of OIEXRET.
12To compute OIEXRET for a rm on a given day, we require all 26 delta points to be
available at the Volatility Surface. Following Martin and Wagner (2019), we also lter out
rm-day observations if SV IXi,t does not monotonically increase across horizons.
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ahead. TOTVOL denotes the daily total trading volume across option contracts.
TOTOI measures the daily total open interest across these option contracts. An
increase in TOTVOL and TOTOI indicates an increase in trading activity in the
option market. TOTVOL-to-STOCKVOL denotes the daily ratio of TOTVOL
divided by the stock trading volume, measuring the trading activity in the option
market relative to the corresponding activity in the stock market.
OTMPUTVOL stands for the daily total trading volume of OTM puts with mon-
eyness K/S < 0.95. OTMPUTVOL-to-TOTVOL denotes the daily ratio of OTM-
PUTVOL divided by TOTVOL.13 An increase in OTMPUTVOL is commonly
thought to indicate an increase in the hedging demand by investors who seek pro-
tection against a large stock price drop, whereas an increase in OTMPUTVOL-
to-TOTVOL captures this hedging activity after adjusting for a potential overall
increase in option trading activity. Moreover, OTMCALLVOL measures the daily
total trading volume of OTM calls with moneyness K/S > 1.05. An increase in
OTMCALLVOL possibly indicates an increase in speculative demand by investors
who seek to prot from a large stock price increase.
DISPOI measures the daily dispersion of options' open interest across levels of







φjMj | , (2.4)
where φj is the proportion of open interest for the option with strike Kj relative
to all available strikes. We require at least 3 contracts with positive open interest
to compute DISPOI on a given day.14 An increase in DISPOI reects an increase
in the dispersion of investor beliefs regarding the future stock price.
13For this ratio, we add a very small positive number (0.01) to TOTVOL, to avoid zero values
in the denominator.
14DISPOI is a slight modication of the corresponding measure introduced by Andreou,
Kagkadis, Philip, and Taamouti (2018). Since we only utilize options with expiry between 16
and 60 days ahead, we use an open interest-weighted version of their measure to ensure that we
can compute DISPOI for a suciently large cross-section at the daily frequency. Our empirical
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In principle, the values of these trading activity-related variables are not compa-
rable across rms and election cycles due to the potential rm and cycle xed
eects. Hence, we need to normalize the daily values of these trading activity-
related variables in the sample period used for the empirical analysis. To this end,
in each cycle, we express them as multiples (ratios) of the corresponding rm-level
average daily value that is computed from January to June prior to the November
presidential election, using a winsorization at the 99th percentile. In this way, we
inherently neutralize both rm and election cycle eects, rendering the normalized
values of these variables comparable in the cross-section and across cycles.
To ensure that the values of the option-based variables are reliable, we lter out
rm-day observations when TOTOI for options with expiry between 16 and 60
days ahead is zero or when ATM cannot be computed from the Volatility Surface
le. Moreover, we compute normalized versions of the trading activity-related
variables only if at least two-thirds of their daily values during the averaging
period (prior January to June) are non-zero, with the exception of DISPOI where
this requirement is one-third of the values.
2.2.2.3 Summary statistics
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics for the option-based variables
during the sample period used in our benchmark results, which corresponds to the
union of the calendary day intervals: [d− 119, d− 60], [d− 15, d− 1], [d+ 1, d+ 15],
and [d+ 61, d+ 120], where d is the US presidential election day from 1996 to 2016.
The entire sample contains 936,959 rm-day observations for 3,956 unique rms
(permnos) across the six election cycles. To reduce the impact of outliers, the
price-related variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles per election
cycle, whereas the normalized trading activity-related variables are winsorized at
results are very similar if we instead use the trading volume-weighted version of this measure, as
in Andreou et al. (2018), but they are based on a substantially smaller cross-section.
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the 99th percentile. The median value of ATM is 44.12% p.a., whereas the me-
dian value of LSKEW is 3.82% p.a. The summary statistics show that rm-level
implied volatilities exhibit substantial variation. Whereas OTM puts are typically
more expensive than ATM options, as in the well-studied case of equity index
options, LSKEW can also take negative values at the rm level. OIEXRET also
exhibits substantial variation, with a median value of 49.5 bps per month. As ex-
pected, the values of the trading activity-related variables exhibit large variation
too, and they are positively skewed.
2.2.3 Political variables
We construct a number of variables to capture corporate characteristics and ac-
tivity in the following four political dimensions: i) sensitivity to economic policy
uncertainty, ii) stock return exposure to the presidential party, iii) geographical
political alignment with the presidential party, and iv) political connectedness via
campaign contributions.
2.2.3.1 Sensitive rms
Following Akey and Lewellen (2017), we identify rms that are sensitive to eco-
nomic policy uncertainty by estimating the following regression model, using excess
monthly stock returns for each rm i:
ri,t − rf,t = αi + δiEPUt + εi,t, (2.5)
where EPUt is the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index of Baker et al. (2016).
15
In our benchmark results, we use a 36-month estimation window and we only
15The EPU Index is an aggregate time-series index based on the scaled frequency of articles
in 10 leading US newspapers containing terms jointly related to uncertainty, the economy, and
policy. See Baker et al. (2016) for details on the construction of this index.
Chapter 2. Manifestations of Political Uncertainty 110
include rms that have no missing returns during this period. Sensitive is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a rm if its coecient estimate δ̂i is
signicant at the 10% level, and 0 otherwise. A signicant negative (positive)
coecient estimate δ̂i indicates that the rm's stock return decreases (increases)
when economic policy uncertainty increases. In Section 2.5, we perform a number
of robustness tests using alternative denitions of Sensitive on the basis of a shorter
estimation window as well as dierent specications of model (2.5), which include
the Macroeconomic Uncertainty Index of Jurado et al. (2015) or the S&P 500
VIX.
2.2.3.2 Exposed rms
We further identify rms whose stock returns are exposed to the party aliation of
the US President. In particular, following Addoum and Kumar (2016), we estimate
the following regression model using excess monthly stock returns for each rm i:
ri,t − rf,t = αi + βi (rm,t − rf,t) + θiRepubDummyt + εi,t, (2.6)
where rm,t is the market return and RepubDummyt is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 when the President is Republican, and 0 when the President is
Democrat. This regression model is similar to the specication of Santa-Clara
and Valkanov (2003). A positive (negative) coecient estimate, θ̂i > 0 (θ̂i < 0),
indicates that, ceteris paribus, the rm's stock yields a higher (lower) premium
during Republican presidential terms.
Dierent from Addoum and Kumar (2016), who estimate this model using industry-
level returns, we determine stock return exposure to the party aliation of the
President at the rm level. Moreover, since in our sample period no party held
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the presidency for more than two consecutive terms, we use a 10-year estima-
tion window of monthly observations, and we only include rms with no missing
returns.16
In our benchmark results, we set RepubDummyt equal to 1 from November after
a Republican President is elected, and equal to 0 from November after a Demo-
crat President is elected. In our robustness analysis, to account for the potential
predictability of the election outcome and the swing in stock returns in antici-
pation of this outcome, we follow Addoum and Kumar (2016) by alternatively
setting RepubDummyt equal to 1 from August prior to a Republican President
being elected, and equal to 0 from August prior to a Democrat President being
elected.17
We dene Exposed as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a rm if the
coecient estimate θ̂i is signicant at the 10% level, and 0 otherwise. We further
identify whether a rm is favorably exposed to the incumbent or contender party
as well as whether it is favorably exposed to the winning or losing party. In
particular, Exposed_Incumbent (Exposed_Contender) is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 for a rm if, apart from being signicant, θ̂i > 0 (θ̂i < 0) when a
Republican President is in oce or θ̂i < 0 (θ̂i > 0) when a Democrat President is
in oce. Similarly, Exposed_Winner (Exposed_Loser) is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 for a rm if, apart from being signicant, θ̂i > 0 (θ̂i < 0) when
a Republican President has been elected or θ̂i < 0 (θ̂i > 0) when a Democrat
President has been elected.
16This choice ensures that there is a presidential party change during the estimation period.
17Arguably, apart from the 1996 Clinton vs. Dole contest, the rest of the elections during our
sample period were particularly close for their outcome to be considered a foregone conclusion
long in advance.
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2.2.3.3 Aligned rms
We also consider the political geography of rms' headquarters to identify their
alignment with the presidential party. To this end, we use the PAI of Kim et al.
(2012), updated until 2016. PAI is a state-level composite index, which measures
whether the Governor, the Senators and House Representatives as well as the
majorities in the state Senate and House, respectively, belong to the same party
as the President. PAI ranges from 0, when none of the above belongs to the same
party as the President, to 1, when all of the above belong to the same party.
PAI allows us to identify whether a rm is geographically politically aligned with
the incumbent or contender party as well as with the winning or losing party of
the presidential election. To this end, Aligned_Incumbent (Aligned_Contender)
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a rm if its headquarters are located
in the top (bottom) quartile of states according to PAI before the election, and 0
otherwise. Similarly, Aligned_Winner (Aligned_Loser) is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 for a rm if its headquarters are located in the top (bottom)
quartile of states according to the PAI computed right after the election, and 0
otherwise.
In addition, to examine the eect of the degree of political alignment, we use
the PAI value of the rm's headquarters state per se. Specically, to account
for potential year xed eects in PAI and to ensure comparability across election
cycles, we dene PAI* as the value of PAI in excess of its median annual value
across states. Finally, to examine the eect of a shift in the degree of a rm's
political alignment after the election, we dene ∆PAI as the dierence in PAI
computed right after relative to just before the election.
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2.2.3.4 Connected rms
We construct a series of variables to measure the degree of rms' political connect-
edness with candidates at federal elections. We make use of transaction-level data
involving direct contributions of corporate Political Action Committees (PACs) to
federal election candidates' PACs, which are provided by the FEC.18 We match
corporation PACs with CRSP rms by name from 1991 to 2016. The matched
dataset contains 893,954 transactions from rm PACs to candidate PACs. This
dataset contains candidates' details, including their party aliation, the state/dis-
trict and oce for which they stood, the amount contributed by each rm PAC
to each candidate PAC, and the election cycle for which this contribution was
made.19 We subsequently merge this dataset with the election results provided
by the MIT Election Lab and the rms' headquarters state sourced from COM-
PUSTAT. Hence, we can identify whether the candidate to whom the rm PAC
contributed actually ran in the general election, whether she was subsequently
elected or not, and whether she was a "home candidate", i.e., a candidate in the
state where the rm's headquarters are located.
Following Cooper et al. (2010), we dene the variable Num. of Connections by
counting the number of general election candidates to which the rm has directly
contributed money during the past 60-month window. Moreover, we dene Con-
nected as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a rm has contributed to at
least one candidate during the past 60 months, and 0 otherwise. In our robust-
ness analysis, which is presented in Section 2.5, we alternatively explore stricter
denitions of political connectedness.
18These data comprise all "hard money" contributions, which are typically limited to $10,000
per candidate per election cycle. See Cooper et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the FEC
database on campaign contributions.
19The descriptive statistics of the constructed dataset, which are available upon request, are
qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Cooper et al. (2010) and Akey (2015) for an earlier
sample period.
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To further examine whether contributing exclusively to either of the two parties
has a signicant eect, we dene the dummy variable Connected_Democrat_only
(Connected_Republican_only), which takes the value 1 if the rm has contributed
to Democrat (Republican) candidates only during the past 60 months. To the con-
trary, the dummy variable Connected_both takes the value 1 if the rm has con-
tributed to both Democrat and Republican candidates during the past 60 months.
An interesting feature of the campaign contributions dataset is that most of these
rms typically donate money to both Republicans and Democrats. This activity
can be interpreted as a form of political hedging. To examine the eect of this
behavior, we dene the dummy variable Hedged, which takes the value 1 for a rm
if the ratio of Republican-to-Democrat candidates it has contributed to during the
past 60 months lies between the 25th and 75th percentile of the corresponding
distribution, among rms which have made at least one direct contribution during
this period, and 0 otherwise.
2.2.3.5 Frequency and correlations of political dummy variables
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the frequency of the political dummy variables across
the six election cycles in our sample period. As discussed in Section 2.3, the
characterisation of these dummy variables is made at the end of June prior to
the November election day. For the sample of rms with optionable stocks, which
are included in the subsequent empirical analysis, we nd that a large fraction of
rms were Sensitive in the 36-month window prior to the 2004 and 2008 elections.
Moreover, the fraction of Exposed rms was approximately equal to 10% prior
to the 1996, 2000, 2012, and 2016 elections, whereas this fraction increased to
around 20% prior to the 2004 and 2008 elections. To the contrary, by virtue of
the denition of Aligned_Incumbent, the fraction of rms that were politically
aligned with the presidential party prior to the election remained stable, around
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25%, across the six election cycles. Moreover, the fraction of rms characterised
as Connected was approximately equal to 30%, without substantial uctuations
across the six election cycles. Hence, the propensity of rms to engage in campaign
contributions did not seem to uctuate in tandem with their sensitivity to economic
policy uncertainty or their exposure to the party aliation of the President.
Panel C of Table 2.1 reports the pairwise correlation coecients of these dummy
variables. We nd that the correlations are very close to 0. This nding conrms
that these dummy variables capture dierent dimensions of rms' political charac-
teristics and activity. Therefore, it is meaningful to examine the potential eects
of each of these characteristics on rm risk, expected return, and option trading
activity.
2.3 Empirical design
2.3.1 Denition of Election, PostElection, and Benchmark
periods
The aim of our study is to estimate the eects of political uncertainty around US
presidential elections on the option-based variables dened in Section 2.2, across
rms with dierent political characteristics. To this end, we dene three periods
within a presidential election cycle. The Election period refers to an interval
of calendar days just before the November presidential election day d.20 The
PostElection period refers to an interval of calendar days right after the election
day. To identify the dierential eect of the Election and PostElection periods, we
20The US presidential election takes place every four years on the rst Tuesday after the rst
Monday in November.
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also need to dene a Benchmark period, during which the corresponding option-
based variable should not be aected by the political uncertainty surrounding the
presidential election.
In our benchmark empirical design, we make the following choices. Election is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval
[d − 15, d − 1]. For symmetry, PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+ 1, d+ 15]. The Benchmark period
is the union of the calendar day intervals [d − 119, d − 60] and [d + 61, d + 120].
Figure 1 visualizes the timeline of the benchmark empirical design. To ensure
that our regression estimates are based on a sucient number of observations
per rm within each period, we only include rms with valid observations for the




d− 119 d− 60 d− 15 d− 1 d+ 1 d+ 15 d+ 61 d+ 120
Figure 2.1: Timeline of benchmark empirical design
The denition of these three periods is motivated by the following considerations.
First, we want the Election period to be narrowly dened just before the presi-
dential election day. In this way, we ensure that the main event dominating this
period and aecting the pricing and trading activity of options is the presidential
election. In addition, using the 30-day Volatility Surface as well as individual op-
tions with expiries between 16 and 60 days ahead, we ensure that the life of the
options used during this period spans the election event. Moreover, we exclude
the election day itself, in case there is an early resolution of the election outcome
during that day.
Second, we want the PostElection period to be narrowly dened just after the
election day. In this way, this period primarily reects the uncertainty surrounding
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the composition, orientation, and policies of the new administration, in conjuction
with the potentially new majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives.
Political uncertainty may persist during this period, even though the election
outcome is known. The presidential winner is sworn in oce on January 20, which
ranges from 72 to 78 days after the election day. In the meantime, especially if
a new president is elected, there is a transition period during which the new
administration and its main policy priorities gradually become known.
Third, the denition of the Benchmark period needs to satisfy two conditions. On
the one hand, it should be suciently close to the Election and the PostElection
periods, so that the dierential eects, which may be estimated in the latter two
periods, are correctly attributed to the uncertainty surrounding the election event.
On the other hand, it should ensure that the values of the option-based variables
during this period are computed from options whose expiry does not span the
election day. Given the interpolation scheme that OptionMetrics uses to compute
the standardized 30-day Volatility Surface, truncating the Benchmark period at
d − 60 minimizes the possibility of using information from options with expiries
that span the election day.21 Similar is the justication for the trading activity-
related variables, which are computed from options with expiry between 16 and
60 calendar days ahead.
We also include the interval [d + 61, d + 120] in the Benchmark period for two
reasons. First, this choice ensures that any eect estimated during the Election
and the PostElection periods is not spuriously driven by a coincidental time trend;
including this post-election interval in the Benchmark period would neutralize the
eect of such a trend. Second, this choice alleviates the potential concern that an
eect identied during the PostElection period might be spuriously driven by a
21OptionMetrics uses a non-linear interpolation scheme, which for the 30-day Volatility Surface
overweighs information from options with expiry around 30 days ahead. This weight becomes
extremely low for options with expiry more than 45 days ahead. See the OptionMetrics manual
for the exact weighting scheme.
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permanent shift in the corresponding option-based variable caused by the election
outcome.
Even though the above denitions of the Benchmark, Election, and PostElection
intervals lead to the correct intepretation of the estimated dierential eects, we
conduct an extensive robustness analysis, which is presented in Section 2.5, to
examine whether our benchmark results are sensitive to these denitions. In par-
ticular, we alternatively consider: i) a narrower denition of the Election and
PostElection periods, ii) a much wider denition of the Benchmark period, and
iii) a denition of the Benchmark period that includes only the pre-election inter-
val.
2.3.2 Estimating the eect of sensitivity
To identify the eect of rm sensitivity to policy uncertainty on option-implied
risk, expected return, option trading activity, and dispersion of investor beliefs
around presidential elections, we employ a dierence-in-dierences framework and
estimate specications of the following regression model:
OptionV ari,t =α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x Sensitivei
+ γ1PostElectiont + γ2PostElectiont x Sensitivei
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.7)
where OptionV ar denotes each of the examined option-based variables, i indexes
rms, t indexes days, Electiont and PostElectiont are the time dummy variables
dened above, and Sensitivei is the dummy variable indicating whether a rm is
sensitive to economic policy uncertainty or not, as dened in Section 2.2.3.1.
To alleviate the potential concern that our estimates might be aected by reverse
causality, Sensitivei is dened prior to the beginning of our sample period, i.e.,
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prior to d− 119 in our benchmark timeline denition, and remains xed through-
out the election cycle. Furthermore, to mitigate the potential impact of model
misspecication or omitted variables bias, we include rm-by-election cycle xed
eects. These xed eects account for all rm characteristics, which may aect the
option-based variable but are time-invariant within each election cycle, i.e., from
d − 119 until d + 120 in our benchmark timeline denition. Hence, our estima-
tion approach essentially captures the variation of the dependent variable within
a rm and given an election cycle. It should also be noted that the eect during
the Benchmark period of a rm being Sensitive is captured by this xed eect.
In our full model specication, we include the daily stock return of the rm and
the daily aggregate market return as control variables. In doing so, not only we
control for a potential mechanistic relationship between stock returns and the
corresponding option-based variable, but we also control for a potential day eect
due to a market-wide shock that may aect the entire cross-section.
The coecient β1 (γ1) yields the dierential time eect of the Election (Post-
Election) period on the option-based variable, relative to the Benchmark period,
for a non-sensitive rm. The coecient β2 (γ2) additionally captures the dier-
ential eect during the Election (PostElection) period of a rm being Sensitive,
rather than not, ceteris paribus. More precisely, β2 (γ2) can be interpreted as
the di-in-di estimate of the eect of rm sensitivity to policy uncertainty dur-
ing the Election (PostElection) period. Specically, β2 measures the quantity
(∆Sensitive − ∆NonSensitive), where ∆ indicates the dierence in the option-
based variable between the Election and the Benchmark periods.
Motivated by the arguments of Petersen (2009), our statistical inference through-
out this study is based on two-way clustered standard errors, by rm-cycle and
day. Though conservative in nature, using two-way clustered standard errors is
deemed necessary because the innovations of our option-based variables can be
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highly correlated at the daily frequency and across rms; in addition, Election
and PostElection are time dummy variables dened over an interval of consecu-
tive calendar days, and hence persistent by construction. In fact, we showcase
that when clustering instead standard errors by rm-cycle only, t-statistics can be
substantially inated, leading to potentially spurious inference.
2.3.3 Estimating the eect of exposure
In a similar fashion, we gauge the eect of rm exposure to the presidential party
by estimating specications of the following regression model:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x Exposedi
+ γ1PostElectiont + γ2PostElectiont x Exposedi
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.8)
where Exposedi is the dummy variable dened in Section 2.2.3.2. The rest of the
variables are dened as in model (2.7). To alleviate a potential reverse causality
concern, it should be stressed that Exposedi is determined prior to the beginning of
the sample period in each election cycle. Moreover, its eect during the Benchmark
period is accounted for by the rm-cycle xed eect. Based on model (2.8), the
coecient β2 (γ2) can be interpreted as the di-in-di estimate of the eect of a
rm being Exposed, rather than not, on the corresponding option-based variable
during the Election (PostElection) period.
We further seek to estimate the eect during the Election period of a rm being
exposed to the incumbent or contender party. Similarly, we seek to estimate the
eect during the PostElection period of a rm being exposed to the winning or
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losing party. To this end, we employ the following regression model:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x Exposed_Incumbenti
+ γ1PostElectiont
+ β3Electiont x Exposed_Contenderi
+ γ2PostElectiont x Exposed_Winneri
+ γ3PostElectiont x Exposed_Loseri
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.9)
where the dummy variables Exposed_Incumbenti, Exposed_Contenderi,
Exposed_Winneri, and Exposed_Loseri are also dened in Section 2.2.3.2. Here,
the coecient β2 (β3) can be interpreted as the di-in-di estimate of the eect
of a rm being exposed to the incumbent (contender) party, relative to not being
exposed at all, on the corresponding option-based variable during the Election pe-
riod. Similar is the interpretation for the coecients γ2 and γ3 in the PostElection
period, for the dierential eect of being exposed to the winning and losing party,
respectively.22
2.3.4 Estimating the eect of alignment
We also estimate the eect of a rm's geographical political alignment with the
incumbent or contender party during the Election period and the winning or losing
party during the PostElection period by estimating specications of the following
22It should be stressed again that the coecient θi from model (2.6), whose sign determines
whether the rm is exposed to the incumbent or contender party during the Election period,
and whether the rm is exposed to the winning or losing party in the PostElection period, is
estimated prior to the beginning of the Benchmark period. Hence, reverse causality is not an
issue in this specication either.
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regression model:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x Aligned_Incumbenti
+ β3Electiont x Aligned_Contenderi
+ γ1PostElectiont+
+ γ2PostElectiont x Aligned_Winneri
+ γ3PostElectiont x Aligned_Loseri
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.10)
where the dummy variables Aligned_Incumbenti, Aligned_Contenderi,
Aligned_Winneri, and Aligned_Loseri are dened in Section 2.2.3.3. In this
specication, the coecient β2 (β3) can be interpreted as the di-in-di estimate
of the eect on the corresponding option-based variable during the Election period
of a rm's headquarters being located in a state that is politically aligned with
the incumbent (contender) party, relative to not being aligned with either party.
Similar is the interpretation of the coecients γ2 and γ3, in the PostElection
period, for the dierential eect of a rm being aligned with the winning and
losing party, respectively.
Alternatively, to estimate the eect of the strength of a rm's geographical political
alignment on the corresponding option-based variable, we use the following model
specication:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x PAI
∗
i
+ γ1PostElectiont + γ2PostElectiont x ∆PAIi
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.11)
where PAI∗i and ∆PAIi are also dened in Section 2.2.3.3. Here, the coecient
β2 measures the eect of the degree of a rm's political alignment with the presi-
dential party on the option-based variable during the Election period, whereas the
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coecient γ2 measures the corresponding eect during the PostElection period
due to a shift in the degree of political alignment with the presidential party right
after the election.
2.3.5 Estimating the eect of connectedness
To estimate the eect of rm political connectedness via campaign contributions,
we estimate specications of the following regression model:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x Connectedi
+ γ1PostElectiont + γ2PostElectiont x Connectedi
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.12)
where the dummy variable Connectedi is dened in Section 2.2.3.4. It should be
stressed again that Connectedi is dened prior to the beginning of the sample
period in each election cycle, alleviating a potential reverse causality concern.
Under this specication, the coecient β2 (γ2) can be interpreted as the di-
in-di estimate of the eect of a rm being Connected, rather than not, on the
corresponding option-based variable during the Election (PostElection) period.
Alternatively, we also examine whether the strength of political connectedness has
an eect on the corresponding option-based variable during the Election period.
To this end, we consider a variation of model (2.12), where instead of the dummy
variable Connectedi, we use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of
candidates the rm has contributed to, i.e., Num. of Connections.
We further seek to examine whether the party aliation of the candidates with
whom the rm is connected yields a dierential eect during the Election period.
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To this end, we estimate the following regression model:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont
+ β2Electiont x Connected_Democrat_onlyi
+ β3Electiont x Connected_Republican_onlyi
+ β4Electiont x Connected_bothi
+ Φ′Controlsi,t
+ Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.13)
where the dummy variables Connected_Democrat_onlyi,
Connected_Republican_onlyi, and Connected_bothi are dened in Section 2.2.3.4.
Under this specication, the coecient β2 (β3) can be interpreted as the di-in-
di estimate of the eect of a rm being connected with Democrat (Republican)
candidates only, rather than not being connected at all, on the corresponding
option-based variable during the Election period.
2.3.6 Estimating interaction eects
We further examine the potential interaction eect between rm sensitivity to
policy uncertainty and political connectedness. To this end, we estimate variations
of the following regression model:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x Sensitivei
+ β3Electiont x Sensitivei x Connectedi
+ γ1PostElectiont + γ2PostElectiont x Sensitivei
+ γ3PostElectiont x Sensitivei x Connectedi
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t.
(2.14)
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In this specication, the coecient β3 (γ3) captures the dierential eect during
the Election (PostElection) period of a rm being Connected, rather than not,
given that it is also Sensitive.
In a similar fashion, we additionally examine whether there is an interaction eect
between rm sensitivity to policy uncertainty and political hedging, by replacing
the dummy variable Connectedi with the dummy variableHedgedi in model (2.14).
In further analysis, we also estimate the potential interaction eect between expo-
sure to the presidential party and political connectedness, by replacing the dummy
variable Sensitivei with the dummy variable Exposedi in model (2.14).
Last, we alternatively use a triple-dierence framework to examine the dierential
eect of rm political connectedness during the Election period, controlling for
the eect of its sensitivity status. Specically, we estimate the following regression
model:
OptionV ari,t = α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont x Sensitivei
+ β3Electiont x Connectedi
+ β4Electiont x Sensitivei x Connectedi
+ Φ′Controlsi,t + Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t.
(2.15)
Here, β4 yields the triple-di estimate of the eect of a rm being Connected,
rather than not, net of the eect of being Sensitive or not. In particular, β4
measures the quantity (∆Connected&Sensitive − ∆NotConnected&Sensitive)
− (∆Connected&NonSensitive−∆NotConnected&NonSensitive), where ∆ in-
dicates the dierence in the corresponding option-based variable between the Elec-
tion and the Benchmark periods.
Similarly, we employ this triple-dierence framework to estimate the eect of a rm
being Hedged, rather than not, controlling for the eect of its sensitivity status,
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by replacing the dummy variable Connectedi with the dummy variable Hedgedi
in model (2.15).
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Figure 2.2: The gure shows the average level of the S&P 500 ATM during
the Benchmark, the Election, and the Post Election periods. For a given US
Presidential Election day, d, from 1996 to 2016, the Election period is dened
as the interval [d-15, d-1] and the PostElection period is dened as the interval
[d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-60]
and [d+61, d+120].
We begin the presentation of our results by examining the time series properties
of volatility around the US Presidential Elections using the ATM of the S&P
500 index. Figure 2.2 shows the average level of the S&P 500 ATM during the
Benchmark, the Election, and the Post Election periods. Table 2.2 reports the
estimates of the model
ATMm,t =α + β1Electiont + β2Electiont + φ1rmkt,t + εm,t, (2.16)
where ATMm,t is the daily S&P 500 ATM and rmkt,t is the daily level of the
market return. We nd that the average ATM of the S&P 500 index during the
Benchmark period equals 17.4% p.a. The volatility of the index increases, on
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average, to 24% during the Election period. The increase equals to 6.6% (t-stat =
5.41). Furthermore, we also nd that the uncertainty persists after the election.
During the Post Election period, the ATM of the S&P 500 index is higher by
5.2% (t-stat = 3.21) compared to the benchmark period. The estimated increases
remain statistically signicant when we control for the daily level of the market
return.
We continue by examining the dierential eect of the US Presidential Elections
across all the rms of our sample. Table 2.3 reports the estimates from various
specications of model (2.7), leading to a series of interesting conclusions. First,
we nd that ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET exhibit a signicant increase during
the Election period across rms, regardless of their sensitivity status. This time
eect remains robust, even when we control for stock-level and aggregate market
returns. The statistical signicance of this time eect is very strong, even though
we cluster standard errors by both rm-cycle and day.23 This eect is highly sig-
nicant in economic terms too. In particular, for non-sensitive rms, we report
an average increase of 5.49% in ATM during the Election period, across the six
presidential election cycles in our sample. To put this gure into perspective, the
average value of ATM during the Benchmark period was 46.92% p.a., indicating
a percentage increase in ATM during the Election period of more than 11%. Sim-
ilarly, we estimate an increase of 0.87% in LSKEW during the Election period,
which corresponds to a percentage increase of more than 17% relative to the aver-
age LSKEW value of 4.97% p.a. during the Benchmark period. Moreover, we nd
an increase of 37 bps in OIEXRET during the Election period, which corresponds
to a percentage increase of approximately 50% relative to the average OIEXRET
value of 75 bps per month during the Benchmark period.
23Echoing the arguments of Petersen (2009), clustering standard errors only by rm-cycle
in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of Table 2.3 yields spuriously inated t-stats. Hence, we
subsequently report t-stats based on two-way clustered standard errors.
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2.4.1 The eect of sensitivity
Second, we nd a signicant dierential eect during the Election period due
to rm sensitivity. In particular, for Sensitive rms, we estimate an additional
increase of 6.86% in ATM, 1.02% in LSKEW, and 55 bps in OIEXRET. As a result,
the total eect of political uncertainty during the Election period for Sensitive
rms amounts to an increase of more than 12% in ATM, 1.9% in LSKEW, and
92 bps in OIEXRET. These signicant di-in-di estimates indicate that political
uncertainty around presidential elections aects the risk and expected return of
rms in a dierential manner on the basis of their sensitivity to economic policy
uncertainty. In fact, the eect of political uncertainty during the Election period
on the price and tail risk as well as the expected return of Sensitive rms is twice
as big as its eect on non-sensitive rms.24
The third interesting conclusion arising from Table 2.3 refers to the corresponding
eects right after the presidential election day. We nd that regardless of their
sensitivity status, rms exhibit higher levels of ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET
during the PostElection period, as compared to the Benchmark period. In fact, for
non-sensitive rms, we nd a relative increase of 3.84% in ATM, 0.67% in LSKEW,
and 26 bps in OIEXRET. Though the magnitude of these relative increases is
somewhat smaller than the corresponding increases during the Election period,
they remain stongly signicant in both economic and statistical terms.
Equally importantly, we also nd a signicant dierential eect on the risk and
expected return of Sensitive rms during the PostElection period. Specically,
24For the average rm in our sample, its ATM, LSKEW, and OIXRET increase during the
Election period irrespectively to whether the rm is sensitive or not. Furthermore, since the
number of sensitive rms is considerably smaller to the number of non-sensitive rms, coecient
β1 of model (2.7) may be viewed as a tight lower bound of the increase that an equally-weighted
index across all the stocks of our sample would experience during the Election period. For
example, the ATM for the non-sensitive rms increase by 5.49% during the Election period.
Hence, we should expect that the ATM of an equally weighed index containing all the stocks
of our sample to increase more than but closely to 5.49% during the Election period. In fact,
in untabulated results, we estimate the specication ATMi,t = α + β1Electiont + Firm ×
ElectionCycleFE + εi,t and nd β1 to be equal to 6.11% (t-stat = 5.41).
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the reported di-in-di estimates indicate an additional increase of 6.57% in ATM,
0.95% in LSKEW, and 48 bps in OIEXRET for Sensitive rms. Hence, the total
eect on Sensitive rms is more than twice as big as the eect on non-sensitive
rms during the PostElection period.
In sum, we nd that the political uncertainty surrounding the presidential elections
leads to a highly signicant increase in rms' price and tail risk. This conclusion
is consistent with the ndings of Kelly and Pruitt (2015) at the aggregate market
level. Contributing further to this literature, we show that this increase in price
and tail risk is translated into an increase in the required equity premium. Most
interestingly, we document that, besides the aggregate time eect, political un-
certainty exerts an additional, strong dierential eect on the risk and expected
return of rms that are sensitive to economic policy uncertainty. Hence, we cor-
roborate the arguments of Brogaard and Detzel (2015) and Akey and Lewellen
(2017) that sensitivity to policy uncertainty is an important rm characteristic,
and we show that it acts as a fundamental source of risk during episodes of political
uncertainty, such as presidential elections.
Moreover, we convincingly show that the eect of political uncertainty persists in
the rst few days after the presidential election, even though the election outcome
itself is known. In other words, we show that the resolution of uncertainty regard-
ing the election outcome does not immediately resolve the political uncertainty
surrounding the presidential election. Its eects are still manifested in the option-
implied measures of rm price and tail risk and expected return for some days after
the election. These eects are signicantly stronger for rms that are sensitive to
policy uncertainty, stressing again the importance of this rm characteristic.
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2.4.2 The eect of exposure
Next, we examine the eect of a rm's exposure to the presidential party. Table
2.4 reports the corresponding estimates from alternative specications of models
(2.8) and (2.9). It should be noted that the sample of rms used in these tests is
smaller, because we require a complete history of 10-year monthly stock returns
to determine whether a rm is Exposed or not (see Section 2.2.3.2).
Using this smaller sample of rms, we rstly conrm the previous ndings re-
garding the time eect of political uncertainty, regardless of whether the rm is
Exposed or not. In particular, for the non-exposed rms, we estimate an aver-
age increase of 6.18% (4.4%) in ATM, 0.97% (0.83%) in LSKEW, and 41 bps
(29 bps) in OIEXRET during the Election (PostElection) period, relative to the
Benchmark period.25
More interestingly, we report highly signicant dierential eects on the option-
implied price risk and expected return of Exposed rms. In particular, we esti-
mate an additional, strongly signicant increase of 3.47% in ATM and 31 bps in
OIEXRET during the Election period for Exposed rms. We also estimate an
additional increase of 0.32% in LSKEW for Exposed rms, but this is signicant
only at the 10% level. Similarly, we nd a signicant dierential increase in ATM
and OIEXRET during the PostElection period for Exposed rms. Hence, political
uncertainty renders stock options signifcantly more expensive around presidential
elections, and this eect is substantially larger for Exposed rms, which also com-
mand a higher premium. These results lead to the conclusion that exposure to the
presidential party, in the spirit of Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and Addoum
and Kumar (2016), is an important dimension of rm risk, which is manifested
during these episodes of political uncertainty.
25For this smaller sample of rms, the average value during the Benchmark period is 42.48%
p.a. for ATM, 5.06% p.a. for LSKEW, and 59 bps per month for OIEXRET.
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Identifying the party to which rms are favorably exposed provides some further
interesting insights. Specically, estimating model (2.9), we nd that the dieren-
tial eects of political uncertainty are stronger for rms that are favorably exposed
to the incumbent party during the Election period. In particular, we nd a dif-
ferential increase of 3.96% in ATM, 0.58% in LSKEW, and 38 bps in OIEXRET
for Exposed_Incumbent rms. These dierential increases are signicant at the
1% level. On the other hand, the corresponding estimates for Exposed_Contender
rms are smaller in magnitude and insignicant for LSKEW. This decomposition
of political exposure enables us to conclude that not only stock options of Exposed
rms become more expensive around presidential elections, but also that the deep
OTM puts of rms that are exposed to the incumbent party are substantially more
expensive relative to the at-the-money options during the Election period. This
nding reects the willingness of investors to pay a signicantly higher price to be
protected against the downside tail risk of Exposed_Incumbent rms during this
period.
We estimate interesting dierential eects during the PostElection period too. In
particular, we nd a large dierential increase of 7.78% in ATM and 59 bps in
OIEXRET for rms that are exposed to the party that has just lost the presidential
election. To the contrary, we nd no signicant dierential eect on the risk and
expected return of rms that are exposed to the winning party. In sum, our di-in-
di estimates show that investors perceive rms that are exposed to the incumbent
party as well as rms that are exposed to the loser party as substantially riskier,
due to the political uncertainty surrounding the presidential election, and they
require a higher premium to withhold their stock.
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2.4.3 The eect of alignment
Examining the eect of geographical political alignment with the presidential
party, Table 2.5 reports the estimates from various specications of models (2.10)
and (2.11).
Beyond the aggregate time eect of political uncertainty across rms, which is
discussed in the previous subsections, we make a number of interesting observations
regarding the dierential eect of political alignment. In particular, we nd that
rms located in states which are politically aligned with the incumbent party
experience a signicant additional increase of 1.23% in ATM, 0.31% in LSKEW,
and 11 bps in OIEXRET during the Election period, relative to rms that are
not aligned with either party. To the contrary, rms that are aligned with the
contender party do not exhibit a signicant additional increase in their price and
tail risk or equity premium during the same period.
An implication of this evidence is that, during the Election period, investors per-
ceive the potential benets enjoyed by rms located in states which are politically
aligned with the presidential party to be at risk due to the uncertainty in the
outcome of the forthcoming election. Hence, investors require a higher premium
for Aligned_Incumbent rms, whose stock options, and especially their deep OTM
puts, become substantially more expensive during this period. Interestingly, this
evidence provides support for the argument of Kim et al. (2012) that geographical
political alignment with the presidential party is a source of risk. In fact, we doc-
ument that it can aect both the price and the tail risk of the rm during episodes
of political uncertainty, such as presidential elections.
Estimating the corresponding dierential eects during the PostElection period,
we nd that rms located in states which are politically aligned with the party
that has just lost the presidential election exhibit an additional increase of 1.10%
in ATM and 9 bps in OIEXRET, relative to rms that are not aligned with either
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party. We do not nd any dierential eect on the tail risk of these rms. More-
over, our di-in-di estimates show no additional increase in the risk or expected
return of rms that are geographically politically aligned with the party that has
just won the election.
We further examine the eect of the strength of political alignment. Columns (3)
and (6) in Table 2.5 lead to the conclusion that the higher the degree of political
alignment with the presidential party, the greater the increase in ATM, LSKEW,
and OIEXRET during the Election period. In particular, a rm with a PAI value
equal to 0.25 in excess of the median value in the corresponding election cycle
would exhibit an additional increase of 0.96% in ATM, 0.19% in LSKEW, and
more than 9 bps in OIEXRET during the Election period. Moreover, we estimate
that a rm experiencing a reduction in its state-level PAI value by 0.5 right after
the presidential election would exhibit an additional increase of 1.34% in ATM
and more than 11 bps in OIEXRET during the PostElection period.
Taken together, these results show that the eects of political uncertainty are
typically stronger among rms that either risk losing the benets of being po-
litically aligned with the presidential party in the forthcoming election or have
just ceased being aligned with the presidential party due to the election outcome.
Even though the magnitude of these dierential eects is somewhat smaller than
the corresponding eects reported above due to rm sensitivity and exposure, we
conclude that geographical political alignment is a particularly important rm
characteristic that determines the manifestation of political uncertainty around
presidential elections.
2.4.4 The eect of connectedness
We also consider the eect of political connectedness on rm risk and expected
return. Table 2.6 presents the estimates from various specications of models
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(2.12) and (2.13).
We report no signicant dierential eect on the ATM and OIEXRET of Con-
nected rms during the Election period. To the contrary, we nd that Connected
rms exhibit an additional increase of 0.37% in LSKEW during this period. Hence,
investors are ready to pay a signicantly higher price for the relatively deep OTM
puts of Connected rms during the Election period, but this does not translate
into a higher required premium for the stocks of these rms. We derive very
similar conclusions when we alternatively consider stricter denitions of political
connectedness in our robustness analysis (see Section 2.5.2.3).
We further examine whether using the actual number of candidates with whom a
rm is connected, instead of a dummy variable, to capture the strength of political
connectedness, leads to dierent conclusions. Column (3) of Table 2.5 reports
the corresponding estimates. We still nd no signicant eect on ATM, whereas
the relationship of OIEXRET with the number of connected politicians becomes
signicantly negative, though very small in magnitude. Moreover, the positive
eect of political connectedness on LSKEW during the Election period remains
intact.
Motivated by the arguments of Cooper et al. (2010), we additionally consider
whether contributing exclusively to candidates of either party gives rise to a dif-
ferential eect during the Election period. Estimating model (2.13), we nd no
evidence that contributing to Democrat or Republican candidates only has a dif-
ferential eect on rm risk or expected return. In fact, the dierential positive
eect we previously documented with respect to LSKEW originates from rms
that contribute to candidates of both parties. In unreported results, we have
also examined whether contributing exclusively to Senate or House candidates
would yield a dierential eect, presumably because a Senate candidate might be
a stronger political connection. Again, we nd no such a dierential eect.
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Last, we report dierential eects due to political connectedness during the Post-
Election period. In particular, we nd that Connected rms exhibit an additional
increase of 0.99% in ATM and 0.28% in LSKEW during this period, though the
latter eect is marginally signicant.
In sum, our results lead to the conclusion that being politically connected is asso-
ciated with an additional increase in equity tail risk around presidential elections.
However, we nd no evidence that politically connected rms command an ad-
ditional equity premium during these episodes of political uncertainty. Hence,
we remain sceptical of whether a risk-based mechanism can explain the ndings
of Cooper et al. (2010) on the positive correlation between the strength of rm
political connectedness and future stock returns.
2.4.5 Interaction eects
Motivated by the arguments of Akey and Lewellen (2017), we further examine the
potential interaction eects between rm sensitivity and political connectedness.
Table 2.7 presents the estimates from alternative specications of models (2.14)
and (2.15).
First, we test whether political connectedness is an amplifying or a mitigating
mechanism with respect to the strong eect of political uncertainty, which is doc-
umented in Section 2.4.1 for Sensitive rms. We nd that political connected-
ness amplies the eect on LSKEW for Sensitive rms during the Election and
PostElection periods. In particular, rms that are both Connected and Sensitive
exhibit an additional increase of 1.14% (1.45%) in LSKEW during the Election
(PostElection) period, as compared to non-Connected but Sensitive rms. Polit-
ical connectedness also exerts a dierential eect on the ATM of Sensitive rms,
but this eect is not statistically signicant. We nd no statistical signicance for
this eect, even if we cluster standard errors by rm-cycle only (see column (4)
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of Table 2.6). Moreover, there is no signicant interaction eect with respect to
OIEXRET.
Second, we gauge the dierential eect on the risk and expected return of a rm
being Connected, rather than not, controlling for the eect of being Sensitive or
not. Column (3) in Table 2.7 reports the corresponding triple-di estimates. In-
terestingly, we nd that political connectedness signicantly increases LSKEW by
0.88% during the Election period, net of the eect of rm sensitivity. We also
estimate an increase of 0.72% in ATM that can be purely attributed to politi-
cal connectedness, but this triple-di estimate is statistically insignicant. The
corresponding eect on OIEXRET is negligible.
In sum, we nd no evidence that being Connected acts as a mitigating factor
with respect to the eect of political uncertainty around presidential elections.
To the contrary, being Connected aggravates the eect on the downside tail risk
of Sensitive rms. Moreover, being Connected signicantly increases the relative
expensiveness of deep OTM puts during the Election period, net of the eect of
the rm's sensitivity status.
In a further attempt to examine whether there is a mechanism that attenuates
the eect of political uncertainty on Sensitive rms, we also consider the role
of political hedging. To this end, we re-estimate model (2.14), after replacing the
dummy variable Connectedi with the dummy variableHedgedi, which is dened in
Section 2.2.3.4.26 Table 2.8 reports the corresponding results. Overall, we nd no
signicant evidence that those Sensitive rms which are also Hedged experience a
reduction in their risk or expected return during the Election period, as compared
to the Sensitive rms which are not Hedged.
26We have dened a rm as Hedged or not in terms of the ratio of Republican-to-Democrat
candidates that its PAC has contributed to. For robustness, we have alternatively dened the
dummy variable Hedged in terms of the ratio between total dollar contributions to Republican
and Democrat candidates, expressed as a percentage of rm market value. Using this alternative
denition of the dummy variable Hedged, the corresponding estimates, which are available upon
request, lead to very similar conclusions.
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In addition, column (3) in Table 2.8 reports the triple-di estimate of the eect of
a rm being Hedged, rather than not, accounting for the eect of being Sensitive or
not. Again, we nd no evidence that being politically Hedged leads to a reduction
in rm risk or expected return during the Election period. Hence, we conclude
that political hedging does not play a distinct role with respect to the eects of
political uncertainty around presidential elections.
Last, we also examine the potential interaction eect between political connect-
edness and exposure to the presidential party. To this end, we re-estimate model
(2.14), after replacing the dummy variable Sensitivei with the dummy variable
Exposedi. Table 2.A1 in the Appendix presents the corresponding results. We nd
that if a rm is Exposed, then being also Connected leads to a sizeable, but sta-
tistically insignicant, reduction in its ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET during the
Election period. Hence, there is some evidence, albeit statistically insignicant,
that political connectedness can partly mitigate the eect of political uncertainty
for Exposed rms.
2.5 Robustness analysis
2.5.1 Alternative denitions of Benchmark, Election, and
PostElection periods
Section 2.3.1 provides a detailed justication for the denition of the Benchmark,
Election, and PostElection periods that are used in the benchmark empirical anal-
ysis. To address the potential concern that the main conclusions of our analysis
might be driven by this specic denition, we perform a number of robustness
tests, employing alternative denitions.
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First, we use a much wider denition for the Benchmark period, which now con-
tains the union of the calendar days [d−179, d−30] and [d+31, d+180]. This wider
denition ensures that the dierential eects we estimate during the Election and
PostElection periods are genuinely driven by the political uncertainty surrounding
the presidential election. In fact, this much wider Benchmark period now covers
almost an entire calendar year around the presidential election day, and hence it
should embed the eect of any other political or economic event, apart from the
election itself. Table 2.9 reports the estimates for the eect of rm sensitivity to
economic policy uncertainty on risk and expected return, using this alternative
denition.27 Comparing the results reported in Table 2.9 with the corresponding
results reported in Table 2.3, we conclude that both the aggregate time eects of
political uncertainty and the dierential eects of rm sensitivity are very robust
to the use of this much wider Benchmark period.
Second, we alternatively use a narrower denition for the Election and PostElection
periods. In particular, Election is now a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 for the calendar days in the interval [d− 8, d− 1], and PostElection is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+8].
This narrower denition ensures that the dierential eects we estimate during the
Election and PostElection periods are indeed driven by the political uncertainty
surrounding the presidential election, since the latter is certainly the dominant
event in nancial markets during this very narrow time period. Table 2.A2 in
the Appendix presents the corresponding results using these narrower denitions.
Comparing them with the benchmark results reported in Table 2.3, we conrm that
both the overall increase in ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET during the Election
and PostElection periods and the corresponding dierential increases for Sensitive
rms are genuinely driven by the political uncertainty surrounding the presidential
27It should be noted that, to alleviate a potential reverse causality concern, the characterisation
of rms as Sensitive or not is again made prior to the beginning of this alternative Benchmark
period.
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election. If anything, the estimated dierential increase in ATM and LSKEW is
even stronger using these narrower denitions.
Third, we alternatively dene the Benchmark period to contain the interval of
calendar days [d − 119, d − 60] only. Including only this pre-election interval in
the Benchmark period alleviates the potential concern that the results reported
in Section 2.4 might be aected by a potential sharp reduction in rm risk and
expected return in the months following the presidential election. In that case,
including the interval [d + 61, d + 120] in the denition of the Benchmark pe-
riod would underestimate the level of rm risk and expected return, leading to
an overestimation of the dierential eects during the Election and PostElection
periods. Table 2.A3 in the Appendix reports the corresponding results using this
alternative denition of the Benchmark period. Comparing these results with the
benchmark results reported in Table 2.3, we nd that the estimated time eects
due to political uncertainty remain intact. Moreover, we report larger di-in-di
estimates of the eect of rm sensitivity on ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET, par-
ticularly during the Election period. Hence, we conclude that, if anything, the
inclusion of the interval [d+ 61, d+ 120] in the denition of the Benchmark period
reduces, rather than increases, the magnitude of the dierential eects that we
estimate around presidential elections.
In sum, the economic and statistical signicance of our benchmark results is not
driven by the specic denitions of the three periods made in our main empirical
design. In fact, alternative denitions yield even stronger di-in-di estimates of
the eect of rm sensitivity on risk and expected return. We have also performed
the same robustness analysis for the eects of the other corporate political char-
acteristics that we examine in this study. The corresponding results, which are
readily available upon request, conrm that our benchmark conclusions regarding
the dierential eects of political exposure, alignment, and connectedness on rm
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risk and expected return are not particularly sensitive to alternative defnitions of
the Benchmark, Election, and PostElection periods.
2.5.2 Alternative denitions of political dummy variables
Our benchmark analysis is based on the political dummy variables dened in
Section 2.2.3. Here, we perform a number of robustness checks using alternative
denitions of these variables.
2.5.2.1 Sensitive rms
We examine variations of the benchmark approach we used to dene a rm as
Sensitive or not. In particular, on the basis of the regression model (2.5), we
alternatively dene a rm as Sensitive when: i) the coecient estimate δ̂i is sig-
nicant at the 5% level, instead of the 10% level, ii) the coecient estimate δ̂i
is signicant at the 10% level, but it is now estimated using the past 24-month
window, instead of the past 36-month window, or iii) the coecient estimate δ̂i
is signicant at the 10% level, but it is now estimated using a variation of the
EPU Index of Baker et al. (2016); this alternative index is constructed using also
tax code expiration and economic forecaster disagreement data, apart from the
frequency of newspaper articles. We have repeated our benchmark analysis using
each of these three alternative denitions of the dummy variable Sensitive. The
corresponding results, which are available upon request, yield very similar conclu-
sions to the ones discussed in Section 2.4.1, regarding the dierential eect of rm
sensitivity on ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET around presidential elections.
We also employ alternative denitions of the dummy variable Sensitive using dif-
ferent specications of model (2.5). In particular, we include MUI as an additional
regressor in (2.5) and dene a rm as Sensitive, if the coecient estimate δ̂i from
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this augmented model is signicant at the 10% level. Table 2.A4 in the Appendix
presents the corresponding results using this alternative denition. These results
are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 2.3. Sensitive rms ex-
hibit a signicant dierential increase in ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET during
the Election and PostElection periods, in addition to the overall time eect that
is observed during these periods. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the
magnitude of these dierential eects is now lower relative to our benchmark re-
sults. Due to the non-negligible correlation between the EPU Index and MUI, this
alternative approach essentially characterizes a rm as Sensitive with respect to
the component of EPU Index that is orthogonal to macroeconomic uncertainty.
Hence, this alternative denition of the dummy variable Sensitive does not fully
account for the dierential eect of sensitivity to economic policy uncertainty on
rm risk and expected return.
In addition, we alternatively dene the dummy variable Sensitive after including
the S&P 500 VIX as an additional regressor in (2.5). Table 2.A5 in the Appendix
reports the corresponding results using this alternative denition. The results
are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in our benchmark analysis, indi-
cating that Sensitive rms exhibit a dierential increase in ATM, LSKEW, and
OIEXRET during the Election and PostElection periods. However, the magni-
tude of these dierential eects is substantially lower relative to the benchmark
results, and it is only marginally statistically signicant for LSKEW. The explana-
tion for this reduction in the magnitude of the dierential eects lies in the strong
correlation between the EPU Index and VIX (see Baker et al., 2016, for a related
discussion). Hence, characterizing a rm as Sensitive only with respect to the
component of the EPU Index that is orthogonal to market volatility fails to fully
account for the dierential eect of rm sensitivity to economic policy uncertainty
on risk and expected return around presidential elections.
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2.5.2.2 Exposed rms
Our benchmark analysis for the eect of political exposure utilized the dummy
variable Exposed, which was dened on the basis of the regression model (2.6). In
this model specication, RepubDummyt is set equal to 1 from November after a
Republican President is elected, and equal to 0 from November after a Democrat
President is elected. In contrast, based on the ndings of Abramowitz (1988, 2008)
that the presidential election outcome is predictable, Addoum and Kumar (2016)
alternatively set RepubDummyt equal to 1 from August prior to a Republican
President being elected, and equal to 0 from August prior to a Democrat President
being elected. To alleviate the concern that our benchmark results might be
aected by a potential mischaracterisation of Exposed rms, we repeat our analysis
using this alternative denition of RepubDummyt.
Table 2.A6 in the Appendix reports the corresponding results for the eect of
political exposure on rm risk and expected return. The results are very similar
to the ones reported in Table 2.4. Actually, the dierential eect of political
exposure on LSKEW is now strongly signicant. It should be further noted that
the fraction of rms characterised as Exposed across the electoral cycles, using
this alternative denition of RepubDummyt, is very similar to the one reported in
Panel B of Table 2.1. Hence, we conclude that Exposed rms exhibit a signicant
dierential increase in ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET during the Election and
PostElection periods, regardless of the exact denition of RepubDummyt.
2.5.2.3 Connected rms
A rm is dened as Connected in the benchmark analysis, if it has contributed
to at least one federal election candidate during the past 60 months. Arguably,
contributing to a single or a few candidates only may not be sucient for a rm to
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establish particularly strong political connections. Here, we alternatively explore
stricter denitions of corporate political connectedness.
First, we dene Connected* as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
number of candidates the rm has contributed to during the past 60 months is
higher than the corresponding median value across rms with positive contribu-
tions, and 0 otherwise. As a result of this stricter denition, the fraction of rms
that are characterised as Connected* in each election cycle is half of the corre-
sponding fraction reported in Panel B of Table 2.1. Table 2.A7 in the Appendix
reports the results from estimating model (2.12) using this alternative denition
of political connectedness. These results conrm the conclusions we derived in
our benchmark analysis. In particular, we nd a signicant dierential increase in
LSKEW for Connected* rms during the Election and PostElection periods. To
the contrary, there is no signicant dierential eect on the ATM or OIEXRET
of Connected* rms during the Election period.
Second, we dene the dummy variable Connected_HQState, which takes the value
1 if a rm has contributed to a candidate who has been elected in the state of its
headquarters during the past 60 months, and 0 otherwise. In addition, the variable
Num. of Connections_HQState counts the number of the candidates to whom the
rm has contributed and who have been elected in the state of its headquarters
during the past 60 months. Arguably, contributing to a "home" candidate, who
also gets elected, constitutes a stronger form of political connection. Table 2.A8 in
Appendix presents the corresponding estimates using these two stricter measures
of political connectedness. In sum, the reported results are very similar to the ones
presented in Table 2.6, conrming the conclusions of our main analysis in Section
2.4.4.
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2.5.3 Subsample of big- and mid-cap rms
Our benchmark analysis is based on a sample of rms with optionable stocks. We
have additionally imposed a number of lters to ensure the reliability of the val-
ues of the option-based variables. As a result, our sample consists of rms which
are, on average, much bigger in terms of capitalization relative to the standard
cross-section of rms that is examined in most empirical asset pricing studies.
Nevertheless, we perform an additional robustness test to alleviate the potential
concern that our benchmark results might be primarily driven by the smaller cap-
italization rms in our sample, limiting the economic signicance of the estimated
dierential eects. In particular, we repeat our analysis using only rms that are
constituents of the S&P 500 and the S&P Mid-Cap 400 Indices in the correspond-
ing electoral cycle. This sample selection naturally reduces the number of rms
included in this robustness analysis, which now ranges from 493 in 1996 to 740 in
2008. Table 2.10 reports the corresponding results for the eect of rm sensitivity
on risk and expected return.
Using this subsample of big- and mid-cap rms, we rstly conrm that ATM,
LSKEW, and OIEXRET exhibit, on average, a signicant increase during the
Election and PostElection periods. Moreover, comparing the results in Table 2.10
with the corresponding results reported in Table 2.3, we nd that the di-in-di
estimate of the eect of rm sensitivity on ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET is even
larger in this subsample of rms, particularly during the Election period. Hence,
we conclude that the economic signicance of the dierential eect of sensitivity
to policy uncertainty on risk and expected return is actually stronger for big- and
mid-cap rms, relative to what our benchmark results indicate.28
28We have also performed the same robustness analysis for the eects of political exposure,
alignment, and connectedness, using this subsample of big- and mid-cap rms. The corresponding
results yield conclusions that are very similar to the ones derived in our benchmark analysis.
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2.5.4 Placebo tests with "pseudo" election days
We conclude our robustness analysis by conducting placebo tests to alleviate any
remaining concerns that our results might be an artefact of the empirical design
or that they might be caused by "luck". To this end, we repeat our benchmark
empirical analysis by alternatively using combinations of "pseudo" election dates.
In particular, we draw 10,000 combinations of six "pseudo" election dates d̃, one
from each of the six election cycles in our sample period. This choice ensures that
all six election cycles are represented in each combination of "pseudo" election
dates. Each "pseudo" election day d̃ is drawn from the interval between the end
of April, prior to the actual November election, and the end of August after the
election. In the spirit of Kelly et al. (2016), the only restriction we impose is that
the "pseudo" election day d̃ cannot occur within 30 days from the actual election
day d.
For each combination of the six "pseudo" election days, we estimate specications
of model (2.7), where the Benchmark, Election, and PostElection periods are de-
ned as in our benchmark empirical design, but now relative to the "pseudo"
election day d̃. To alleviate any concern regarding reverse causality, we still char-
acterise a rm as Sensitive or not prior to the beginning of the corresponding
"pseudo"-Benchmark period.
Table 2.11 reports the results from these placebo tests. Specically, it reports the
mean estimate of each coecient across the 10,000 combinations of the "pseudo"
election days, along with the corresponding coecient estimate from Table 2.3,
which is derived using the actual presidential election days. We also report the
placebo p-value, which shows the fraction of the placebo coecient estimates that
are higher than the actual estimate of the corresponding coecient.
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We nd that the average placebo coecient estimates are negative for all three
option-implied measures of rm risk and expected return. This holds true for
the estimates of the dierential time eect during the Election and PostElection
periods (i.e., coecients β1 and γ1 in model (2.7)) as well as the di-in-di esti-
mates of the eect of rm sensitivity (i.e., coecients β2 and γ2 in model (2.7)).
As a result, we conrm that the large positive dierential eects reported in our
benchmark analysis are not simply an artefact of the employed empirical design.
Moreover, we nd that the placebo p-values are very low for all estimates across the
three measures. Hence, these falsication tests suggest that the estimated increases
in ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET during the Election and PostElection periods,
and the corresponding estimated dierential increases for Sensitive rms, using the
actual presidential election days, are signicantly greater than what would have
been estimated with randomly selected "pseudo" election days. In other words,
the magnitude of our benchmark estimates can be genuinely attributed to the
politicaly uncertainty surrounding the actual presidential election days; it could
not be spuriously caused by "luck" or combinations of other, non-election events.
2.5.5 Scheduled Earnings Announcements during the Elec-
tion period
A prominent example of rm-specic scheduled events that aect the rm's ATM is
the earnings announcement drift. Dubinsky et al. (2018) nd that a rm's implied
volatility increases before an earnings announcement, the term structure of its
implied volatility is negatively sloped, and the implied volatility discontinuously
falls after the announcement. Motivated by their study, we rst assess whether
there is an earnings season surrounding the presidential election that could aect
our result. Secondly, we test the eect of the presidential elections on the term
structure of the ATM of the market and of individual stocks.
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Figure 2.3: For each US Presidential Election day, d, the Figure shows the
fraction of stocks in each Earnings Announcement Regime for the days during
the Election period, ranging from d − 15 to d − 1. We consider a stock to be
in the Pre Announcement Window regime if it has a scheduled announcement
in the following 7 days. If the next earnings announcement is after 7 days, we
consider the stock to be in the Non-Pre Announcement Window regime.
To gauge the possible eect that earnings announcements have on our results
we work as follows. First, for each rm in our sample, we source the dates of its
scheduled earnings announcements from Compustat. Second, on each day, we split
the stocks for which we have earning announcement data into two categories. In
the rst category, which we call Pre Announcement Window regime, we assign all
the stocks that have a scheduled earnings announcement in one of the following
seven days. In the second category, which we call the Non-Pre Announcement
Window regime, we assign the rest of the stocks. Figure 2.3 shows the fraction of
stocks in each category for each day of the Election period.
The percentage of rms in the Pre Announcement Window regime ranges from 14%
to 27% across the days of the Election period. Furthermore, we nd that across all
the days of the Election period, more than 78% of our rm-day observations are
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in a Non-Pre Announcement Window regime. The percentage increases to 82% in
our narrower denition for the Election period, where Election is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d− 8, d− 1]. Hence,
our sample is dominated by rm-day observations, where rms are in the Non-
Pre Announcement Window. This nding alleviates the potential concern that
our results could be systematically aected by an earnings season surrounding the
presidential elections.
Furthermore, we test the eect of the presidential elections on the slope of the ATM
term structure. We proxy for the slope of the term structure with the dierence
between the ATM measure using the implied volatilities for options with maturity
equal to 60 days (ATM2m) minus the ATM,
ATMSl = ATM2m − ATM.
We test the eect that the Election and the Post Election periods have on the
term-structure of the S&P 500 and the average stock by the regression models
ATMSlm,t =α + β1Electiont + γ1PostElectiont+
+ φ2rmkt,t + εm,t
(2.17)
and
ATMSli,t =α + β1Electiont + γ1PostElectiont+
+ φ1ri,t + φ2rmkt,t+
+ Firm x Election Cycle FE + εi,t,
(2.18)
respectively. Table 2.12 reports the results. The slope of the S&P 500 ATM term
structure is on average positive and equals 0.49% during the Benchmark period. In
contrast, the term structure of the index becomes negatively sloped during both
the Election and the Post Election periods, as it decreases by -1.86% (t-stat =
−5.04) and -1.07% (t-stat = −2.63), respectively. Similarly, for the average stock,
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we nd that the slope of the term-structure decreases by −1.5% (t-stat = −5.14)
and −0.4% (t-stat = −2.92) during the Election and the Post Election periods, re-
spectively. Hence, there are two main dierences between the presidential elections
and rm-specic earnings announcements. First, the presidential elections aect
both the market overall and the average stock individually. Second, in contrast to
the earnings announcements, the uncertainty created by the presidential elections
is not resolved abruptly after the event but persists during the PostElection period
as well.
2.6 The eect on option trading activity and the
dispersion of investor beliefs
In this Section, we examine the eect of political uncertainty around presidential
elections on various dimensions of option trading activity and the dispersion of in-
vestor beliefs. Apart from testing the existence of an aggregate time eect during
the Election or PostElection period, we also examine whether there are dieren-
tial eects during these periods for rms that are Sensitive, Exposed, Aligned, or
Connected.
2.6.1 Option trading activity
Table 2.13 presents the estimates for the eect of political uncertainty on TOTVOL.
Interestingly, we nd signicant dierential time eects. In particular, relative
to the Benchmark period, TOTVOL signicantly increases during the Election
period, whereas it signicantly decreases during the PostElection period. The
magnitude of these time eects is quite large. Given the normalised denition of
the option trading variables (see Section 2.2.2.2), the reported estimates indicate
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that the average increase in TOTVOL during the Election period is approximately
equal to 30% of the average TOTVOL value from January to June prior to the
election.29 Similarly, relative to the Benchmark period, we nd a signicant reduc-
tion in TOTVOL during the PostElection period, which is approximately equal to
20% of its average value in the prior period from January to June.30
Next, we examine whether there is a dierential eect on TOTVOL for rms with
specic political characteristics. Even though there is some evidence that rms
which are sensitive to policy uncertainty and rms that are geographically politi-
cally aligned with the presidential party exhibit a dierential increase in TOTVOL
during the Election period, this evidence is not statistically signicant. The only
di-in-di estimate that is signicant at the 5% level indicates a substantial in-
crease in TOTVOL during the PostElection period for rms exposed to the party
that has just lost the presidential election.
As an alternative measure of trading activity in the option market, we also utilize
TOTOI. Table 2.A9 in the Appendix reports the corresponding estimates. Similar
to TOTVOL, we nd a highly signicant increase in TOTOI during the Election
period. To the contrary, the estimated decrease in TOTOI during the PostElection
period is statistically insignicant. Examining the dierential eects due to rm
political characteristics, the most interesting nding is that rms which are aligned
29Alternatively, since the average TOTVOL value during the Benchmark period is 1.26, the
coecient estimate of 0.293 for the Election period, which is reported in Panel A of Table 2.13,
indicates a percentage increase of approximately 23% relative to the Benchmark period.
30Since TOTVOL is computed from options with expiry between 16 and 60 days ahead, this
trading activity cannot be driven by potentially abnormal trading patterns of near-expiry options.
Another potential concern is that our results might be reecting a periodical option trading
pattern due to the denition of the Election and PostElection periods and the expiry cycle of
the options. To address this potential concern, we alternatively use a much narrower denition
of these two periods. Similar to the robustness check discussed in Section 2.5.1, Election takes
the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d− 8, d− 1], and PostElection takes the value 1
for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+8], where d is the presidential election day. We also
construct TOTVOL using options that expire between 8 and 60 days ahead. The corresponding
results, which are available upon request, yield a very similar pattern; we estimate again a
signicant average increase in TOTVOL during the narrower Election period and a signicant
average decrease in TOTVOL during the narrower PostElection period. Hence, our estimates
reect a genuine time eect due to the political uncertainty surrounding the presidential election,
and they are not spuriously driven by the option expiry cycle.
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with the presidential party exhibit a signicant additional increase in TOTOI
during the Election period.
To gauge whether these trading activity patterns are more pronounced in the
option rather than the underlying stock market, we also estimate the corresponding
eects on the TOTVOL-to-STOCKVOL ratio. Results are reported in Table 2.A10
in the Appendix. Interestingly, we nd a signicant increase in TOTVOL-to-
STOCKVOL during the Election period, and a signicant decrease in TOTVOL-
to-STOCKVOL during the PostElection period. Hence, we conclude that the
documented eects on option trading activity around presidential elections do
not simply mimic similar eects on stock trading activity; the eects on option
trading activity are much more pronounced. In addition, we nd that rms which
are aligned with the presidential party exhibit an additional increase in TOTVOL-
to-STOCKVOL during the Election period.
Overall, we nd strong evidence that option trading activity is substantially in-
creased during the Election period. This increase could be a reection of an
increased dispersion of investor beliefs due to political uncertainty, or it could be
driven by hedging or speculative motives in anticipation of stock price shifts due
to the election outcome. In fact, open interest and the option-to-stock volume
ratio have been proposed as proxies for investor hedging demand (see inter alia
Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2010; Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; Johnson
and So, 2012). In an attempt to understand better the underlying mechanism that
leads to the documented patterns, we further examine components of the option
trading activity across dierent option moneyness levels.
To this end, we rstly consider the trading activity in OTM puts, which is com-
monly regarded to reect hedging demand by pessimistic investors (see inter alia
Dennis and Mayhew, 2002; Beber and Brandt, 2006; Stilger et al., 2017). Table
2.14 reports the estimates for the eect of political uncertainty on OTMPUTVOL.
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We nd signicant dierential time eects, which are similar to the ones reported
for TOTVOL. In particular, relative to the Benchmark period, we nd a signicant
increase (decrease) in OTMPUTVOL during the Election (PostElection) period.
However, we do not report signicant dierential eects on OTMPUTVOL due
to corporate political characteristics, with the exception of an additional increase
during the PostElection period for rms which are exposed to the party that has
just lost the presidential election as well as for Connected rms.
To examine whether these time eects on the trading activity of OTM puts sim-
ply reect the corresponding time eects on total option trading volume reported
in Table 2.13, we utilize the ratio OTMPUTVOL-to-TOTVOL. Table A11 in the
Appendix reports these estimates. Using this standardised measure of trading ac-
tivity in OTM puts, we nd that the average increase during the Election period
remains large and signicant, whereas the eect during the PostElection period
disappears. Moreover, we nd no evidence of a signicant dierential eect for
Sensitive, Exposed, Aligned, or Connected rms during the Election period. We
only estimate a signicant additional increase for Connected rms during the Post-
Election period.
Last, we consider the eect of political uncertainty on the trading of activity of
OTM calls, which may reect speculative demand by optimistic investors (see,
for example, Bali and Murray, 2013; Filippou, Garcia-Ares, and Zapatero, 2017;
Gkionis, Kostakis, Skiadopoulos, and Stilger, 2018) or simply volatility trading.
Table 2.15 presents the corresponding results using OTMCALLVOL. We docu-
ment a very strong increase in OTMCALLVOL during the Election period, and
a signicant decrease during the PostElection period. Interestingly, we also nd
a signicant additional increase in the OTMCALLVOL of Sensitive rms during
the Election period, and a signicant additional decrease during the PostElection
period for rms which are exposed to the party that has just won the presidential
election.
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In sum, the previous analysis leads to a number of interesting conclusions. First,
we document that there is a signicant increase in option trading activity during
the Election period and a corresponding decrease during the PostElection period.
Second, these shifts in option trading activity are much more pronounced than
the corresponding shifts in stock trading activity. Hence, the importance of the
option market as trading venue increases in the run up to presidential elections.
Third, we nd similar patterns in the trading activity of both OTM puts and
OTM calls. As a result, the documented shifts in total trading activity cannot
be exclusively attributed to hedging or speculative motives. Fourth, we nd no
consistent evidence that rm political characteristics exert a signicant dierential
eect on total option trading activity or its components. Therefore, the signicant
dierential increase in ATM or LSKEW around presidential elections for Sensitive,
Exposed, Aligned, and Connected rms, which is documented in Section 2.4, cannot
be attributed to a trading pressure mechanism along the lines of Bollen andWhaley
(2004) and Garleanu et al. (2009).
2.6.2 Dispersion of investor beliefs
Motivated by the previous conclusions, we further examine whether political un-
certainty aects the dispersion of investor beliefs. To this end, we utilize DISPOI,
which is dened in Section 2.2.2.2. The results reported in Table 2.16 indicate a
number of signicant eects. Specically, we nd a large increase in the dispersion
of investor beliefs during the Election and PostElection periods, as compared to
the Benchmark period. Given an average DISPOI value of 1.14 during the Bench-
mark period, the dierential estimate of 0.173 (0.164) for the Election (PostElec-
tion) period, which is reported in Panel A of Table 2.16, corresponds to a relative
percentage increase of more than 15% (14%).
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Even more interestingly, we nd that corporate political characteristics exert a
signicant dierential eect too. In particular, Sensitive rms experience a very
large additional increase in DISPOI during both the Election and the PostElection
period. A substantial additional increase in DISPOI is reported for Exposed rms
too. Identifying the party to which rms are exposed, we nd that these positive
di-in-di estimates are strongly signicant for rms which are exposed to the
incumbent party, and for rms which are exposed to the party that has just lost
the election. We also estimate a signicant additional increase in DISPOI for
rms that are aligned with the incumbent presidential party during the Election
period. Last, we nd only marginally signicant evidence of a small dierential
reduction in DISPOI for rms that are Connected during the Election period.
Concluding, our results convincingly show that not only political uncertainty is
priced in the option market, but it also substantially increases the dispersion of
investor beliefs with respect to future price shifts. Contributing to the literature,
we show that rm political characteristics constitute an additional factor that can
render these beliefs even more disperse during episodes of political uncertainty. In
particular, we highlight that, during the Election period, investors form signi-
cantly more disperse beliefs regarding the value of the rms that are sensitive to
economic policy uncertainty as well as the rms that are exposed to or are geo-
graphically politically aligned with the presidential party. Overall, this evidence
explains to an extent the corresponding dierential eects reported in Section 2.4
for ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET, and it is consistent with the argument that
volatility and the equity premium are associated with heterogeneity in investor
beliefs.
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2.7 Conclusions
This study contributes to the growing literature that examines the eects of polit-
ical uncertainty on nancial markets by providing comprehensive evidence on the
manifestations of this type of uncertainty around US presidential elections. Using
information from the option market, we examine the time and cross-sectional dif-
ferential eects of these episodes of political uncertainty on the expected return of
equity, price and tail risk, as well as on option trading activity and the dispersion
of investor beliefs.
We nd that political uncertainty surrounding presidential elections is priced in
the option market, leading to a highly signicant increase in the equity price and
tail risk and the equity premium. Most interestingly, we document that, besides
the aggregate time eect, political uncertainty exerts strong dierential eects on
the basis of corporate political characteristics. This is particularly true for rms
that are sensitive to economic policy uncertainty and rms that are exposed to
or are geographically politically aligned with the presidential party. Moreover,
we convincingly show that the eect of political uncertainty persists in the rst
few days after the presidential election, even though the election outcome itself is
known.
Our results corroborate the arguments of Kim et al. (2012), Brogaard and Det-
zel (2015), and Akey and Lewellen (2017) that geographical political alignment
with the presidential party and sensitivity to policy uncertainty, respectively, are
important rm characteristics, which act as fundamental sources of risk during
episodes of political uncertainty. Similar is the conclusion for rms whose stock
returns are favorably or adversely exposed to the party aliation of the President.
To the contrary, we only nd limited evidence that direct political connectedness,
in the form of campaign contributions, is a source of tail risk. These ndings call
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for further research to understand the causes and implications of these corporate
political features and activities.
In an attempt to understand the trading mechanisms that give rise to these ef-
fects, we also examine the patterns in option trading activity and the dispersion
of investor beliefs around presidential elections. Whereas we nd a signicant
overall increase in option trading activity in the run up to the election, indicat-
ing an increase in the importance of the option market as trading venue, we nd
no consistent evidence that corporate political characteristics exert signicant dif-
ferential eects on this trading activity. Therefore, the documented dierential
eects on rm risk and expected return cannot be attributed to a trading pressure
mechanism.
On the other hand, we estimate a signicant dierential eect on the dispersion of
investor beliefs for sensitive, exposed, and aligned rms. Hence, we demonstrate
another channel through which political uncertainty aects nancial markets. It
causes an increase in the heterogeneity of investor beliefs, which, in turn, is as-
sociated with an increase in option-implied risk and the equity premium. Future
research could shed more light on the types of active traders and their motives




Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A shows the summary statistics for the daily option-based variables. The sample period in the 
benchmark results corresponds to the union of the calendar day intervals: [d-119, d-60], [d-15, d-1], [d+1, 
d+15], and [d+61, d+120], where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. ATM denotes 
the firm-level, annualized 30-day volatility implied by at-the-money options. LSKEW measures the 
difference between the annualized 30-day volatility implied by out-of-the-money put options and ATM. 
OIEXRET stands for the 30-day option-implied expected excess return of Martin and Wagner (2018), 
expressed in basis points (bps) per month. TOTVOL denotes the daily total trading volume of option 
contracts. TOTOI shows the daily total open interest for option contracts. TOTVOL-to-STOCKVOL denotes 
the daily ratio of TOTVOL divided by the stock trading volume. OTMPUTVOL stands for the daily total 
trading volume of out-of-the-money put options. OTMPUTVOL-to-TOTVOL shows the daily ratio of 
OTMPUTVOL divided by TOTVOL plus 0.01 to avoid zero values in the denominator. OTMCALLVOL 
corresponds to the daily total trading volume of out-of-the-money call options. DISPOI measures the daily 
dispersion of options’ open interest across levels of moneyness. Trading volume and open interest are 
computed from options with expiry between 16 and 60 days ahead. TOTVOL, TOTOI, TOTVOL-to-
STOCKVOL, OTMPUTVOL, OTMPUTVOL-to-TOTVOL, OTMCALLVOL, and DISPOI are normalized to 
be expressed as multiples of the corresponding firm-level average daily value computed from January to 
June prior to the November Presidential Election. Panel B shows the frequency of the political dummy 
variables per election cycle. Sensitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the regression 
slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index of Baker et al. 
(2016) is significant at the 10% level. Exposed is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the 
regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Republican President dummy is significant at 
the 10% level. Aligned_Incumbent is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if its headquarters 
are located in one of the top quartile states according to the election year’s Political Alignment Index (PAI) 
of Kim et al. (2012). Connected is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if its Political Action 
Committee (PAC) has contributed money to the PAC of a US House, Senate, or Presidential candidate 
during the past 60 months. Sensitive, Exposed, Aligned_Incumbent, and Connected are defined at the end of 
June prior to the November Presidential Election day d. Panel C shows the correlation matrix of the 
political dummy variables. 
 Panel A: Option-Based Variables 




ATM (%, p.a.) 50.61 26.90 19.13 30.19 44.12 64.94 102.84 936,959 
LSKEW (%, 
p.a.) 
5.23 7.01 -2.21 1.68 3.82 7.20 17.36 936,959 
OIEXRET (bps, 
per month) 
95.0 129.7 -6.1 14.2 49.5 128.7 350.6 895,231 
TOTVOL 1.29 3.34 0.00 0.04 0.32 1.08 5.39 886,019 
TOTOI 1.34 1.91 0.04 0.26 0.81 1.66 4.34 886,019 
TOTVOL-to-
STOCKVOL 
1.17 2.56 0.00 0.06 0.39 1.15 4.81 886,017 
OTMPUTVOL 1.48 5.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 6.18 875,782 
OTMPUTVOL-
to-TOTVOL 
1.11 2.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 5.67 875,782 
OTMCALLVOL 1.32 4.65 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.70 5.79 883,123 
DISPOI 1.20 0.87 0.33 0.69 1.00 1.42 2.80 514,044 





























1996 900 5.56% 536 12.31% 1,057 25.7% 900 29.4% 
2000 1,180 5.76% 694 10.81% 1,434 24.1% 1,180 27.5% 
2004 1,385 12.06% 892 19.17% 1,447 25.7% 1,385 27.9% 
2008 1,399 23.02% 1,053 24.41% 1,527 25.5% 1,399 31.0% 
2012 1,398 5.51% 1,063 7.43% 1,507 24.7% 1,398 32.3% 








Table 2.1: (Continued) 
Panel C: Correlation of Political Dummies 
   Sensitive Exposed 
Aligned_ 
Incumbent 
Connected   
 Sensitive 1      
 Exposed 0.058 1     
 Aligned_Incumbent -0.001 0.011 1    







Table 2.2: The Effect of the US Presidential Elections on the Market 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for the regression model (2.16). Election is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US Presidential 
Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar 
days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-60] and 
[d+61, d+120]. ATM denotes the annualized 30-day volatility implied by at-the-money options of the S&P 
500 index. 𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 denotes the S&P 500 return. Standard errors are clustered at the election year (cycle) 
level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 S&P 500 ATM (%, p.a.) 

















Clusters Cycle Cycle 
Observations 636 636 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: The Effect of Political Exposure 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression models (2.8) and 
(2.9). Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], 
where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of 
the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Exposed is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a 
firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Republican President dummy is 
significant at the 10% level. Exposed_Incumbent(Contender) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the sign of this significant slope coefficient is positive (negative) when a Republican President is in office 
or negative (positive) when a Democrat President is in office. Exposed_Winner(Loser) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the sign of this significant slope coefficient is positive (negative) when a 
Republican Presidential candidate has been elected or negative (positive) when a Democrat Presidential 
candidate has been elected. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include 
the daily stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 















































PostElection x Exposed 













     
7.78*** 
(5.93) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 














Observations 509,008 509,008 509,008 568,231 568,231 568,231 
R-squared adj. 0.827 0.829 0.829 0.828 0.831 0.831 















































PostElection x Exposed 













     
0.30 
(1.09) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 














Observations 509,008 509,008 509,008 568,231 568,231 568,231 









Table 2.4: (Continued) 















































PostElection x Exposed 













     
59.2*** 
(5.70) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 














Observations 486,413 486,413 486,413 542,956 542,956 542,956 




Table 2.5: The Effect of Political Alignment 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression models (2.10) and 
(2.11). Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], 
where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of 
the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. PAI* is the state-level value of the Political Alignment 
Index (PAI) of Kim et al. (2012) in excess of its median value across states in the same year. ΔPAI is the 
change in the state-level PAI right after the election. Aligned_Incumbent(Contender) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for a firm if its headquarters are located in one of the top (bottom) quartile states 
according to PAI before the election. Aligned_Winner(Loser) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
a firm if its headquarters are located in one of the top (bottom) quartile states according to PAI right after 
the election. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily stock 
and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 

































































PostElection x ΔPAI 
     
-2.68*** 
(-4.54) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














Observations 819,867 819,867 819,867 915,217 915,217 915,217 
R-squared adj. 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.851 0.851 0.851 

































































PostElection x ΔPAI 
     
-0.24 
(-1.63) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














Observations 819,867 819,867 819,867 915,217 915,217 915,217 









Table 2.5: Continued 

































































PostElection x ΔPAI 
     
-22.9*** 
(-4.96) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














Observations 783,328 783,328 783,328 874,352 874,352 874,352 




Table 2.6: The Effect of Connectedness 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression models (2.12) and 
(2.13). Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], 
where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of 
the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Connected is a dummy variable defined at the end of June 
prior to the November Presidential Election. It takes the value 1 for a firm if its PAC has contributed 
money to the PAC of a US House, Senate, or Presidential candidate in the past 60 months. Num. of 
Connections denotes the number of candidates that the firm PAC has contributed to. 
Connected_Democrat_only (Republican_only) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if its 
PAC has contributed money only to Democrat (Republican) candidates during the past 60 months years. 
ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily stock and market 
returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 




































Election x Connected_both 





    
4.21*** 
(4.40) 
PostElection x Connected 
    
0.99*** 
(2.85) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 732,409 815,579 
R-squared adj. 0.839 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.840 




































Election x Connected_both 





    
0.68*** 
(4.10) 
PostElection x Connected 
    
0.28* 
(1.74) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 732,409 815,579 








Table 2.6: (Continued) 




































Election x Connected_both 





    
31.3*** 
(4.34) 
PostElection x Connected 
    
0.3 
(0.11) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Observations 699,165 699,165 699,165 699,165 780,399 




Table 2.7: The Interaction Effect between Sensitivity and Connectedness 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression models (2.14) and 
(2.15). Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], 
where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of 
the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Sensitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a 
firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Economic Policy Uncertainty 
index of Baker et al. (2016) is significant at the 10% level. Connected is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for a firm if its PAC has contributed money to the PAC of a US Congress, Senate, or Presidential 
candidate during the past 60 months. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control 
variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard errors are clustered either at the firm-by-
cycle level (one-way) or at the firm-by-cycle & day levels (two-way). *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 












































PostElection x Sensitive 





PostElection x Sensitive x 
Connected 





Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 817,579 817,579 
R-squared adj. 0.840 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 












































PostElection x Sensitive 





PostElection x Sensitive x 
Connected 





Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 817,579 817,579 










Table 2.7: (Continued) 












































PostElection x Sensitive 





PostElection x Sensitive x 
Connected 





Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Observations 699,165 699,165 699,165 780,399 780,399 







Table 2.8: The Interaction Effect between Sensitivity and Hedging 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression models (2.14) and 
(2.15), using Hedged instead of Connected firms. Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 
2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, 
d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Sensitive is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock 
return on the Economic Policy Uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) is significant at the 10% level. 
Hedged is a dummy variable defined at the end of June prior to the November Presidential Election. It 
takes the value 1 for a firm if its PAC has contributed money to the PAC of a US House, Senate, or 
Presidential candidate during the past 60 months and the ratio of Republican-to-Democrat candidates it has 
contributed to lies between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the corresponding cross-sectional distribution. 
ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily stock and market 
returns. Standard errors are clustered either at the firm-by-cycle level (one-way) or at the firm-by-cycle & 
day levels (two-way). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 










































PostElection x Sensitive 





PostElection x Sensitive x 
Hedged 





Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 817,579 817,579 
R-squared adj. 0.840 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 










































PostElection x Sensitive 





PostElection x Sensitive x 
Hedged 





Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 817,579 817,579 









Table 2.8: (Continued) 










































PostElection x Sensitive 





PostElection x Sensitive x 
Hedged 





Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Observations 699,165 699,165 699,165 780,399 780,399 





Table 2.9: The Effect of Sensitivity, Wider Benchmark Period 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.7), 
using a wider benchmark period. Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days 
in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark 
period is the union of the intervals [d-179, d-30] and [d+31, d+180]. Sensitive is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for a firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) is significant at the 10% level. ATM, LSKEW, and 
OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard 
errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 1,522,389 1,522,389 1,632,418 1,632,418 
R-squared adj. 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 1,552,389 1,552,389 1,632,418 1,632,418 
R-squared adj. 0.257 0.265 0.260 0.268 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 1,482,204 1,482,204 1,558,596 1,558,596 












Table 2.10: The Effect of Sensitivity, Sample of S&P 500 and S&P 400 Firms 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.7), 
using firms that are constituents of the S&P 500 and the S&P MidCap 400 Indices. Election is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US 
Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, 
d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Sensitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the regression 
slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Economic Policy Uncertainty index of Baker et al. 
(2016) is significant at the 10% level. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control 
variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-
cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 350,175 350,175 373,584 373,584 
R-squared adj. 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.823 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 350,175 350,175 373,584 373,584 
R-squared adj. 0.347 0.352 0.347 0.352 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 341,037 341,037 363,841 363,841 












Table 2.11: The Effect of Sensitivity, Placebo Estimates from  
Pseudo-Election Dates 
This Table shows the results from the placebo tests described in Section 6.4. Alternative specifications of 
the regression model (2.7) are estimated using 10,000 draws of six pseudo-election days ?̃?, one for each 
of the six US Presidential Election cycles from 1996 to 2016. The pseudo-election day ?̃? cannot be drawn 
within 30 calendar days from the actual US Presidential Election day d. For each variable, the Table 
reports the average placebo coefficient estimate across the 10,000 sets of pseudo-election days (Mean 
Placebo Est.), the corresponding coefficient estimate using the actual election days (Actual Est.), and the 
fraction of placebo estimates that exceed the actual estimate of the corresponding coefficient (p-value). 
For the placebo tests, Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the 
interval [?̃?-15, ?̃?-1]. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the 
interval [?̃?+1, ?̃?+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [?̃?-119, ?̃?-60] and [?̃?+61, 
?̃?+120]. Sensitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the regression slope coefficient 
estimate of its stock return on the Economic Policy Uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) is significant 
at the 10% level. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily 
stock and market returns. 
  Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Election Mean Placebo Est. 

















































Controls  No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects  Firm-
Cycle 
Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
  Panel B: LSKEW (%, p.a.) 
Election Mean Placebo Est. 

















































Controls  No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects  Firm-
Cycle 
Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




Table 2.11: (Continued) 
  Panel C: OIEXRET (bps, per month) 
Election Mean Placebo Est. 

















































Controls  No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects  Firm-
Cycle 







Table 2.12: The Effect on the slope of the ATM term structure 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for the regression models (2.17) and (2.18). Election is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US 
Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-
60] and [d+61, d+120]. 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑖
𝑆𝑙 denotes the difference of the annualized 60-day volatility minus the 
annualized 30-day volatility implied by at-the-money options. 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑚
𝑆𝑙 denotes the 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑖
𝑆𝑙 measure for the 
S&P 500 index. Standard errors are clustered at the election year (cycle) level. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 𝑨𝑻𝑴𝒎
𝑺𝒍 (%, p.a.) 𝑨𝑻𝑴𝒊
𝑺𝒍 (%, p.a.) 






















Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects No No Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Cycle Cycle Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day 
Observations 636 636 817,477 817,477 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.A1: The Interaction Effect between Political Exposure and Connectedness 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.14), 
using Exposed instead of Sensitive firms. Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 
calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US Presidential Election day, from 1996 to 2016. 
PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. 
The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Exposed is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on 
the Republican President dummy is significant at the 10% level. Connected is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for a firm if its PAC has contributed money to the PAC of a US Congress, Senate, or 
Presidential candidate during the past 60 months. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. 
Control variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the 
firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 































Controls No Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day 
Observations 509,008 509,008 568,231 
R-squared adj. 0.827 0.829 0.831 































Controls No Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day 
Observations 509,008 509,008 568,231 
















Table 2.A1: (Continued) 































Controls No Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day 








Table 2.A2: The Effect of Sensitivity, Narrower Election and PostElection Period 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.7), 
using a narrower Election and PostElection period. Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
the calendar days in the interval [d-8, d-1], where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. 
PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+8]. 
The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Sensitive is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on 
the Economic Policy Uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) is significant at the 10% level. ATM, 
LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily stock and market 
returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 691,340 691,340 737,650 737,650 
R-squared adj. 0.841 0.842 0.841 0.843 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 691,340 691,340 737,650 737,650 
R-squared adj. 0.295 0.303 0.295 0.302 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 661,710 661,710 706,014 706,014 









Table 2.A3: The Effect of Sensitivity, Only Pre-Election Benchmark Period 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.7), 
using a pre-election only benchmark period. Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 
calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. 
PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. 
The benchmark period is the interval [d-119, d-60] only. Sensitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 for a firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Economic Policy 
Uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) is significant at the 10% level. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are 
defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-
way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 452,887 452,887 545,796 545,796 
R-squared adj. 0.849 0.853 0.833 0.835 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 452,887 452,887 545,796 545,796 
R-squared adj. 0.362 0.371 0.337 0.345 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 432,709 432,709 521,390 521,390 







Table 2.A4: The Effect of Sensitivity, Accounting for Macroeconomic Uncertainty 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.7). 
Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where 
d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the 
intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Sensitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if 
the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Economic Policy Uncertainty index of 
Baker et al. (2016) is significant at the 10% level, having included the Macroeconomic Uncertainty Index 
of Jurado et al. (2015) in the regression model. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. 
Control variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the 
firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 732,221 732,221 817,369 817,369 
R-squared adj. 0.839 0.840 0.838 0.841 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 732,221 732,221 817,369 817,369 
R-squared adj. 0.295 0.302 0.295 0.303 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 698,977 698,977 780,189 780,189 









Table 2.A5: The Effect of Sensitivity, Accounting for Market Volatility 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.7). 
Election is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where 
d is the US Presidential Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the 
intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Sensitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if 
the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Economic Policy Uncertainty index of 
Baker et al. (2016) is significant at the 10% level, having included the S&P 500 VIX Index in the 
regression model. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily 
stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 732,221 732,221 817,369 817,369 
R-squared adj. 0.839 0.840 0.838 0.840 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 732,221 732,221 817,369 817,369 
R-squared adj. 0.2944 0.302 0.2951 0.303 





























Controls No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle & 
Day 





Observations 698,977 698,977 780,189 780,189 









Table 2.A6: The Effect of Political Exposure, Alternative Definition of Republican 
President Dummy 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression models (2.8) and 
(9). The dummy variables Election and PostElection are defined in Table 3. The benchmark period is the 
union of the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. Exposed is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
for a firm if the regression slope coefficient estimate of its stock return on the Republican President dummy 
is significant at the 10% level, but now the Republican President dummy takes the value 1 from August 
prior to the election of a Republican Presidential candidate and the value 0 from August prior to the 
election of a Democrat Presidential candidate. The dummy variables Exposed_Incumbent(Contender) and 
Exposed_Winner(Loser) are defined in Table 3. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. 
Control variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the 
firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 















































PostElection x Exposed 













     
6.83*** 
(5.53) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 














Observations 509,008 509,008 509,008 568,231 568,231 568,231 
R-squared adj. 0.827 0.829 0.829 0.828 0.830 0.831 















































PostElection x Exposed 













     
0.52** 
(2.00) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 














Observations 509,008 509,008 509,008 568,231 568,231 568,231 











Table 2.A6: (Continued) 















































PostElection x Exposed 













     
50.2*** 
(5.26) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 














Observations 486,413 486,413 486,413 542,956 542,956 542,956 




Table 2.A7: The Effect of Political Connectedness, Alternative Definition of 
Connectedness I 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.12), 
using a different definition for a firm to be connected (Connected*). Election is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US Presidential Election 
day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the 
interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-60] and [d+61, d+120]. 
Connected* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if the number of US Congress, Senate, or 
Presidential candidates that its PAC has contributed money to during the past 60 months is higher than the 
corresponding cross-sectional median across firms with positive contributions. ATM, LSKEW, and 
OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily stock and market returns. Standard 
errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 





















Controls No Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day 
Observations 732,409 732,409 817,579 
R-squared adj. 0.839 0.840 0.840 





















Controls No Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day 
Observations 732,409 732,409 817,579 
R-squared adj. 0.294 0.302 0.303 





















Controls No Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle Firm-Cycle 
Clusters Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day Firm-Cycle&Day 
Observations 699,165 699,165 780,399 











Table 2.A8: The Effect of Political Connectedness, Alternative Definition of  
Connectedness II 
This Table shows the coefficient estimates for alternative specifications of the regression model (2.12), 
using a different definition for a firm to be connected (Connected_HQState). Election is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for the calendar days in the interval [d-15, d-1], where d is the US Presidential 
Election day from 1996 to 2016. PostElection is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the calendar 
days in the interval [d+1, d+15]. The benchmark period is the union of the intervals [d-119, d-60] and 
[d+61, d+120]. Connected_HQState is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a firm if its PAC has 
contributed money during the past 60 months to the PAC of a US Congress or Senate candidate who has 
also been elected in the state of the firm’s headquarters. Num. of Connections_HQState denotes the number 
of candidates that the firm PAC has contributed to and have been elected in the state of the firm’s 
headquarters. ATM, LSKEW, and OIEXRET are defined in Table 1. Control variables include the daily 
stock and market returns. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-by-cycle & day levels. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: ATM (%, p.a.) 























   
4.28*** 
(4.42) 
PostElection x Connected_HQState 
   
0.86** 
(2.50) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 










Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 815,579 
R-squared adj. 0.839 0.840 0.840 0.840 























   
0.69*** 
(4.10) 
PostElection x Connected_HQState 
   
0.30* 
(1.86) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 










Observations 732,409 732,409 732,409 817,579 














Table 2.A8: (Continued) 























   
31.6*** 
(4.35) 
PostElection x Connected_HQState 
   
-0.9 
(-0.40) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 










Observations 699,165 699,165 699,165 780,399 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Is the term structure of the S&P
500 risk-neutral Cumulants priced in
the cross section of equity returns?
3.1 Introduction
Asset pricing is about identifying factors which price the cross section of expected
returns. To this end, index options may be useful, because their forward looking
market prices may reveal the expectations of informed investors (see, for example,
Black (1975); Easley et al. (1998)). The previous literature has examined whether
asset pricing factors can be constructed from the risk-neutral moments (RNMs)
of the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index returns distribution. These studies
motivate the construction of the factors within Merton's (1973) Intertemporal
Capital Asset Pricing model (ICAPM) setting, and they use either single maturity
RNMs (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006); Chang, Christoersen, and Jacobs
(2013)), or a synopsis of the term structure of the second RNM (Xie (2014);
Dotsis (2017)) as pricing factors. A key implicit assumption, is that RNMs proxy
201
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the physical moments, and thus they are related to the investment opportunity
set1. Hence, under the ICAPM setting, the RNMs are used as state variables, and
their innovations are used as factors.
However, the assumption that physical moments can be proxied by their risk-
neutral counterparts is debatable (see, e.g., Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004)). In
addition, the evidence on whether these factors are priced is weak in light of the
recent literature, which suggests using greater critical values for t-statistics to
assess the statistical signicance of results in order to alleviate concerns on data
mining (e.g, Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2015; Harvey, Liu, and Zhu, 2016).
We revisit this literature, by taking an alternative approach to identify state vari-
ables, that circumvents the assumption about the relation between physical and
risk-neutral moments. In the theoretical setting of Feunou, Fontaine, Taamouti,
and Tédongap (2014), the vector of state variables is an ane function of the
term structure of any given order's risk-neutral cumulant (RNCs; non-normalised
RNMs) of the return's distribution of a claim on aggregate consumption. Fur-
thermore, the stochastic discount factor (SDF) is an ane function of the levels,
rather than the innovations, of the state variables. Hence, in contrast to the previ-
ous literature, we use the levels of the RNCs of the S&P 500 returns distribution,
rather than the innovations of its RNMs, to identify factors of risk.
First, we estimate the unobserved linear combination of RNC maturities, by ap-
plying three alternative dimensionality reduction techniques (DRTs) to the term
structure of any given order's RNC: (i) the principal component analysis (PCA),
(ii) the three pass regression lter of Kelly and Pruitt (3PRF, 2015), and (iii)
the reduced rank regression (RRR) analysis. The last two DRTs construct ane
factors, which also take into account the fundamental relation between the market
risk premium and the vector of the state variables, as dictated by the Feunou
1Xie (2014) employs an alternative approach. He relates the slope of the VIX term structure
to the investment opportunity set, within an extension of Gabaix's (2012) rare disaster model.
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et al. (2014) setting. Subsequently, we test whether the constructed factors are
priced in the cross section of stock returns. Furthermore, as a special case of a
linear combination of RNCs with dierent maturities, we also examine the pricing
performance of a single horizon RNC. This corresponds to the linear combination
of an RNC term structure, where the weights of the other horizons, but the em-
ployed one, are zero. Finally, to examine whether our results may be driven by
the Feunou et al. (2014) setting, we test the pricing performance of each factor in
an ICAPM setting. We do this, by testing whether its innovations are priced in
the cross section of stock returns.
We apply each DRT to the term structure of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC of the S&P
500 index returns distribution, separately, for the period spanning January 1996 to
December 2017. We nd that at most two factors explain the dynamics of the term
structure of RNCs for any given order's RNC term structure. The PCA reveals
that the rst principal component (PC) aects RNCs roughly the same across
their maturities (level interpretation), whereas the second PC aects positively
(negatively) the shorter (longer) RNCmaturities, thus it has a slope interpretation.
The two factors obtained from RRR are correlated with the two respective PC
factors, whereas the factor obtained from 3PRF is correlated with the second PC
factor. These ndings hold regardless of the order of the examined RNC. To test
the pricing performance of each factor, we conduct two types of exercises. First,
we estimate the price of risk of each factor, by means of rolling window and full
sample Fama and MacBeth (FM, 1973) regressions. To assess the robustness of
the results, we employ dierent sizes for the rolling window and alternative sets of
test portfolios. Second, we sort all stocks traded in NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex,
in portfolios based on the beta exposure of each stock returns to any given factor.
Subsequently, we examine whether the spread portfolio, that is long the portfolio
containing the stocks with the highest betas and short the portfolio containing the
stocks with the lowest betas, yields a signicant performance, as well as whether
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there is a monotonic relation between the average returns of the sorted portfolios
and the factor's exposure. For robustness, we estimate the factor exposure (beta)
by using dierent sizes for the estimation window, and we perform the analysis by
sorting stocks in decile and quintile portfolios, separately.
The FM regressions yield that factors which use information from the term struc-
ture of RNCs are not priced. The price of risk of any given factor is either insignif-
icant or not robustly signicant across the dierent test assets, and the dierent
lengths of the rolling windows. The results hold regardless of the order of exam-
ined RNCs. Hence, our ndings imply that the term structure of any given order's
RNC does not contain useful information to construct factors of risk that price the
cross section of stock returns. The portfolio sorting exercises yield similar results
to the FM regressions. We do not observe a linear monotonic relationship between
the factor exposure of the constructed portfolios and their average returns. Fur-
thermore, the return of the spread portfolio is either insignicant or not robustly
signicant across the dierent beta estimation windows.
The fact that factors are found to be non priced in the cross section of our test
assets, implies that the term structure of RNCs does not contain useful information
for asset pricing purposes. It may be the case though that RNCs of specic
maturities does contain such useful information. Hence, we repeat the asset pricing
tests by considering RNCs of single maturities of one, three, six, and twelve months
as respective potential factors. Again, we nd that the factors constructed as single
RNC maturities are not priced.
Our ndings on the non pricing performance of constructed factors, may also be
a manifestation that the Feunou et al. (2014) setting is misspecied, rather than
genuinely indicating that the term structure of RNCs contains no information to
construct asset pricing factors. To address this point, we repeat the asset pricing
tests by considering the innovations rather than the levels of our factors. This
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representation bypasses the Feunou et al. (2014) setting, is consistent with an
ICAPM setting, and makes our analysis directly comparable to the studies of
Ang et al. (2006) and Chang et al. (2013). Again, we nd that the innovations
of our factors are not priced in the cross section of stock returns. Our paper
contributes to the literature which investigates whether index option prices may
contain information that can be used to construct factors to price stock returns.
The most related studies to ours are the ones by Ang et al. (2006), Chang et al.
(2013), Xie (2014), and Dotsis (2017), who use option prices written on the S&P
500 index to extract systemic factors of risk. The empirical evidence is mixed and
at best weak, given the recent literature which suggests using critical values of 3
for the t-test statistics to evaluate the signicance of the pricing performance of
factors, to alleviate data mining concerns (Harvey et al., 2016).
In particular, in their benchmark analysis Ang et al. (2006) use daily returns over
one month to estimate the stocks' exposure to the innovations of aggregate volatil-
ity, proxied by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). They
nd that the spread portfolio, that is long the portfolio containing the stocks with
the highest exposures and short the portfolio containing the stocks with the lowest
exposures, yields a statistically signicant negative alpha equal to approximately
−1% (t-stat = -3.04) per annum during the 1986-2000 period. In contrast, Chang
et al. (2013) follow the same procedure and nd that the price of risk of Risk-
Neutral Volatility, essentially identical to VIX, is statistically indistinguishable
to zero during the 1996-2007 period. In our study, we nd that the innovations
of RNV (square of Risk-Neutral Volatility) are not priced during the 1996-2017
period. In untabulated results, we have also tested whether the innovations of
Risk-Neutral Volatility are priced during the 1996-2017 period. We conrm that
the result of Chang et al. (2013) in our extended sample period. Chang et al.
(2013) also apply the same analysis to estimate the price of risk for the innova-
tions of RNS. They nd that the spread portfolio earns on average a monthly
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Fama-French-Carhart alpha equal to -0.80% (t-stat = -2.42) during the 1996-2007
period. In untabulated results, we repeat their exercise and document an alpha
equal to -0.61% (t-stat = -2.02), which is quantitatively and statistically com-
parable. In our extended sample, though, ranging from 1996 to 2017 the alpha
of the spread portfolio is statistically indistinguishable to zero. Finally, in their
benchmark analysis, Xie (2014) and Dotsis (2017) employ dierent empirical ap-
proaches to the one used by Ang et al. (2006). Xie (2014) uses a trivariate portfo-
lio sorting procedure that controls for the market return and the level of the VIX
term-structure. He documents that the innovations of the slope of the VIX term-
structure earn a positive price of risk of approximately 2.5% (t-stat = 2.31) per
annum during the 1996-2013 period. Dotsis (2017) uses a 5-year rolling-window to
estimate the stocks' exposures to the innovations of the RNV term-structure using
monthly rather than daily returns. In contrast to Xie (2014), he nds that the
spread portfolio earns a negative price of risk approximately equal to −5% (t-stat
= 2.05) per annum during the 1996-2013 period. He does not, though, document
a monotonic relation between the factor exposure of the constructed portfolio and
their average returns. We have not attempted to replicate their results. We use
dierent variations of the methodology followed by Ang et al. (2006) and nd that
the price of risk for the innovation of the slope of the RNV term-structure is not
priced during the 1996-2017 period.
Our contribution to this strand of literature surpasses the mere replication of
previous studies. Our paper diers from the aforementioned ones in three ways.
First, our empirical approach is founded theoretically. Instead of conjecturing that
RNMs proxy for unobserved state variables by resorting in an ICAPM setting, we
utilise the arguments of Feunou et al. (2014) that theoretically predict that the
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state variables are a linear combination of the levels of the RNCs.2 Second, we in-
vestigate whether factors constructed from the term structures of RNCs of various
orders, separately, price the cross section of equity returns. Previous studies have
examined only the term structure of the RNV (second RNC). Third, in addition
to the PCA that has been used by the previous studies to extract risk factors from
the term structure of the S&P 500 option prices, we also employ two alternative
DRTs. These construct factors by respecting the fundamental relation between
the market risk premium and state variables; PCA does not share this desirable
theoretical property.
More generally, our paper contributes to the literature which proposes factors for
asset pricing.3 The provided evidence that the term structure of RNCs is not
priced in the cross-section of stock returns may be due to the fact that either
the Feunou et al. (2014) setting is not valid, and/or factors are mis-estimated,
and/or constructed factors are indeed not priced. Given that the ane setting is a
well accepted paradigm (e.g., see Due, Pan, and Singleton, 2000, and references
therein), and that our results hold regardless of the method we use to construct
factors, our ndings echo the more recent evidence that most of the asset pricing
anomalies documented by the previous literature do not hold (Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2018)). This new evidence is attributed to the more conservative critical
values used to assess signicance, the formation of portfolios in the portfolio sorts
analysis to minimize the eect of micro-cap stocks (value weighted instead of
equally weighted), and the longer time periods being examined. Our study employs
all three dimensions.
2Maio and Santa-Clara (2012) show that the ICAPM should not be blindly used as a shing
license to justify the use of certain factors for asset pricing purposes. Instead, certain conditions
should be satised, including the presence of a theoretical background.
3Some notable examples of this literature are the market return of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner
(1965), the squared market return of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), the consumption growth
of Breeden (1979), the size and book-to-market factors of the Fama and French (1992) model,
the return momentum of Carhart (1997), the market liquidity of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003),
and the market trading volume of Lo and Wang (2006).
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Our study should not be viewed as complementary to the growing literature that
utilizes information embedded in option prices written on individual stocks to
predict future stock returns, such as (Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), Rehman
and Vilkov (2012), Bali and Murray (2013), Conrad et al. (2013), Stilger et al.
(2017), Gkionis et al. (2018), and Wang (2017)). According to the factor taxon-
omy of Harvey et al. (2016), these studies employ individual rm characteristics
that lead to predictive relations which cannot be justied by the established asset
pricing models (asset pricing anomalies). In contrast, our study complements the
literature that seeks to identify common risk factors. As put by Harvey et al.
(2016), [w]hile the beta against the market return is systematic (exposure to a
common risk factor), the standard deviation of the market model residual is not
based on a common factor  it is a property of the individual rm, that is, it is an
idiosyncratic characteristic.4
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the setting of
Feunou et al. (2014), explain how the term structure of any given order's RNC may
reveal the vector of the state variables, and provide the RNCs formulae. In Section
3, we describe the data we use and the calculation of RNCs. Section 4, presents
the results of the three DRTs we employ to construct factors. Sections 5 and 6
presents the results of the FM regressions and of the portfolio sorts, respectively.
Section 7, presents the results on the pricing performance of the innovations of each
constructed factor, and the pricing performance of RNS in our sample. Section 7
concludes and discusses the ndings.
4The studies on the use of the informational content of equity options for asset pricing pur-
poses, in line with Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), document that options written on individual
stocks can predict subsequent stock performance. The explanation put forward lies to the limits
of arbitrage, most notably short selling constraints, that a stock is subject to. In a nutshell,
investors that want to short an overpriced stock and hindered to do so in the spot market due to
limits of arbitrage, trade their belief in the stock's option market by buying (selling) put (call)
options and thus raising (lowering) their price, in line to the demand based option pricing model
of Garleanu et al. (2009). The relatively expensiveness of put options relative to call options
leads to greater put-call parity violations that predict subsequent stock underperformance as the
negative information that has been embedded in the option prices is slowly diused to the spot
market due to limits-of-arbitrage.
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3.2 Methodology
We investigate whether the informational content of S&P 500 market options prices
can be used to explain the cross sectional variability of equity returns. To this
end, we employ the theoretical framework of Feunou et al. (2014). They show that
in the context of ane general equilibrium models, the SDF is an ane function
of the RNCs of the distribution of returns of aggregate consumption.
To x ideas, let xrt+1 be the (log) excess return from holding an asset from period





where St denotes the time-t price of the asset. Feunou et al. (2014, see Appendices
A.1 - A.4) consider ane models that satisfy the following three properties. (i)
Excess returns, xrt+1, and the vector of the K state variables, Xt+1, belong to the
family of ane jump-diusion continuous-time models, (ii) the risk-free rate is an
ane function of Xt, and (iii) the SDF is an exponential ane function of Xt+1
and xrt+1. Moreover, they show that under these three properties, the (log) SDF
factor from period t to period t+ 1 is




where θ, γ, and Γ are parameters of the underlying model and xret+1 is the ex-
cess return from a claim on aggregate consumption. Furthermore, the cumulant-
generating functions of excess returns on aggregate consumption over an invest-




t+j, under the physical measure, P, and the







FPr,0(u; τ) +XTt FPr,X(u; τ)
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(3.3)













where FMr,0(u; τ) and FMr,0(u; τ) for M = P, Q, are functions of the argument u,
and the parameters of the underlying model. Subsequently, by taking the rst
derivative of the cumulant generating function under P, in (3.3), with respect to
its argument u, evaluated at u = 0, the equity premium over an investment horizon
τ can be stated as




= βep,0(τ) + βep(τ)
>Xt, (3.5)
where βep,0(τ) and βep(τ) are functions of the parameters of the underlying model
and the jth element of βep(τ), βj,ep(τ) , expresses the sensitivity of the equity
premium over the horizon τ to the jth state variable, Xj,t. Moreover,the nth
derivative of the cumulant-generating function under Q, in (3.4), with respect to
its argument u, evaluated at u = 0, yields that the computed at time-t nth RNC
of excess returns over any horizon τ is also an ane function of the state vector
Xt
MQt, n(τ) ≡ EQt (τ)
[(






= βn,0(τ) + βn(τ)
>Xt,
(3.6)
where βn,0(τ) and βn(τ) are functions of the parameters of the underlying model
and the jth element of βn(τ), βj,n(τ), captures the sensitivity of the nth RNC of
excess returns over the horizon τ to the jth state variable, Xj,t.
3.2.1 State Variables Spanned by Risk-Neutral Cumulants
Equation (3.6) shows that any given order τ -horizon RNC is an ane function of
the state vector Xt. In the case where equation (3.6) can be inverted, one can
express the unobservable state vector Xt as an ane function of M
Q
t, n, which as
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we show in Section 3.2.2, can be estimated. In the case of an economy where Xt






For economies, where the dimension of Xt is greater than one, Feunou et al. (2014)
show that Xt is an ane function of the whole term structure of any given order










= Bn,0 +BnXt, (3.8)
where Bn,0 is the q-vector containing the constants βn,0(τ1) and Bn is the (q×K)
matrix that stacks the βn(τi) vector coecients. The jth element of the vector
βn(τi) captures the sensitivity of the nth RNC of excess returns over the horizon
τi to the jth state variable, Xj,t. Assuming that the number of horizons is greater
than the number of states (q ≥ K), one can invert equation (3.8) and obtain a
system of linear restrictions on the state variables with respect to the dierent
horizons of the RNC, as in
Xt = −B̄nBn,0 + B̄nMQt, n (3.9)
where the (K×q) matrix, B̄n = (BnB>n )−1B>n , is the left-inverse of Bn, has a rank
less or equal to K, and its element in the jth row and ith column is the sensitivity




5In our empirical analysis, we employ six dierent horizons. The most popular empirical
asset pricing models implicitly assume that at most six state variables drive equity returns; see,
e.g., the Fama and French (1996, 2015) three and ve factor models, the four factor models
of Carhart (1997), Novy-Marx (2013) and Hou et al. (2015). These factors are not necessarily
orthogonal with each other, so possibly an even smaller number of orthogonal state variables
might drive equity returns. In fact, Clarke (2016) performs Principal Component Analysis on
the cross-section of equity returns and nds that three factors are sucient to explain the cross-
sectional variability of equity returns and that an asset pricing model consisting of these factors
is comparable to the aforementioned models. Finally, DeMiguel, Martin-Utrera, Nogales, and
Uppal (2019) simultaneously test the asset pricing performance of 23 characteristics and nd
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Equation (3.9) shows that the vector of state variables Xt is a linear combination
of the various maturities of a given order RNC. Any technique to reduce dimen-
sionality, amounts to constructing factors which are a linear combination of the
original variables to which the technique is applied. Therefore, applying a dimen-
sionality reduction technique (DRT) to the term structure of a given order RNC,
will yield factors as linear combinations of the RNC's term structure. Hence, the
derived factors could be regarded as proxies of the state variables described in
equation (3.9).
A remark is in order at this point. In the case that the factors are not found to price
the cross section of equity returns, this would imply that either (i) index options do
not contain useful information to price equity returns, and/or (ii) the theoretical
setting of ane models as developed by Feunou et al. (2014) is not valid, and/or
(iii) the constructed factors are not valid proxies of the state variables. (iii) would
question the validity of the technique used to reduce dimensionality. Therefore,
we use three alternative DRTs: Principal Components Analysis (PCA), the three
pass regression lter of Kelly and Pruitt (3PRF, 2015) and the Reduced Rank
Regression (RRR) analysis, to test the robustness of our results. From a theoretical
perspective, for the constructed factors to be valid proxies of the respective state
variables, they should also satisfy equation (3.5), i.e. the market risk premium
should also be an ane function of the proxies. The last two DRTs, as we explain
below, deliver factors which by construction satisfy equation (3.5), whereas PCA
does not necessarily do so. However, we still use PCA as a benchmark technique
given its popularity in the literature of DRTs.
We follow Andreou et al. (2018) who substitute the unobservable variable Xt on











that in absence of transaction costs 6 factors are sucient to price the cross-section of equity
returns.
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Subsequently, we proxy for the EP in (3.10) with its realization, proxied by the
return of the S&P 500 index, ret,t+t, and obtain its tted value using the 3PRF
estimator of Kelly and Pruitt (2015). The estimate r̂et,t+t has two properties: (i)
it is an ane function of the term structure Mt,n and hence can be regarded as a
proxy of the state vector Xt, and (ii) it satises (3.5).
Finally, we follow Feunou et al. (2014) who instead of employing only a single
horizon equity premium return, they employ the whole term structure of the equity
premium. In particular, they stack the equity premiums of equation (3.5) across
horizons τ = τ1, τ2, . . . , τq and substitute the state vector from equation (3.9) to
obtain a system of linear restrictions of the following form
EPt = Π0 + ΠM
Q
t, n (3.11)
where EPt is the (q × 1) vector of the q single-horizon equity premium returns,
Π0 is a (q × 1) vector and Π is (q × q) matrix of rank less or equal to q. For
a given rank of matrix Π, r ≤ q, equation (3.11) corresponds to a multivariate
Reduced-Rank Regression (RRR). To this end, we employ the estimator provided
by Hansen (2008). In Section 3.4, we discuss in detail the implementation of the
three DRTs, in detail.
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3.2.2 Estimation of Risk-Neutral Cumulants
We apply the Bakshi et al. (2003) formulae of risk-neutral moments (RNMs) to
calculate the rst three risk-neutral cumulants6






























Let H(St+τ ) denote a twice dierentiable payo on the asset's price at time-(t+τ).
The time-t arbitrage free price of H can be replicated by a position on the risk
free asset, the stock, and a linear combination of out-of-the-money (OTM) call

















HSS(K)P (t, τ ;K)dK
(3.13)
where S̄ is an arbitrary level of the stock at time-(t + τ), r is the continuously
compounded risk-free rate at time-t with horizon (t + τ), HS (HSS) denotes the
rst (second) partial derivative of the payo function.
The rst three cumulants can be expressed in terms of the prices of the mean
contract, µt(τ) ≡ EQt [xrt,t+τ ], the volatility contract, Vt(τ) ≡ EQt [e−rτxr2t,t+τ ] ,
the cubic contract, Wt(τ) ≡ EQt [e−rτxr3t,t+τ ], and the quartic contract, Xt(τ) ≡
6The RNCs are non-standardised risk-neutral Moments. In particular, the risk-neutral volatil-
ity is the second RNC. risk-neutral Skewness is the third RNC standardised by the term
(EQt [xrt,t+τ ] − E
Q
t [xrt,t+τ ]
2])3/2. Finally, risk-neutral Kurtosis is the fourth RNC standard-
ised by the term (EQt [xrt,t+τ ] − E
Q
t [xrt,t+τ ]
2])4/2. Moreover, note that the Bakshi et al. (2003)
formulae refer to actual and not excess returns. Since, though, the risk-free rate from t to t+ τ
is known at time-t, excess returns and returns have the same cumulants (as they are centralised
moments).
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EQt [e




rτWt(τ)− 3µt(τ)erτVt(τ) + 2µt(τ)3 (3.15)
MQt,4(τ) = e
rτXt(τ)− 4µt(τ)erτWt(τ) + 6µt(τ)2erτVt(τ)− 3µt(τ)4 (3.16)
where
µt(τ) ≈ erτ − 1−
erτ
2
V (t, τ)− e
rτ
6

































































































P (t, τ ;K)dK
(3.20)
Equations (3.18) - (3.20), show that the arbitrage free prices of the contracts
are computed as a weighted linear combination of out-of-the-money call and put
options.
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3.3 Data
We obtain daily S&P 500 European style index option data, the level of the S&P
500 index, the dividend yield of the S&P 500, and the continuously compounded
risk-free rates from 1996 through 2017 from the Ivy DB database of OptionMetrics.
We follow the existing literature, and we impose a number of lters on the option
data set prior to extracting the RNCs. In particular, we discard options with zero
open interest, with less than 5 days-to-maturity, whose best bid price is greater
than the best oer price, and whose best bid price is less or equal to $3/8. We also
discard duplicate prices per contract and day. We calculate the option price as the
average of the best bid and best oer. Consequently, we eliminate in-the-money
(ITM) options, as they are less liquid than OTM options. In line with Chang et al.
(2013), we eliminate put (call) options whose strike prices are greater (less) than
103% (97%) of the underlying asset price, we discard option prices that violate
Merton's (1973) arbitrage bounds and whose OM IvyDB implied volatility is not
available.
The cross-sectional pricing exercises use daily and monthly stock return data ob-
tained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) on all common
stocks (share codes 10 and 11) traded in NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex (exchange
codes 1, 2, 3, 31, 32, and 33). The market return, the risk-free rate, the returns of
the test assets, and the factor mimicking portfolio returns for size, book-to-market,
and momentum factors are obtained from Ken French's website.
3.3.1 Estimation of Risk-Neutral Cumulants
For each one of the 5,517 trading days of our sample, spanning January 1996
to December 2017, we create single horizon RNCs for 30, 60, 91, 182, 273, and
365 days' horizons (corresponding roughly to 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months). The
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calculation of the integrals in equations (3.18) to (3.20) require a continuum of out-
of-the-money (OTM) calls and OTM put options whose expirations are constant
across the trading dates. In contrast, the market provides a nite number of
discrete strike prices whose maturities vary each day.
On each trading day, we create constant maturity RNCs as follows. For each con-
tract, we rst calculate its corresponding Black-Scholes-Merton implied volatility
using a root nding algorithm. Subsequently, for the maturities with at least two
available OTM call and put options, we create a ne grid for moneyness (K/S)
levels ranging from 0.01% to 300% and interpolate in the implied volatility 
moneyness space using a natural cubic spline. Beyond the moneyness levels of
the available contracts, we extrapolate horizontally using the implied volatilities
corresponding to the lowest and highest available strike prices. Once the grid is
constructed, implied volatilities for moneyness levels less (greater) than 100% are
translated back to put (call) option prices using Merton's (1973) formulas. Then,
we calculate the integrals in equations (3.18) to (3.20) using trapezoidal numerical
integration. To get the constant RNCs for the desired maturities we interpolate
linearly accross the available maturities.
We estimate the RNCs with horizons greater than one month for all the 5,517
trading days in our sample. The one month horizon RNCs have not been estimated
for 648 trading days. This is due to data availability. When there are no available
contracts maturing after 5 days and in less than 31 days, the one month horizon
RNCs are not computed.
3.3.2 Risk-neutral Cumulants: Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for the levels of all maturities of the 2nd
(Panel A), 3rd (Panel B), and 4th (Panel C) RNC term structure. As the order of a
cumulant increases, the values of the cumulant drop by approximately a power of
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ten. For presentation purposes, prior to calculating the statistics of the 3rd and 4th
RNC we have multiplied their corresponding time series by 10 and 100 respectively.
The mean value of the 2nd RNC of returns increases monotonically from 0.004 to
0.058 as the returns' horizon increases from one to twelve months. Similarly, the
mean value of the 3rd RNC (4th RNC) decreases (increases) monotonically from
-0.005 (0.026) to -0.254 (3.199) across the horizons. Our ndings are consistent
with the previous literature that has studied the term structures of the risk-neutral
moments or cumulants of the S&P 500 returns' distribution. This documents that
under the risk-neutral measure, the distribution of the S&P 500 returns becomes
more negatively skewed and exhibits heavier tails as the returns' horizon increases
(see, among others, Neumann and Skiadopoulos, 2013; Feunou et al., 2014; Xie,
2014; Dotsis, 2017).
Column `St.Dev'. reports the standard deviations of the time series. For all the
RNCs, the standard deviations increase monotonically as the horizon increases.
The less precise estimates of the longer horizons are likely due to the combination
of the increased uncertainty which is inherent in longer horizons and the lower
liquidity of the longer maturity contracts. Finally, column `ADF' reports the
statistic of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test whose null hypothesis is that the
time series contains a unit root. The test rejects the unit root hypothesis at the
5% statistical signicance level for all the time series. Therefore, the series of
RNCs are stationary and there is no need to dierence them. Moreover, the last
6 columns of Table 3.1 report the pairwise correlations of the individual horizon
time series within each term structure. The pairwise correlations of the time series
comprising the term structure of the 2nd RNC range from 83% for the most distant
horizons to 99% for the closest ones. Similarly, the pairwise correlations of the time
series comprising the term structure of the 3rd (4th) RNC range from 63% (59%)
to 98% (95%). Overall, the high correlations suggest that each term structure
exhibits a strong factor structure. Therefore, the informational content of each
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RNC term structure may be summarised by a few factors.
3.4 Estimation of State Variables
In Section 3.2, we presented the setting of Feunou et al. (2014). Within their
setting, the vector of the state variables, and thus the SDF, is an ane function
of the term structure of the RNCs of the distribution of returns on aggregate
consumption, which we proxy by the level of the S&P 500 index. A DRT applied
to the term structure of a RNC yields factors that are a linear combination of the
RNC's term structure. Hence, the derived factors may be regarded as proxies of the
state variables. In this Section, we describe the three DRT methods we employ;
namely the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the reduced-rank regression
analysis (RRR), and the three-pass regression lter (3PRF) of Kelly and Pruitt
(2015). Then, we present the results on the constructed factors obained from each
DRT method.
3.4.1 Principal Component Analysis
Our benchmark approach is PCA due to its popularity in the literature of DRTs.
PCA is a statistical procedure that extracts uncorrelated factors from a set of
variables, termed principal components (PCs). PCs are linear combinations of the
variables and they are computed so that the rst PC explains the largest possible
variability of the variables, and each succeeding PC explains the largest possible
variability left. For any given order RNC term structure, we apply the PCA to
the scaled time series of the individual horizons. In line with common practice,
we scale the time series to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one.
Table 3.2 reports the loadings of the PCs extracted from the term structure of
the 2nd (Panel A), 3rd (Panel B), and 4th (Panel C) RNC. Moreover, in row `R2,
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entries report the percentage of the term structure's total variance explained by
the n-th PC and in row `Cum R2' it reports the percentage explained by the rst
n PCs. All the term structures exhibit a strong factor structure. In particular,
the rst PC explains 95.2%, 88.5%, and 87.0% of the total variability of the term
structure of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC respectively. Moreover, the rst two PCs
explain 99.53%, 97.5%, and 96.9% of the total variability of the term structure of
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC respectively.
For the term structure of any given RNC, the rst PC mimics the level of the
term structure as it loads with roughly the same weight on the time series of each
individual RNC maturity. The weights of the second (third) PC, suggest that it
mimics the slope (curvature) of the term structure. Indeed, once we proxy the
slope of a term structure as the dierence between the 365 days horizon minus
the 30 days horizon estimate, i.e. slope = MQt, n(12m) −MQt, n(1m), we nd that
its correlation with the second PC (column PC2) equals 52%, 44%, and 42% for
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC, respectively. Similarly, the correlation between the
curvature = MQt, n(12m)− 2×MQt, n(6m) +MQt, n(1m) proxy of a term structure and
PC3 equals 59%, 65%, and 62% for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC, respectively.
3.4.2 Reduced Rank Regression Analysis
Equation (3.11) shows that the term structure of the equity premium is an ane
function of the term structure of any given order RNC. In line with Feunou et al.
(2014), we substitute the equity premium over a horizon τ with the realisation of
the S&P 500 excess returns over the same horizon, xret,t+τ . Moreover, we follow
the common practice and scale all individual time series to have zero mean and
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where xret+ is the term structure of the S&P 500 (log) excess returns, M
Q
t, n is the
term structure of the n-th RNC, and Π is a matrix with rank less or equal to the
number of horizons q. For a given hypothesis for the rank of matrix Π, equation
(3.21) corresponds to a multivariate RRR. Furthermore, for a given rank condition,
rank(Π̂) = r ≤ q, Hansen's (2008, see Theorem 5) formulae provide an estimator
for Π such that the rank of the estimated matrix equals r, i.e. rank(Π̂) = r.7
Since, by construction, the rank of Π̂ equals r, the q time series (Π̂MQt, n) are
linearly dependent. To extract the r linearly independent factors we must apply an
orthogonalisation procedure such as the Gram-Schmidt procedure. Since, though,
we are going to use the factors in a regression setting, we apply the PCA to Π̂MQt, n,
which provides a base yielding linearly independent and uncorrelated factors.
To estimate Π, we rst need to choose an appropriate rank condition. In line
with Feunou et al. (2014), we determine the rank of Π in two alternative ways, to
asses robustness. First, we calculate the p values associated with the likelihood
ratio test, by Anderson (1951), on the hypothesis: H0 : rank(Π) ≤ r against
rank(Π) = q. The rank of Π is determined as the minimum value of r such that
the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 1% signicance level. Second, for a given
rank r, we regress the individual horizon time series of excess returns in xret+ on the
r estimated RRR factors. Subsequently, we compare the R2s of the regressions for
the dierent assumed values of the rank r. If the R2s do not signicantly increase
by increasing the assumed rank r by one, then r factors from Mt, n are sucient
to summarize its predictive content with respect to the term-structure xret+ and
thus the rank of Π should be equal to r.
Table 3.3 reports the results of the RRR analysis applied to the term structure of
the 2nd (Panel A), 3rd (Panel B), and 4th (Panel C) RNC. In particular, column
7In linear models with more than one independent variables, called multivariate regressions,
the RRR estimator takes into account the reduced rank restriction on the coecient matrix Π.
Without the rank condition, the RRR and the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators would
provide the same estimates.
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`r = 1' reports in rows `1-month' to `12-months' the R2s of the regressions of the
1-month to 12-months S&P 500 (log) excess returns on the variable that has been
estimated for the hypothesis rank(Π) = 1 and row `H0 : rank(Π) ≤ r' reports the
p-value of the Anderson (1951) test. Similarly, columns (r = 2) to (r = 6) report
the corresponding values for the hypotheses rank(Π) = 2 to rank(Π) = 6.
For any given order RNC term structure, the p value of Anderson's (1951) likeli-
hood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the rank(Π) ≤ 1 at the 1% signicance
level. In contrast, for the same level of statistical signicance, the test does not
reject the hypothesis rank(Π) ≤ 2 for any of the RNC term structures. Therefore,
the rst methodology suggests that the rank is equal to 2. In addition, the second
methodology of selecting the rank, also suggests that the rank equals 2, as the
inclusion of a third factor provides a signicantly relatively lower increase in the
R2s compared to the inclusion of a second factor. For example, the inclusion of a
second factor increases the R2s of the predictive regressions on the 30-days horizon
equity premium from 5.3 to 8.5 (60.4%), from 8.6 to 10.8 (26%), and from 6.6 to
7.9 (20%) for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC respectively. The inclusion of a third factor
provides comparatively marginal increases for the 2nd RNC (8.23%), 3rd (7.4%)
and the 4th (12.7%) RNC. Overall, the evidence suggest that the rank of matrix
Π equals 2. Therefore, the RRR analysis complements the PCA by showing that
two factors are sucient to explain the variability of each term structure by re-
specting at the same time the relation between the term structure of the market
risk premium and that of a given order's RNC.
To provide an intuitive interpretation of the two RRR factors, we associate them
to the rst two PCs of each term-structure, which proxy its level and slope, re-
spectively. The entries in row `cor(·, PC1)' (`cor(·, PC2)') and columns `r = 1'
and `r = 2' of Table 3.3, report the correlations between the rst (second) PC
and the rst and second RRR factors, respectively. For example, the correlation
between the rst RRR factor extracted from the 2nd RNC term structure and the
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rst (second) PC equals 45.3% (70.7%). The correlation of the second RRR fac-
tor extracted from the 2nd RNC term structure and the rst (second) PC equals
−6.8% (70.7%). Simillarly, the correlations between the RRR and the PCA factors
extracted from the higher order RNC term structures show that the RRR fators
mix the information contained in the rst two PCs, but their eect on each term
structure is hard to interpret. Overall, the correlations suggest that the RRR and
the PCA factors contain similar information, which is not though, identical.
3.4.3 The three pass regression lter
Equation (3.10) shows that any τ horizon of the equity premium return is an ane
function of the term structure of any given order RNC. We follow Andreou et al.
(2018), and for any given order RNC, we construct one factor as the tted value
of the 30-day equity premium obtained from the following linear model
xret, t+30 days = β0 + β
>MQt, n, (3.22)
where xret,t+30 days is the realization of the S&P 500 excess return during the next
30-day period, β0 is a scalar, and β is a (q× 1) vector. In line with Andreou et al.
(2018), we estimate β0 and β using the 3PRF estimator of Kelly and Pruitt (2015).
In contrast to the PCA, the 3PRF DRT has the advantage that it constructs factors
which explain most of the variability of the term structure of RNCs, and they also
respect the relation between the market risk premium of a given horizon and the
state variables as shown by (3.5) and (3.22). Therefore, the 3PRF factor may be
a strict subset of the PCA factors which capture solely the variability of MQt, n.
In line with Kelly and Pruitt (2015), we standardize the independent variables in
MQt, n to have unit time series variance.
We construct the 3PRF factor as follows. In the rst pass, for each horizon τi, we
run the time series regressionsMt, n(τi)
Q = φ0,i+φixr
e
t, t+30 days+εi,t. Subsequently,
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we retain the estimated slopes φ̂i and in the second pass, for each time ti, we run
the cross sectional regressions MQt, n = φ0,t + Ftφ̂i. The cross sectional regressions
yield a time series of estimated slopes F̂t. Finally, in the third pass we estimate β0
and β from the following regression xret, t+30 days = β0 + βF̂t + ηt+τ . The forecast
x̂ret, t+30 days = β̂0 + β̂
>MQt, n serves as our 3PRF factor.
To gauge the informational content of the 3PRF factor extracted from the term
structure of a given order's RNC, we work as follows. First, we compare the
predictive performance of the 3PRF and the RRR factors with respect to the
S&P 500 excess return for horizons from one up to twelve months. Second, we
compute the correlations of the 3PRF factor with the rst two PCs that mimic the
level and the slope of each term structure, respectively. For any given RNC term
structure, the entries in column `3PRF' and rows `1-month' to `12-months' of Table
3.3, report the R2s for the predictive regressions. The entry in row `cor(·, PC1)'
(`cor(·, PC2)') reports the correlation of the 3PRF factor with the rst (second)
PC.
For any given order's RNC term structure, the highest R2s are achieved for the
30-days horizon. This is expected, as this was the target forecast variable. Inter-
estingly, though, the 3PRF procedure outperforms the combined predictive power
of the two RRR factors only for the 2nd RNC, where the R2 equals 9.0% versus
6.9%. For the term structures of the higher order RNCs, the performance of the
3PRF factor is similar to the performance of the RRR factors combined. Finally,
for any given RNC term structure, the informational content of the 3PRF factor is
essentially identical to the second PC of the term structure, as the correlations are
greater than 99.9% in absolute terms. The high correlations suggest that for any
given order's RNC term structure we shouldn't expect the pricing performance of
the second PC to dier from that of the 3PRF factor.
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3.5 Are factors priced? Fama-MacBeth regressions
In the setting of Feunou et al. (2014), the state vector is a linear combination of the
term structure of any given order RNC term structure of the returns' distribution
of a claim on aggregate consumption. Hence, the ane transformations of the
2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC term structures, described in Section 3.4, may be regarded
as factors that proxy the state vector. Furthermore, since the SDF is an ane
function of the state variables (see equation (3.2)), they should price the cross-
section of equity returns. To this end, we test the pricing performance of each
factor, SV , by means of FM two-stage regressions. As a special case of using the
whole term structure of RNCs, we also examine whether a single horizon RNC is
priced. This corresponds to the linear combination, where the weights of the other
maturities RNCs, but the employed one, are zero.
In the setting of Feunou et al. (2014), the SDF is a function of the excess return
of a claim on aggregate consumption and the state variables. For this reason, we
test the pricing performance of each SV , by the cross sectional regression
Ri,t −Rf,t = λ0 + λMKT (RMKT,t −Rf,t) + λSV SVt, (3.23)
where Ri,t, RMKT,t, and Rf,t are the monthly rates of return of the ith risky asset,
the market portfolio, and the risk-free asset. λMKT and λSV are the prices of risk
of the excess market return and the factor SV , respectively. The factor SV is said
to be priced, if its estimated price of risk is signicantly dierent to zero.
In line with Fama and MacBeth (1973), we estimate the prices of risk of the
constructed factors and infer their statistical signicance as follows. First, we
choose a set of N test assets. For any given test asset, in the rst stage, we
estimate its betas by running a time series regression of T months of daily excess
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returns on the market's excess return and SV , as in
Ri,t −Rf,t = β0 + βiMKT (RMKT,t −Rf,t) + βiSV SVt + εi,t (3.24)
where βiMKT and β
i
SV are the measures of the ith risky asset's exposures to market
excess return and the factor SV .8 To obtain the prices of risk as percentages per
month, prior to proceeding to the second step, we standardise the estimated betas
to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. In the second stage, we
run the cross-sectional regression of next month's excess returns on the estimated
betas, as in
Ri,t −Rf,t = λ0 + λMKTβ̂iMKT + λSV β̂iSV + ηi (3.25)
We repeat the procedure by rolling the beta estimation window forward by one
month. At the end of the procedure, we have a time series of estimated λ's. Their
average values yield the estimated prices of risk. To assess robustness, we perform
the FM regressions for dierent sets of test assets and dierent beta estimation
windows, separately. We consider the following test assets: (i) 25 portfolios formed
on Size and Book-to-Market, (ii) 25 portfolios formed on operating protability
and investment, (iii) 49 industry portfolios, and (iv) 10 portfolios formed on mo-
mentum.
Table 3.4 reports the estimated prices of risk of the rst two principal components
(sub-columns PC1 and PC2) of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC term structure, obtained
via a beta estimation window equal to one (Panel A), three (Panel B), six (Panel
C), and twelve months (Panel D). Entries in Panel E, report the prices of risk
for the full sample FM regressions, where in the rst stage, we estimate betas
by running time series regressions on the full sample of daily returns and in the
second stage we run the cross sectional regressions each month. The second stage,
8Note, that in principle, we could had augmented equation (3.24), by controlling for the
other SV s we have constructed from any given DRT method. However, given that factors are
orthogonal, the estimated SV betas in (3.24) will not change in the augmented version.
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leads to a time series of estimated prices of risk. Their average value yields the
full-sample estimated price of risk. The reported t-statistics in parenthesis, are
calculated using Newey-West standard errors9.
Overall, the results of the FM regressions presented in Table 3.4, suggest that
the principal components of the term structures are not priced factors of risk,
as the estimated prices of risk are either insignicant or not robustly signicant
when estimated using dierent beta estimation windows or across the dierent
test assets. For example, the price of risk for the rst PC of the 2nd RNC term
structure, estimated using a one-month beta estimation window, equals −0.49%
(t-stat=−2.32) for the 49 industry portfolios, and −0.61% (t-stat=−2.80) for the
10 portfolios formed on momentum. In contrast, the prices of risk estimated using
the same test assets, are statistically indistinguishable from zero for longer beta
estimation windows.
The entries in Table 3.5, report the prices of risk for the variables estimated via
the reduced rank regression analysis (columns RRR1 and RRR2), the three pass
regression lter (column 3PRF), and the single 1-, 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizon of
the 2nd (Panel A), 3rd (Panel B) and 4th (Panel C) RNC, using a beta estimation
window of three months. We present the results only for the three months beta
estimation window, due to space constrains.10
The results of Table 3.5 suggest that the RRR factors, the 3PRF factor, and the
individual horizons RNCs are not priced in the cross section of stock returns; the
reported estimated prices of risk are either statistically indistinguishable from zero,
9Throughout the study, we compute t-statistics using NW standard errors, with the lag





, and T is the sample size. For all the beta estimation windows, we estimate
from 252 to 263 prices of risk, hence q is always equal to 5.
10The three month estimation window strikes a good balance between beta estimates that are
not biased to outlier values, yet it is reasonably short to capture time variations in betas. The
one-month beta estimation window may misestimate betas, as it uses between 15 and 23 daily
return observations and thus one or two outlier observations are likely to have a large impact (see,
e.g., Bali et al., 2017, chap. 8). Furthermore, longer than three months beta estimation periods
are not reasonably short enough to allow the estimation of conditional time-varying betas.
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or not robustly signicant across the dierent test assets. Overall, the evidence
is consistent with the results of Table 3.4 and indicates that variables extracted
from the RNC term structures do not yield FM estimated prices of risk that are
robustly signicant dierent from zero.
3.6 Portfolio Sorts
The results in Section 3.5, indicate that the RNCs do not contain useful infor-
mation to price equity returns. The insignicant results obtained via the FM
regressions, though, are not conclusive for two reasons. (i) FM regressions assume
a linear relationship between the risk assets' excess returns and their exposure to
the risk factor, and they test whether the slope of the relationship is signicantly
dierent to zero. (ii) it is possible that the test assets we chose, even though
diverse, do not contain sucient dispersion in exposure to the risk factor. In this
Section, we test whether a factor extracted from the term structure of a RNC,
SV , is a priced factor of risk by means of portfolio sorts. As we discuss below,
portfolio sorts address both of these issues.
To test whether a constructed factor SV is priced, we proceed as follows. First,
we estimate the beta exposure of every common stock traded in NYSE, NASDAQ,
and Amex on the market excess return and the factor SV , by running a time series
regression of T months of the stock's daily excess returns on the market's excess
return and SV , as in
Ri,t −Rf,t = βi0 + βiMKT (RMKT,t −Rf,t) + βiSVSVt + εi,t, (3.26)
where Ri,t, RMKT,t, and Rf,t are the daily rates of return of the ith risky asset, the
market portfolio, and the risk-free asset. Then, at the end of the beta estimation
period, we form P portfolios by ranking stocks on the basis of their βiSV exposure.
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Hence, the constructed portfolios contain sucient dispersion in exposure to the
factor SV . Subsequently, we form value weighted portfolios. We weight each stock
in the portfolio by its relative market value within the portfolio at the end of the
beta estimation period and record the portfolio's return the subsequent month.
Finally, we roll the beta estimation period by one month and repeat. To ensure
robustness, we employ alternative sizes for the beta estimation window. At the
end of the procedure, we have a time series of monthly portfolio returns. The aver-
age monthly cross sectional performance of the portfolios reveals the relationship
between the return of a risky asset and its exposure to the risk factor.
The factor is priced if (i) the cross sectional pattern of the portfolios' returns is
linear with respect to the factor beta, and (ii) the spread portfolio, that is long
the portfolio containing the stocks with the highest betas and short the portfolio
containing the stocks with the lowest betas, yields an average monthly return that
is statistically dierent to zero. For each portfolio, we also estimate its Fama-
French-Carhart four factor alpha, αFFC, by regressing its monthly returns on the
market, size, value, and momentum factors. This allows to check whether any
signicant alphas of the constructed portfolios may be a result of already known
factors or the constructed factors are priced, indeed.
First, we study the monthly performance of decile stock portfolios constructed on
the basis of their one-month beta estimates on either the rst or the second PC of
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RNC term structure. Entries in Table 3.6, report in columns
`1' to `10' and `10 - 1', the average value of the pre-ranking estimated betas, the
post ranking average returns, and the αFFC of the respective decile and spread
portfolios, constructed at the end of each month on the basis of their one month
beta estimates on the rst and second PC of the 2nd (Panels A and B, respectively),
3rd (Panels C and D, respectively) and 4th (Panels D and E, respectively) RNC
term structure. t-statistics, calculated using Newey-West standard errors, are
reported in parenthesis.
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The pattern of the pre-ranking betas shows that the constructed portfolios have
sucient dispersion in exposure to the factor SV . For example, the average values
of the pre-ranking betas for the 2nd RNC - PC1 formed portfolios, monotonically
increase from −5.17 to 4.46, across the ten portfolios. Furthermore, the beta of the
spread portfolio equals 9.63 with a t-statitic equal to 16.11. Hence, the dierence
between the exposure to the 2nd RNC - PC1 factor of the tenth and rst portfolio
is highly statistically signicant. We can see that the average spread portfolio
returns are insignicant for most of the cases. In the cases where signicance
is obtained, still the t-statistics are well below the threshold value of 3 (Harvey
et al. (2016)), which should be used to avoid data mining concerns. Hence, the
results indicate that the term structure of RNCs is not priced even in the case
where portfolio sorts are employed as an alternative to the FM regressions. This
conclusion is corroborated by the evidence that there is no monotonic relation
between the average returns and alphas of the decile portfolios and their magnitude
of exposure to any given factor.
Interestingly, though, we nd that the stocks with the greatest positive (negative)
exposure to the rst PC of the 2nd, (3rd) and 4th RNC term structure, signicantly
underperform. For example, the average returns for the 2nd RNC - PC1 beta sorted
Portfolios 1 to 9 seem to randomly range from 0.61% to 1.07% per month. On the
contrary, Portfolio 10 produces a signicantly lower return equal to −0.07% per
month. The alpha of the portfolio is economically and statistically signicant as
it equals −1.06% per month or −12.0% per annum with a Newey-West adjusted
t-statistic equal to −4.31. Similarly, Portfolio 1 (10) of the 3nd (4th) RNC - PC1
beta sorted portfolios produces an alpha equal to −0.93% (−0.97%) per month or
approximately −11% (−11%) per annum with a t-statistic equal to −4.23 (−4.04).
The evidence overall suggests that even though the PCs are not priced in the cross-
section of equities, yet they drive the risk-adjusted performance of stocks which are
most positively (negatively) exposed to the 2nd, (3rd) and 4th RNC term structure.
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To check whether results may be driven by the choice of the beta estimation win-
dow, we repeat the portfolio sorts exercise by estimating betas for longer estima-
tion periods. Entries in Table 3.7, report the monthly post-ranking performance
of Decile 1, 10, and the spread portfolios constructed on betas estimated using
the past 3-, 6-, and 12-months daily returns. We can see that the principal com-
ponents are not priced factors of risk, as the spread portfolio does not produce a
signicant alpha for any of the longer beta estimation periods. Moreover, Decile
10 (1) consisting of stocks sorted with respect to the rst PC factor beta of the 2nd
and 4th (3rd) RNC term structure underperforms, yet the economical and statis-
tical signicance diminishes as the beta estimation period increases and becomes
insignicant for the 12-month beta estimation period.
We repeat the asset pricing tests via portfolio sorts, in the case where stocks are
sorted to portfolios based on their exposures with respect to the two RRR fac-
tors, the 3PRF factor, and the individual horizons of any given order's RNC term
structure, separately. Entries in Table 3.8, report the monthly post ranking per-
formance of Decile 1, 10, and spread portfolios constructed on the beta exposures
of stocks, estimated using three months of daily returns,with respect to the two
RRR factors (columns RRR1 and RRA2), the 3PRF factor (column 3PRF), and
the single one, three, six, and twelve months horizons RNCs. Consistent with
the results of the FM regressions, we can see that the variables are not priced
in the cross section as the alphas of the spread portfolios are economically and
statistically insignicant11.
Finally, we repeat the asset pricing tests via portfolio sorts by sorting stocks in
quintile rather than decile portfolios. Quintile sorts reduce the eect of any outliers
to our tests. Table 3.9, report the performance of quintile stock portfolios. We
sort stocks in portfolios using the rolling three month estimated beta with respect
11In Tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, we present the results only for the three months beta estima-
tion window, due to space constrains. The results for the other beta estimation windows yield
qualitatively similar results and are available upon request.
Chapter 3. The S&P 500 RNCs and the cross section of equity returns 232
to each one of the candidate state variables used in the previous analysis. We can
see that the spread portfolios do not yield signicant performance and hence none
of the considered factors is priced.
3.7 Further Evidence
3.7.1 Evidence from an ICAPM setting
The factors we have employed in the analysis so far, are constructed from the levels
of the term structure of RNCs and hence they are cast in levels themselves, too.
This is because the Feunou et al. (2014) setting, motivates the construction of state
variables in levels. An alternative setting under which the use of our constructed
variables could also be motivated, is the ICAPM setting, where the innovations
of the factors, rather than their levels, should be employed. Furthermore, the
ICAPM setting is in line with the previous literature, that has studied the pricing
performance of factors constructed from options written on the S&P 500 return
distribution (Ang et al. (2006); Chang et al. (2013); Xie (2014); Dotsis (2017)).
Hence, testing our factors in an ICAPM setting, will allow us to connect our
ndings to the previous literature. For any given factor, we proxy its innovations
by the residuals of an autoregressive moving average (ARMA(1, 1)) model tted
to the time series of each SV . 12 Entries in Table 3.10, reports the FM estimated
prices of risk, using a rolling window equal to one month, for the innovations of the
rst two PCs, the two RRR factors, the 3PRF factor, and the individual horizons
of any given order's RNC term structure13.
12In line with Chang et al. (2013), we use an ARMA(1, 1) to estimate the innovations of each
factor. The results from our asset pricing tests, are robust when we proxy the innovations of any
given factor by the rst daily dierences of its time series.
13In line with the literature, the asset pricing exercises in Section 3.7.1 use the daily returns
within a month to estimate the beta exposure of test assets to each factor (see Ang et al., 2006;
Chang et al., 2013; Xie, 2014; Dotsis, 2017, and references therein). The results for longer beta
estimation windows equal to three, six, and twelve months, yield qualitatively similar results.
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In our sample, the FM regressions indicate that the innovations of the considered
variables are not priced in the cross section of stock returns, as the prices of risk
are either statistically insignicant or not robust across the test assets. Ang et al.
(2006) argue that to the extent that innovations in volatility predict subsequent
deterioration of the investment opportunity set, the so-called leverage eect of
Black (1976), stocks that perform well during periods of increasing volatility should
earn lower expected returns as risk-averse investors are willing to pay a premium
for such stocks (e.g., see, Campbell (1993, 1996)). We nd that the 1-month
horizon 2nd RNC does not earn a negative risk-premium, as the prices of risk
reported in Panel A - column 1M are either marginally statistically signicant
with a positive sign or statistically insignicant. The evidence is robust for longer
beta estimation horizons ( Panel A, columns 3M to 12M). Similarly, we nd no
evidence that the slope of the 2nd RNC earns a negative sign as documented by
Dotsis (2017).
We further explore the pricing performance of the innovations by means of portfolio
sorts. Entries in Table 3.12, report the αFFC of the lowest decile, highest decile,
and spread portfolios constructed by ranking stocks on the basis of their one month
beta estimate on the innovations of the state variables. Consistent with the FM
regressions, we nd that none of the variables are priced as the spread portfolios
are economically and statistically insignicant.14
14A remark is in order at this point. We test whether the innovations of the slope of the
2nd RNC are priced in the spirit of Feunou et al. (2014), Ang et al. (2006) and Chang et al.
(2013). In particular, as the framework of Feunou et al. (2014) dictates, we extract the slope
of the 2nd RNC by applying the principal component analysis (PCA) on the levels of the 2nd
RNC. Furthermore, similarly to Ang et al. (2006) and Chang et al. (2013), we test whether the
innovations of the slope are priced using relatively small beta estimation windows ranging from
one to twelve months.
Dotsis (2017) employs a dierent approach. In particular, each month he uses the most recent
5-year 2nd RNC term structure data and extracts the slope of the term structure by applying
the PCA on the innovations rather than the levels of the 2nd RNC. Subsequently, he estimates
the beta exposure of each stock on the same 5-year window which is much larger than ours.
Subsequently, he forms quintile portfolios and follows their return the subsequent month. The
results of this exercise are presented in Table 4 of Dotsis (2017) and are rather weak in light
of Harvey et al. (2016) criticism. First, there is no monotonic relationship between the beta
exposure of the portfolios and their post-ranking returns. Second, both the return and the risk
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3.7.2 RNS versus RNC: A revisit
Our previous ndings suggest that the term structure and the individual horizons
of the 3rd RNC are not priced in the cross section of equity returns. On the other
hand, Chang et al. (2013) nd that the innovations of the single one, two, and six
month horizon RNS, earn a negative risk premium during the period ranging from
January 1996 to December 2007. RNS is the 3rd cumulant normalised by the term
(EQt [rt,t+τ ]−EQt [rt,t+τ ]2])3/2. Even though, both moments measure the asymmetry
of the risk-neutral distribution, the normalising term alters signicantly the time
series of the 3rd RNC. We nd, that the correlations between the one, three, six,
and twelve months horizon 3rd RNC and RNS, equal −8%, −6%, −3%, and 12%,
respectively.
Entries, in Table 3.12 report the pricing performance of stocks' exposure to both
the levels (Panel A) and the innovations (Panel B) of RNS. Entries report, the
αFFC of the lowest decile, the highest decile and and spread portfolios constructed
by ranking stocks on the basis of their beta exposure, estimated using one month,
three months, and six months of daily returns, to the one month (column 1M),
three month (column 3M), and six month (column 6M) horizon RNS.
We can see that the level of the RNS is not priced in the cross section of equity
returns, as the performance of the spread portfolio is either marginally statistically
signicant or insignicant across the dierent maturities; the marginal signicant
results do not by pass Harvey's (2016) critical values. The results of Panel B
show that in our extended sample the innovations of RNS are not priced either,
as the aFFC of the spread portfolio is statistically indistinguishable to zero across
adjusted return of the spread portfolio are marginally statistically signicant with t-stats equal
to -2.05 and -2.04, respectively.
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all maturities. In sum, over our extended sample, the S&P 500 RNS is not priced,
just as is the case with the 3rd RNC.15
3.8 Conclusions
We contribute to the literature which investigates whether index option prices
contain information which can be used to construct factors of risk. We investigate
whether factors that price the cross section of stock returns can be constructed
from the the term structures of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th risk neutral cumulant (RNC)
of the S&P 500 returns distribution. Our research is motivated by the theoretical
setting of Feunou et al. (2014). In their setting, the SDF and the equity premium
are ane functions of the vector of the state variables. Furthermore, the state
vector is an ane function of the term structure of any given order RNC. Hence,
any linear combination of an RNC term structure may be considered as a proxy of
the vector of the state variables, and thus as a factor of risk that prices the cross
section of stock returns.
We construct factors that are an ane function of any given order's RNC term
structure, by applying three alternative dimensionality reduction techniques (DRTs)
to the term structure of any given order RNC, namely the principal components
analysis, the three pass regression, and the reduction rank regressions. The last
two methods yield factors which respect the fundamental relation between the
market risk premium and state variables. Furthermore, we also employ, as factors
15The estimation procedure, described in Section 3.3.1, is very similar to the one fol-
lowed by Chang et al. (2013, see Appendix A). In fact, we nd that the correlation of
our RNS estimate and the one of Chang et al. (2013), which is available to download at
http://jfe.rochester.edu/data.htm, equals 96%. Furthermore, Chang et al. (2013) docu-
ment that the portfolio that is long the stocks with the highest exposure to the innovations of
RNS and short the stocks with the lowest exposure of RNS earns on average a monthly Fama-
French-Carhart alpha equal to -0.80% (t-stat = -2.42) during the 1996-2007 period. We repeat
their exercise and document an alpha equal to -0.61% (-0.64%) with a t-stat equal to -2.02 (-1.93)
when we estimate the RNS innovations using an ARMA model (the daily dierences). Hence,
our results dier due to the dierent sample period and not due to the procedure we follow to
estimate the innovations of RNS or to test their pricing performance.
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of risk, the single horizon of any given order's RNC, which is a special case of the
more general linear combination of RNCs with dierent maturities specication.
We test the pricing performance of each factor, by a number of dierent specica-
tions of FM regressions and portfolio sorts. Furthermore, to alleviate the potential
concern that our results may be driven by the setting of Feunou et al. (2014), we
also test the pricing performance of each constructed factor in an ICAPM setting.
We nd that factors constructed from the RNC's of the S&P 500 return distribu-
tion are not priced in the cross section of equity returns. For any given order's
RNC term structure, our result holds, regardless of whether we test (i) a factor
constructed by a DRT or an individual horizon RNC, (ii) the pricing performance
of any given factor by means of FM regressions or portfolio sorts, and (iii) if a fac-
tor is priced in the Feunou et al. (2014) or the ICAPM setting. Hence, our results
echo the recent evidence, that most of the asset pricing anomalies documented
by the previous literature do not hold, once more conservative critical values are
used to assess signicance, the eect of micro-cap stocks is downsized and more
extended samples are used(see, e.g., Harvey et al., 2016; Hou et al., 2015). Our















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2: Estimation of State Variables: Principal Component Analysis 
Entries report the loadings from the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for the term-structure of each 
risk-neutral cumulant. Row R2 reports the percentage of the term-structure’s total variance explained by the 
nth principal component and row Cum R2 reports the percentage explained by the first n principal 
components. 
Horizon PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Panel A: 2nd Risk Neutral Cumulant 
1 0.40 -0.58 0.40 -0.46 -0.24 0.28 
2 0.41 -0.37 -0.00 0.21 0.33 -0.74 
3 0.41 -0.18 -0.30 0.54 0.27 0.59 
6 0.42 0.17 -0.42 0.08 -0.77 -0.17 
9 0.41 0.39 -0.34 -0.63 0.42 0.04 
12 0.40 0.57 0.68 0.24 0.00 0.01 
R2 95.20 4.33 0.30 0.11 0.05 0.02 
Cum R2 95.20 99.53 99.82 99.94 99.98 100 
Panel B: 3rd Risk Neutral Cumulant [x10] 
1 0.39 -0.58 0.37 0.44 0.32 -0.28 
2 0.42 -0.36 0.05 -0.11 -0.45 0.69 
3 0.43 -0.16 -0.24 -0.55 -0.28 -0.59 
6 0.43 0.15 -0.38 -0.22 0.73 0.28 
9 0.41 0.39 -0.41 0.64 -0.30 -0.10 
12 0.38 0.58 0.70 -0.16 -0.02 -0.02 
R2 88.53 8.99 1.51 0.51 0.33 0.13 
Cum R2 88.53 97.52 99.03 99.54 99.87 100 
Panel C: 4th Risk Neutral Cumulant [x100] 
1 0.38 -0.61 0.42 -0.39 0.29 -0.28 
2 0.42 -0.37 0.00 0.17 -0.48 0.65 
3 0.43 -0.12 -0.36 0.53 -0.17 -0.60 
6 0.43 0.17 -0.38 0.05 0.72 -0.34 
9 0.41 0.39 -0.27 -0.68 -0.36 0.13 
12 0.38 0.54 0.70 0.27 0.00 0.01 
R2 87.00 9.89 1.83 0.65 0.46 0.17 






Table 3.3: Estimation of State Variables: RRR and 3PRF 
Entries report the explanatory power of the state variables that have been estimated via reduced rank 
regressions (RRR) and the three-way pass regression filter (3PRF) from the term-structures of the 2nd (Panel 
A), 3rd (Panel B), and 4th (Panel C) Risk-Neutral Cumulant of the S&P 500 return distribution on the S&P 
500 excess returns. We consider S&P 500 excess returns at horizons (τ) of 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. 
Each panel reports the R2s associated with each of the individual equity return predictability regressions, 
𝑌𝑡+𝜏 = 𝛱𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, for different hypothesis on the rank of the matrix Π (columns r = 1 to r = 6) and via the 
3PRF (column 3PRF) procedure, where the forecast target variable is the 1-month S&P 500 excess returns 
and the explanatory variables are each term-structure. The last row reports the p-values associated with the 
likelihood ratio test of the rank of Π on the hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝛱) ≤ 𝑟 against 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝛱) = 6. Row cor(⋅
 , 𝑃𝐶1) (cor(⋅ , 𝑃𝐶2)) reports the correlation of the first (second) principal component with the two state 
variables that have been estimated via the RRR for 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝛱) = 2 (columns r = 1 and r = 2) and the 3PRF 
procedure (column 3PRF). 
 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6 3PRF 
Panel A: 2nd risk neutral cumulant (S&P 500 returns R2s) 
1-month 5.3 8.5 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.51 9.0 
2 9.6 9.8 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.6 4.1 
3 9.5 9.6 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.2 3.7 
6 11.35 12.1 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 4.2 
9 7.06 8.1 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 3.3 
12-months 3.73 5.0 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 2.3 
𝐻0: 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝛱) ≤ 𝑟 <0.01 0.11 0.42 0.61 0.85 0.60  
cor(⋅ , 𝑃𝐶1) 45.3% -6.8%     -0.0% 
cor(⋅ , 𝑃𝐶2) 70.7% 49.0%     >99.9% 
Panel B: 3rd risk neutral cumulant (S&P 500 returns R2s) 
1-month 8.6 10.8 11.6 12.6 12.7 12.9 8.6 
2 11.8 11.9 12.8 14.0 14.2 14.2 6.6 
3 10.8 11.3 11.9 12.1 12.2 12.4 6.3 
6 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.1 14.1 14.1 6.7 
9 10.3 10.5 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.8 4.5 
12-months 7.3 7.7 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.5 2.9 
𝐻0: 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝛱) ≤ 𝑟 <0.01 0.02 0.33 0.75 0.98 0.94  
cor(⋅ , 𝑃𝐶1) -64.3% 12.3%     0.7% 
cor(⋅ , 𝑃𝐶2) -64.7% -40.0%     <-99.9% 
Panel C: 4th risk neutral cumulant (S&P 500 returns R2s) 
1-month 6.6 7.9 8.9 9.7 9.9 10.1 6.4 
2 7.5 8.3 8.8 12.3 12.5 13.0 6.3 
3 7.7 8.6 10.4 11.6 11.7 12.4 6.9 
6 13.2 13.3 13.7 14.1 14.1 14.5 9.4 
9 11.0 11.0 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.3 6.2 
12-months 8.4 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.8 4.0 
𝐻0: 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝛱) ≤ 𝑟 <0.01 0.08 0.20 0.52 0.90 0.88  
cor(⋅ , 𝑃𝐶1) 55.9% 74.1%     0.60% 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Fama-MacBeth regressions: Levels of state variables estimated  
using alternative methods 
Entries report the prices of risk (percent per month) of the state variables extracted from Reduced-Rank 
Regressions described in Section 3.2 (columns RR1 and RR2), the Three-Pass Regression Filter procedure 
described in Section 3.3 (column 3PRF), and the single one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month horizon 
(columns 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12-month) of the 2nd (Panel A), 3rd (Panel C), and 4th (Panel D) Risk-Neutral 
Cumulant of the S&P 500 return distribution. Prices of risk are estimated via three month rolling-window 
two-pass Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. In the first stage, we estimate the test asset’s betas by 
running a time series regression of three months of daily excess returns on 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓 and the state variable 
of interest. In the second stage, we run the cross-sectional regression of next month’s excess return on the 
estimated betas. We repeat the procedure by rolling the beta estimation window by one month. The 
procedure leads to a time series of estimated prices of risk. Entries report their average value and the t-
statistic (in parenthesis) using Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance of the spread at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Price of Risk (% per month) 
 RRR1 RRR2 3PRF 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month 
Panel A: 2nd Risk Neutral cumulant 
25 Size/BM -0.210 0.215* -0.094 0.167 0.151 0.141 0.067 
 (-1.12) (1.92) (-0.74) (1.12) (0.96) (0.81) (0.36) 
25 OP/Inv -0.025 0.160 -0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.022 0.049 
 (-0.32) (1.57) (-0.036) (0.044) (-0.05) (-0.20) (0.40) 
49 Ind -0.171 0.434** 0.037 0.030 0.057 0.010 0.130 
 (-1.14) (2.24) (0.24) (0.16) (0.28) (0.049) (0.69) 
10 Mom -0.020 0.298 0.057 -0.053 -0.114 -0.208 -0.172 
 (-0.10) (1.39) (0.45) (-0.35) (-0.66) (-1.17) (-0.77) 
Panel B: 3rd Risk Neutral cumulant 
25 Size/BM -0.326 0.266 -0.182 -0.467 -0.320 -0.152 -0.133 
 (-1.01) (0.81) (-0.58) (-0.97) (-0.85) (-0.45) (-0.46) 
25 OP/Inv -0.059 0.320* 0.071 -0.160 -0.173 -0.013 -0.223 
 (-0.21) (1.90) (0.34) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.031) (-0.74) 
49 Ind -0.320 0.796** -0.173 -0.324 -0.205 -0.065 -0.476 
 (-0.76) (2.22) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.11) (-1.12) 
10 Mom -0.914** -0.273 -0.237 -0.240 0.044 0.551 0.030 
 (-2.22) (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.35) (0.14) (1.39) (0.047) 
Panel C: 4th Risk Neutral cumulant 
25 Size/BM -0.790 -0.418 -0.349 0.952 0.491 0.258 0.117 
 (-1.36) (-0.90) (-0.58) (0.80) (0.84) (0.53) (0.25) 
25 OP/Inv 0.301 0.070 0.165 0.502 0.584 0.155 0.341 
 (0.52) (0.15) (0.39) (0.46) (0.54) (0.17) (0.54) 
49 Ind 0.084 -0.669 -0.416 2.289 1.043 0.657 1.093 
 (0.15) (-0.62) (-0.38) (0.72) (0.70) (0.53) (1.40) 
10 Mom -1.211* 0.377 -0.810 1.745 0.276 -0.519 0.355 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 3.7: Decile portfolio sorts on principal components: Longer beta 
estimation periods 
Entries report the monthly post-ranking performance of the lowest decile (column 1), the highest decile 
(column 10), and the spread (column 10 – 1) stock portfolios constructed on the basis of the stocks’ beta 
exposure on the first (columns PC1) and second (columns PC2) principal components of the 2nd (Panel A), 
the 3rd (Panel B), and the 4th (Panel C) Risk-Neutral Cumulant of the S&P 500 return distribution. At the 
end of each rolling month period, we run the following regression on the daily returns of each stock during 
the past 3, 6, and 12-months 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇
𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖 𝑆𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  
where SV is the first or second principal component of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Risk-Neutral Cumulant’s term-
structure. We sort stocks in ascending order with respect to their 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖  estimate and assign them to ten equally 
populated portfolios. We form value-weighted portfolios by weighting each stock in the portfolio by its 
relative market value (stock price times the number of shares outstanding) within the portfolio at the end 
of the beta estimation period. For each portfolio, we record its value-weighted average beta (pre-ranking 
betas) and its value-weighted subsequent monthly return (post-ranking returns). The table reports the Fama-
French-Carchart four-factor alpha estimated by running a time series regression of the post-ranking value-
weighted monthly returns on monthly 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 for the portfolio containing the 
stocks with the lowest (highest) 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖  in subcolumn 1 (10) and the spread portfolio in subcolumn 10  – 1. t-
values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and 
significant at the 1% level, but for readability reasons the stars are omitted. 
 PC1 PC2 
 1 10 10 – 1 1 10 10 – 1 
Panel A: 2nd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
3-month Beta -1.86 1.41 3.27 -4.63 6.04 10.67 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.28 -0.67** -0.38 -0.20 -0.31 -0.11 
 (-0.83) (-2.94) (-0.81) (-0.99) (-1.21) (-0.31) 
6-month Beta -0.99 0.68 1.67 -2.38 3.44 5.82 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.11 -0.38* -0.27 -0.64*** -0.08 0.56 
 (-0.37) (-1.89) (-0.65) (-3.09) (-0.37) (1.53) 
12-month Beta -0.51 0.34 0.85 -1.30 1.95 3.25 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.10 -0.40 -0.30 -0.64** 0.23 0.87* 
 (-0.35) (-1.56) (-0.70) (-2.47) (0.80) (1.81) 
Panel B: 3rd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
3-month Beta -3.61 4.31 7.92 -9.42 8.55 17.96 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.71*** -0.22 0.48 -0.38 -0.32 0.06 
 (-3.00) (-0.70) (1.09) (-1.51) (-1.45) (0.18) 
6-month Beta -1.71 2.17 3.88 -4.89 4.21 9.10 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.51** -0.24 0.27 0.04 -0.27 -0.32 
 (-2.66) (-0.84) (0.72) (0.20) (-1.43) (-0.96) 
12-month Beta -0.83 1.13 1.96 -2.39 2.02 4.41 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.29 -0.31 -0.02 1.44** 0.58 -0.86* 
 (-1.01) (-0.99) (-0.04) (2.41) (1.22) (-1.82) 
Panel C: 4th Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
3-month Beta -8.68 7.18 15.85 -15.65 16.56 32.21 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.10 -0.81*** -0.71 -0.34* -0.42 -0.07 
 (-0.30) (-3.13) (-1.47) (-1.69) (-1.62) (-0.21) 
6-month Beta -4.31 3.30 7.62 -7.73 8.36 16.09 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.06 -0.42** -0.36 -0.35* 0.18 0.54* 
 (-0.18) (-2.07) (-0.88) (-1.88) (0.89) (1.69) 
12-month Beta -2.14 1.55 3.69 -3.59 3.91 7.49 
 (-5.7) (6.04) (5.97) (-6.06) (5.85) (6.09) 
Carchart 4-factor alpha -0.01 -0.47 -0.46 -0.54** 0.51* 1.04** 




Table 3.8: Decile portfolio sorts on RRR, 3PRF, and single maturity factors 
Entries report the monthly post-ranking performance of decile stock portfolios constructed on the 
basis of their three-month beta estimates on state variables estimated via Reduced-Rank 
Regressions described in Section 3.2 (columns RR1 and RR2), the Three-Pass Regression Filter 
procedure described in Section 3.3 (column 3PRF), or the single one-, three-, six-, and twelve-
month horizon (columns 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12-month) of the 2nd (Panel A), the 3rd (Panel B), and the 
4th (Panel C) Risk-Neutral Cumulant of the S&P 500 return distribution, separately. At the end of 
each rolling three-month period, we run the following regression on the daily returns of each stock 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇
𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖 𝑆𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  
where SV is one of the state variables described above. We then sort stocks in ascending order 
with respect to their 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖  estimate and assign them to ten equally populated portfolios. We form 
value-weighted portfolios by weighting each stock in the portfolio by its relative market value 
(stock price times the number of shares outstanding) in the portfolio at the end of the beta 
estimation period. For each portfolio, we record its value-weighted subsequent monthly return 
(post-ranking returns). The table reports the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha estimated by 
running a time series regression of the post-ranking value-weighted monthly returns on monthly 
𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 for the portfolio containing the stocks with the lowest (highest) 
𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖  in row Decile-1 (Decile-10) and the spread portfolio in row Spread (10 – 1). t-values 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags are provided in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
 RR1 RR2 3PRF 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month 
Panel A: 2nd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
Decile - 1 αFFC -0.19 -0.33 -0.20 -0.14 -0.40 -0.22 -0.16 
 (-0.63) (-1.28) -1.03 (-0.48) (-1.14) (-0.61) (-0.50) 
Decile - 10 αFFC -0.38 -0.02 -0.25 -0.53** -0.73*** -0.69** -0.67** 
 -1.58 -0.08 -1.00 (-2.72) (-3.09) (-2.71) (-2.66) 
Spread (10 – 1) αFFC -0.19 0.31 -0.05 -0.39 -0.33 -0.47 -0.52 
 (-0.47) (0.76) -0.15 (-0.98) (-0.68) (-0.91) (-1.05) 
Panel B: 3rd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
Decile - 1 αFFC -0.09 -0.53** -0.27 -0.67*** -0.70*** -0.77*** -0.45* 
 (-0.37) (-2.45) (-1.19) (-3.61) (-3.05) (-3.16) (1.89) 
Decile - 10 αFFC -0.64** -0.12 -0.37 -0.10 -0.15 -0.13 -0.07 
 (-2.89) (-0.42) (-1.51) (-0.36) (-0.52) (-0.36) (-0.22) 
Spread (10 – 1) αFFC -0.55 0.41 -0.10 0.57 0.55 0.64 0.38 
 (-1.53) (1.15) (-0.30) (1.52) (1.27) (1.25) (0.89) 
Panel C: 4th Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
Decile - 1 αFFC -0.35 -0.83*** -0.33 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 -0.01 
 (-1.26) (-3.74) (-1.61) (-0.43) -0.35 (-0.42) (-0.01) 
Decile - 10 αFFC -0.23 -0.33 -0.43* -0.63*** -0.75*** -0.76** -0.55** 
 (-1.02) (-1.20) (-1.70) (-3.13) (-3.03) (-2.79) (-2.27) 
Spread (10 – 1) αFFC 0.12 0.50 -0.10 -0.49 -0.63 -0.60 -0.54 




Table 3.9: Quintile portfolio sorts on each variable: Three-month beta  
estimation window 
Entries report the monthly post-ranking performance of quintile stock portfolios constructed on the basis 
of their three-month beta estimates on state variables estimated via the Principal Component Analysis 
(columns PC1 and PC2), Reduced-Rank Regressions described in Section 3.2 (columns RR1 and RR2), the 
Three-Pass Regression Filter procedure described in Section 3.3 (column 3PRF), or the single one-, three-
, six-, and twelve-month horizon (columns 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12-month) of the 2nd (Panel A), the 3rd (Panel B), 
and the 4th (Panel C) Risk-Neutral Cumulant of the S&P 500 return distribution. At the end of each rolling 
three-month period, we run the following regression on the daily returns of each stock 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇
𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖 𝑆𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  
where SV is one of the state variables described above. We then sort stocks in ascending order with respect 
to their 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖  estimate and assign them to five equally populated portfolios. We form value-weighted portfolio 
by weighting each stock in the portfolio by its relative market value (stock price times the number of shares 
outstanding) in the portfolio at the end of the beta estimation period. For each portfolio, we record its value-
weighted subsequent monthly return (post-ranking returns). Entries report the Fama-French-Carhart four-
factor alpha estimated by running a time series regression of the post-ranking value-weighted monthly 
returns on monthly 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 for the portfolio containing the stocks with the lowest 
(highest) 𝛽𝑆𝑉
𝑖  in row Quintile-1 (Quintile-5) and the spread portfolio in row Spread. t-values calculated 
using Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
 Fama-French-Carchart 4-factor alpha (αFFC) 
 PC1 PC2 RR1 RR2 3PRF 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month 
Panel A: 2nd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
Quint-1 -0.06 -0.25 -0.17 -0.15 -0.23* -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.27) (-1.81) (-0.85) (-0.89) (-1.68) -0.65 (-0.03) (-0.11) -0.12 
Quint.-5 -0.35** -0.11 -0.19 0.00 -0.15 -0.30** -0.38*** -0.42*** -0.29* 
 (-2.48) (-0.68) (-1.03) (0.01) (-0.90) (-2.49) (-2.67) (-2.79) (-1.80) 
 5 – 1  -0.29 0.14 -0.03 0.15 0.08 -0.16 -0.38 -0.39 -0.27 
 (-1.03) (0.64) (-0.08) (0.52) (0.38) (-0.62) (-1.34) (-1.33) (-0.92) 
Panel B: 3rd Risk Neutral cumulant 
Quint.-1 -0.41** -0.23 -0.09 -0.42*** -0.24 -0.34** -0.51*** -0.37** -0.29** 
 (-2.47) (-1.45) (-0.50) (-2.79) (-1.60) (-2.56) (-3.16) (-2.43) (-1.96) 
Quint.-5 -0.12 -0.25 -0.49*** 0.02 -0.24 -0.19 -0.08 -0.16 0.01 
 (-0.58) (-1.64) (-3.33) (0.10) (-1.47) (-1.01) (-0.43) (-0.64) (0.06) 
5 – 1 0.29 -0.02 -0.40 0.43 0.00 0.15 0.43 0.21 0.30 
 (0.97) (-0.06) (-1.47) (1.74) 0.00 (0.56) (1.58) (0.58) (0.96) 
Panel B: 4th Risk Neutral cumulant 
Quint.-1 -0.10 -0.18 -0.24 -0.53 -0.20 -0.12 0.00 0.09 0.02 
 (-0.48) (-1.21) (-1.46) (-3.20) (-1.37) (-0.58) (0.02) (0.44) (0.09) 
Quint.-5 -0.40** -0.23 -0.18 -0.04 -0.21 -0.43*** -0.58*** -0.43*** -0.33** 
 (-2.25) (-1.58) (-1.10) (-0.21) (-1.39) (-3.04) (-3.51) (-3.08) (-2.17) 
5 – 1 -0.29 -0.05 0.06 0.49* -0.01 -0.30 -0.58** -0.51* -0.35 






Table 3.10: Fama-MacBeth regressions: Innovations of the state variables 
Entries report the prices of risk (percent per month) of innovations of the state variables estimated via 
Principal Component Analysis (columns PC1 and PC2) Reduced-Rank Regressions described in Section 
3.2 (columns RR1 and RR2), the Three-Pass Regression Filter procedure described in Section 3.3 (column 
3PRF), or the single one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month horizon (columns 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12-month) of the 
2nd (Panel A), the 3rd (Panel B), and the 4th (Panel C) Risk-Neutral Cumulant of the S&P 500 return 
distribution, separately. Prices of risk are estimated via rolling-window two-pass Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regressions. In the first stage, we estimate the test asset’s betas by running a time series regression of daily 
excess returns on 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓 and the state variable of interest during the month. In the second stage, we run 
the cross-sectional regression of next month’s excess return on the estimated betas. We repeat the procedure 
by rolling the beta estimation window by one month. The procedure leads to a time series of estimated 
prices of risk. The table reports their average value and the t-statistic (in parenthesis) using Newey-West 
standard errors with 5 lags. ***, and ** indicate statistical significance of the spread at the 1%, and 5% 
level, respectively. 
 Price of Risk (% per month) 
 PC1 PC2 RRR1 RRR2 3PRF 1M 3M 6M 12M 
Panel A: 2nd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
25 Size/BM 0.181 -0.059 -0.085 -0.191 -0.059 0.177 0.081 0.159 0.165 
 (1.39) (-0.49) (-0.69) (-1.34) (-0.49) (1.53) (0.56) (1.27) (1.35) 
25 OP/Inv 0.163 -0.103 0.088 0.013 -0.107 0.181* 0.112 0.093 0.148 
 (1.37) (-1.21) (1.16) (0.096) (-1.27) (1.71) (1.07) (0.78) (1.05) 
49 Ind -0.062 -0.170 -0.181 0.315 -0.184 0.033 -0.059 -0.163 0.025 
 (-0.27) (-1.06) (-1.06) (1.35) (-1.15) (0.18) (-0.29) (-0.68) (0.11) 
10 Mom 0.157 0.012 0.085 0.224 -0.001 0.022 0.096 0.063 0.189 
 (0.87) (0.08) (0.48) (0.89) (-0.01) (0.15) (0.47) (0.37) (0.77) 
Panel B: 3rd Risk Neutral cumulant 
25 Size/BM -0.331 0.324 0.368 0.104 -0.321 -0.804* -0.072 -0.398 -0.035 
 (-1.06) (1.12) (1.18) (0.26) (-1.10) (-1.90) (-0.20) (-1.20) (-0.14) 
25 OP/Inv -0.419 0.393 0.044 0.252 -0.401 -0.626 -0.256 -0.064 -0.235 
 (-1.48) (1.45) (0.20) (0.99) (-1.49) (-1.56) (-1.07) (-0.26) (-0.81) 
49 Ind 0.274 0.740 -0.938 0.337 -0.747 -0.404 0.705 0.807 0.282 
 (0.67) (1.51) (-1.41) (0.56) (-1.55) (-0.86) (1.12) (1.39) (0.61) 
10 Mom -0.022 0.135 -0.727 -1.138* -0.157 -0.855 -0.446 0.075 0.066 
 (-0.041) (0.30) (-1.36) (-1.91) (-0.34) (-1.16) (-0.68) (0.24) (0.12) 
Panel B: 4th Risk Neutral cumulant 
25 Size/BM 0.917 -0.836 0.282 0.518 -0.761 2.010* 0.348 0.444 -0.250 
 (1.18) (-1.49) (0.71) (1.26) (-1.40) (1.78) (0.50) (0.60) (-0.45) 
25 OP/Inv 0.976 -1.018 0.782 0.733 -0.927 1.773 0.221 1.063 0.716 
 (1.39) (-1.21) (1.29) (0.95) (-1.20) (1.17) (0.44) (1.50) (1.06) 
49 Ind -0.395 -2.082 -0.603 0.418 -1.934 1.712 -2.309 -1.376 -1.012 
 (-0.47) (-1.52) (-0.64) (0.42) (-1.48) (1.42) (-1.27) (-1.03) (-0.92) 
10 Mom -0.467 -0.569 -0.309 0.491 -0.435 2.080 -0.323 -0.738 -0.946 





Table 3.11: Portfolio sorts on the innovations of the estimated state variables 
Entries report the monthly post-ranking performance of decile stock portfolios constructed on the basis of 
their one-month beta estimates on the innovations of the first two principal components (columns PC1 and 
PC2), the two variables extracted from the Reduced-Rank Regressions described in Section 3.2 (columns 
RR1 and RR2), the Three-Pass Regression Filter procedure described in Section 3.3 (column 3PRF), or the 
single one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month horizon (columns 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12-month) of the 2nd (Panel A), 
the 3rd (Panel B), and the 4th (Panel C) Risk-Neutral Cumulant of the S&P 500 return distribution, 
separately. At the end of each rolling one-month period, we run the following regression on the daily returns 
of each stock during the previous three months 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇
𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝛥𝑆𝑉
𝑖 𝛥𝑆𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  
where ΔSV is the innovation of one of the variables described above. Then, we sort stocks in ascending 
order with respect to their 𝛽𝛥𝑆𝑉
𝑖  estimate and assign them to ten equally populated portfolios. We form 
value-weighted portfolio by weighting each stock in the portfolio by its relative market value (stock price 
times the number of shares outstanding) in the portfolio at the end of the beta estimation period. For each 
portfolio, we record its value-weighted subsequent monthly return (post-ranking returns). The table reports 
the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor alpha estimated by running a time series regression of the post-ranking 
value-weighted monthly returns on monthly 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 for the portfolio containing 
the stocks with the lowest (highest) 𝛽𝛥𝑆𝑉
𝑖  in row Decile-1 (Decile-10) and the spread portfolio in row (10) 
– (1). t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags are provided in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
 
 Fama-French Carchart 4 factor alpha (αFFC) 
 PC1 PC2 RR1 RR2 3PRF 1M 3M 6M 12M 
Panel A: 2nd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
Decile - 1 αFFC 0.03 -0.61** -0.47* -0.65** -0.55** -0.16 -0.06 -0.35 -0.11 
 (0.13) (-2.74) (-1.82) (-2.61) (-2.49) (-0.69) (-0.23) (-1.61) (-0.50) 
Decile - 10 αFFC -0.05 -0.56** -0.13 -0.48 -0.53** -0.08 -0.08 -0.21 -0.42* 
 (-0.24) (-2.46) (-0.50) (-1.63) (-2.40) (-0.40) (-0.33) (-0.87) (-1.88) 
 (10 – 1) αFFC -0.08 0.05 0.33 0.17 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.14 -0.31 
 (-0.23) (0.14) (0.82) (0.41) -1.49 (0.24) (-0.04) (0.41) (-0.95) 
Panel B: 3rd Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
Decile - 1 αFFC -0.18 -0.32* -0.16 -0.40 -0.64** -0.32 -0.19 -0.10 -0.58** 
 (-0.71) (-1.83) (-0.60) (-1.34) (-2.84) (-1.34) (-0.83) (-0.38) (-2.42) 
Decile - 10 αFFC -0.41* -0.68*** -0.30 -0.38 -0.31* -0.47** -0.23 -0.48** -0.84*** 
 (-1.80) (-3.02) (-1.21) (-1.39) (-1.82) (-2.14) (-1.03) (-2.01) (-3.75) 
 (10 – 1) αFFC -0.23 -0.36 -0.14 0.02 0.33 -0.15 -0.03 -0.38 -0.27 
 (-0.66) (-1.48) (-0.42) (0.07) (1.34) (-0.46) (-0.09) (-0.98) (-0.79) 
Panel C: 4th Risk-Neutral Cumulant 
Decile - 1 αFFC -0.32 -0.76*** -0.49** -0.68** -0.68** -0.21 -0.09 -0.43** -0.55** 
 (-1.43) (-3.23) (-2.10) (-2.53) (-2.86) (-0.99) (-0.40) (-1.99) (-2.33) 
Decile - 10 αFFC -0.40 -0.07 -0.64** -0.30 -0.08 -0.44* -0.42* -0.25 -0.40* 
 (-1.58) (-0.42) (-2.36) (-1.00) (-0.49) (-1.69) (-1.78) (-1.08) (-1.69) 
 (10 – 1) αFFC -0.08 0.69** -0.14 0.38 0.60** -0.23 -0.33 0.19 0.15 




Table 3.12: Portfolio sorts on Risk-Neutral Skewness (levels and innovations) 
Entries report the monthly post-ranking performance of the lowest, highest, and spread portfolio 
of decile stock portfolios constructed on the basis of the stocks’ beta exposure on the level (Panel 
A) and the innovation (Panel B) of the Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) of the S&P 500 return 
distribution. At the end of each rolling one-month period, we run the following regression on the 
daily returns of each stock during the previous one (columns 1-month Betas), three (columns 3-
months Betas), and six-months (columns 6-month Betas) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇
𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝛥𝑆𝑉
𝑖 𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
where Xt is either the level (RNSt) or the innovations (ΔRNSt) of the RNS with horizon one 
(subcolumns 1M), three (subcolumns 3M), and six (subcolumns 6M) months. We then sort stocks 
in ascending order with respect to their 𝛽𝑋
𝑖  estimate and assign them to ten equally populated 
portfolios. We form value-weighted portfolios by weighting each stock in the portfolio by its 
relative market value (stock price times the number of shares outstanding) in the portfolio at the 
end of the beta estimation period. For each portfolio we record its value-weighted subsequent 
monthly return (post-ranking returns). The table reports the value-weighted 𝛽𝑋
𝑖  and Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor alpha estimated by running a time series regression of the post-ranking value-
weighted monthly returns on monthly 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 for the portfolio 
containing the stocks with the lowest (highest) 𝛽𝑋
𝑖  in row Portfolio-1 (Portfolio-10) and the spread 
portfolio in row (10) – (1). t-values calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags are 
provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively 
 1-month Betas 3-month Betas 6-month Betas 
 1M 3M 6M 1M 3M 6M 1M 3M 6M 
Panel A: Levels of Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) 
Decile – 1 beta -8.69 -12.59 -19.58 -3.52 -4.73 -7.29 -2.06 -2.80 -4.03 
αFFC -0.39* -0.84*** -0.86*** -0.14 -0.29 -0.51** -0.06 -0.21 -0.48** 
t(αFFC) (-1.77) (-3.70) (-3.01) (-0.68) (-1.20) (-2.11) (-0.22) (-0.76) (-2.12) 
Decile – 10 beta 8.21 11.38 17.40 3.08 3.99 5.90 1.80 2.30 3.01 
αFFC -0.45** -0.21 -0.18 -0.41* 0.05 -0.44* -0.18 -0.02 -0.21 
t(αFFC) (-2.15) (-1.06) (-0.85) (-1.79) (0.21) (-1.67) (-0.64) (-0.09) (-0.68) 
Spread 10 – 1 beta 16.90 23.97 36.98 6.60 8.73 13.19 3.86 5.10 7.03 
αFFC -0.06 0.63** 0.67* -0.27 0.34 0.07 -0.12 0.18 0.27 
t(αFFC) (-0.20) (2.13) (1.87) (-0.82) (0.96) (0.19) (-0.27) (0.45) (0.67) 
Panel B: Innovations of Risk-Neutral Skewness (ΔRNS) 
Decile – 1 beta -10.16 -15.42 -24.27 -5.29 -7.62 -11.83 -3.58 -5.16 -8.00 
αFFC -0.07 -0.12 -0.49** -0.02 -0.28 -0.13 -0.32 -0.16 -0.45* 
t(αFFC) (-0.35) (-0.51) (-2.01) (-0.12) (-1.14) (-0.65) (-1.15) (-0.66) (-1.89) 
Decile – 10 beta 15.68 11.38 24.91 5.40 7.69 12.47 3.77 5.33 8.60 
αFFC -0.58** -0.57** -0.55** -0.49* -0.27 -0.43* -0.22 -0.15 -0.53* 
t(αFFC) (-2.05) (-2.47) (-2.31) (-1.88) (-1.24) (-1.67) (-0.82) (-0.64) (-1.91) 
Spread 10 – 1 beta 20.44 31.09 49.18 10.69 15.31 24.29 7.35 10.49 16.59 
αFFC -0.51 -0.45 -0.06 -0.47 0.01 -0.30 0.09 0.00 -0.08 




Abramowitz, A. I., 1988. An Improved Model for Predicting Presidential Election
Outcomes. Political Science and Politics 21, 843847.
Abramowitz, A. I., 2008. Forecasting the 2008 presidential election with the time-
for-change model. Political Science and Politics 24, 209217.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Kermani, A., Kwak, J., Mitton, T., 2016. The value
of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States. Journal of
Financial Economics 121, 368391.
Addoum, J. M., Kumar, A., 2016. Political sentiment and predictable returns.
Review of Financial Studies 29, 34713518.
Akey, P., 2015. Valuing changes in political networks: Evidence from campaign
contributions to close congressional elections. Review of Financial Studies 28,
31883223.
Akey, P., Lewellen, S., 2017. Policy Uncertainty, Political Capital, and Firm Risk-
Taking. SSRN Working Paper.
Amin, K. I., Lee, C. M. C., 1997. Option Trading, Price Discovery, and Earnings
News Dissemination. Contemporary Accounting Research 14, 153192.
An, B. J., Ang, A., Bali, T. G., Cakici, N., 2014. The Joint Cross Section of Stocks
and Options. Journal of Finance 69, 22792337.
251
Bibliography 252
Anderson, T. W., 1951. Estimating Linear Restrictions on Regression Coecients
for Multivariate Normal Distributions. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics
22, 327351.
Andreou, P. C., Kagkadis, A., Philip, D., Taamouti, A., 2018. Forward Moments
and Risk Premia Predictability. SSRN Working Paper.
Ang, A., Hodrick, R. J., Xing, Y., Zhang, X., 2006. The cross-section of volatility
and expected returns. Journal of Finance 69, 22792337.
Ansolabehere, S., De Figueiredo, J. M., Snyder, J. M., 2003. Why is there so little
money in U.S. politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 105130.
Augustin, P., Brenner, M., Subrahmanyam, M., 2015. Informed Options Trading
prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading? SSRN Working Paper.
Avramov, D., Chordia, T., Goyal, A., 2006. Liquidity and Autocorrelations in
Individual Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 61, 23652394.
Back, K., 1993. Asymmetric Information and Options. Review of Financial Studies
6, 435472.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., 2016. Measuring Economic Policy Uncer-
tainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131, 15931636.
Bakshi, G., Kapadia, N., Madan, D., 2003. Stock Return Characteristics, Skew
Laws, and the Dierential Pricing of Individual Equity Options. Review of Fi-
nancial Studies 16, 101143.
Bali, T. G., Hu, J., Murray, S., 2017. Option Implied Volatility, Skewness, and
Kurtosis and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns. SSRN Working Pa-
per.
Bibliography 253
Bali, T. G., Murray, S., 2013. Does Risk-Neutral Skewness Predict the Cross-
Section of Equity Option Portfolio Returns? Journal of Financial and Quanti-
tative Analysis 48, 11451171.
Battalio, R., Schultz, P., 2006. Options and the Bubble. Journal of Finance 61,
20712102.
Beber, A., Brandt, M. W., 2006. The eect of macroeconomic news on beliefs and
preferences: Evidence from the options market. Journal of Monetary Economics
53, 19972039.
Bernhard, W., Leblang, D., 2006. Democratic Processes and Financial Markets.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Bialkowski, J., Gottschalk, K., Wisniewski, T. P., 2008. Stock market volatility
around national elections. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 19411953.
Black, F., 1975. Fact and Fantasy in the Use of Options. Financial Analysts Journal
31, 3641.
Black, F., 1976. Studies in stock price volatility changes. In: Proceedings of the
1976 Meeting of the Business and Economic Statistics Section, American Sta-
tistical Association, Washington DC, 177 181.
Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.
Journal of Political Economy 81, 637654.
Bliss, R. R., Panigirtzoglou, N., 2004. Option-Implied Risk Aversion Estimates.
Journal of Finance 59, 407446.
Boehme, R. D., Danielsen, B. R., Sorescu, S. M., 2006. Short-Sale Constraints, Dif-
ferences of Opinion, and Overvaluation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 41, 455487.
Bibliography 254
Bollen, N. P. B., Whaley, R. E., 2004. Does Net Buying Pressure Aect the Shape
of Implied Volatility Functions? Journal of Finance 59, 711753.
Borisov, A., Goldman, E., Gupta, N., 2016. The Corporate Value of (Corrupt)
Lobbying. Review of Financial Studies 29, 85124.
Boutchkova, M., Doshi, H., Durnev, A., Molchanov, A., 2012. Precarious politics
and return volatility. Review of Financial Studies 25, 11111154.
Boyer, B., Mitton, T., Vorkink, K., 2010. Expected Idiosyncratic Skewness. Review
of Financial Studies 23, 170202.
Breeden, D. T., 1979. An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic con-
sumption and investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 265
296.
Brogaard, J., Dai, L., Ngo, P. T. H., Zhang, B., 2019. Global Political Uncertainty
and Asset Prices. SSRN Working Paper.
Brogaard, J., Detzel, A., 2015. The Asset-Pricing Implications of Government
Economic Policy Uncertainty. Management Science 61, 318.
Campbell, J. Y., 1993. Intertemporal Asset Pricing without Consumption Data.
American Economic Review 83, 487512.
Campbell, J. Y., 1996. Understanding Risk and Return. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 104, 298345.
Cao, C., Chen, Z., Grin, J. M., 2005. Informational Content of Option Volume
Prior to Takeovers. The Journal of Business 78, 10731109.
Carhart, M. M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of
Finance 52, 5282.
Bibliography 255
Chan, K., Ge, L., Lin, T.-C., 2015. Informational Content of Options Trading on
Acquirer Announcement Return. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
50, 10571082.
Chan, K. F., Marsh, T. A., 2018. Equity Premiums in the Presidential Cycle: the
Midterm Election Resolution of Uncertainty. SSRN Working Paper.
Chang, B. Y., Christoersen, P., Jacobs, K., 2013. Market skewness risk and the
cross section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 107, 4648.
Chang, B. Y., Christoersen, P., Jacobs, K., Vainberg, G., 2012. Option-implied
measures of equity risk. Review of Finance 16, 385428.
Clarke, C., 2016. The Level, Slope and Curve Factor Model for Stocks. SSRN
Working Paper.
Colak, G., Durnev, A., Qian, Y., 2017. Political uncertainty and IPO activity: Ev-
idence from U.S. gubernatorial elections. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 52, 25232564.
Conrad, J., Dittmar, R., Ghysels, E., 2013. Ex Ante Skewness and Expected Stock
Returns. Journal of Finance 68, 85124.
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., Ovtchinnikov, A. V., 2010. Corporate Political Contri-
butions and Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 65, 687724.
Cremers, M., Weinbaum, D., 2010. Deviations from Put-Call Parity and Stock
Return Predictability. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45, 335
367.
DeMiguel, V., Martin-Utrera, A., Nogales, F. J., Uppal, R., 2019. A Portfolio
Perspective on the Multitude of Firm Characteristics. SSRN Working Paper.
Bibliography 256
DeMiguel, V., Plyakha, Y., Uppal, R., Vilkov, G., 2013. Improving Portfolio Se-
lection Using Option-Implied Volatility and Skewness. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 48, 157.
Dennis, P., Mayhew, S., 2002. Risk-Neutral Skewness: Evidence from Stock Op-
tions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 471493.
Detemple, J., Selden, L., 1991. A General Equilibrium Analysis of Option and
Stock Market Interactions. International Economic Review 32, 279303.
Dotsis, G., 2017. The market price of risk of the variance term structure. Journal
of Banking and Finance 84, 4152.
Dubinsky, A., Johannes, M., Kaeck, A., Seeger, N. J., 2018. Option Pricing of
Earnings Announcement Risks. The Review of Financial Studies 32, 646687.
Due, D., Pan, J., Singleton, K., 2000. Transform analysis and asset pricing for
ane jump-diusions. Econometrica 68, 13431376.
Durnev, A., 2012. The Real Eects of Political Uncertainty: Elections and Invest-
ment Sensitivity to Stock Prices. SSRN Working Paper.
Easley, D., O'Hara, M., Srinivas, P. S., 1998. Option Volume and Stock Prices:
Evidence on Where Informed Traders Trade. Journal of Finance 53, 431465.
Faccio, M., 2006. Politically connected rms. American Economic Review 96, 369
386.
Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., Mcconnell, J. J., 2006. Political connections and cor-
porate bailouts. Journal of Finance 96, 369386.
Faccio, M., Parsley, D. C., 2009. Sudden deaths: Taking stock of geographic ties.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 683718.
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 1992. The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.
The Journal of Finance 47, 427465.
Bibliography 257
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 1993. Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks
and Bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 356.
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 1996. Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing
Anomalies. The Journal of Finance 51, 5584.
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 1997. Industry Costs of Equity. Journal of Financial
Economics 43, 153193.
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 2015. A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model. Journal of
Financial Economics 116, 122.
Fama, E. F., MacBeth, J. D., 1973. Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical
Tests. Journal of Political Economy 81, 607636.
Feunou, B., Fontaine, J. S., Taamouti, A., Tédongap, R., 2014. Risk Premium,
Variance Premium, and the Maturity Structure of Uncertainty. Review of Fi-
nance 18, 219269.
Filippou, I., Garcia-Ares, P. A., Zapatero, F., 2017. Demand for Lotteries: The
Choice between Stocks and Options. SSRN Working Paper.
Fowler, J. H., 2006. Elections and markets: The eect of partisanship, policy risk,
and electoral margins on the economy. Journal of Politics 68, 89103.
Gabaix, X., 2012. Variable rare disasters: An exactly solved framework for ten
puzzles in macro-nance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, 645700.
Gao, X., Ritter, J. R., 2010. The Marketing of Seasoned Equity Oerings. Journal
of Financial Economics 97, 3352.
Garleanu, N., Pedersen, L. H., Poteshman, A. M., 2009. Demand-Based Option
Pricing. Review of Financial Studies 22, 42594299.
Ge, L., Lin, T. C., Pearson, N. D., 2016. Why Does the Option to Stock Volume
Ratio Predict Stock Returns? Journal of Financial Economics 120, 601622.
Bibliography 258
Gkionis, K., Kostakis, A., Skiadopoulos, G. S., Stilger, P. S., 2018. Positive Stock
Information in Out-of-the-Money Option Prices. SSRN Working Paper.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J., 2009. Do politically connected boards aect rm
value. Review of Financial Studies 22, 23312360.
Goncalves-Pinto, L., Grundy, B. D., Hameed, A., van der Heijden, T., Zhu, Y.,
2016. Why Do Option Prices Predict Stock Returns? The Role of Price Pressure
in the Stock Market. Management science, forthcoming.
Goodell, J. W., Vahamaa, S., 2013. US presidential elections and implied volatility:
The role of political uncertainty. Journal of Banking and Finance .
Goyal, A., Saretto, A., 2009. Cross-Section of Option Returns and Volatility. Jour-
nal of Financial Economics 94, 310326.
Grullon, G., Michenaud, S., Weston, J. P., 2015. The Real Eects of Short-Selling
Constraints. Review of Financial Studies 28, 17371767.
Gulen, H., Ion, M., 2016. Policy uncertainty and corporate investment. Review of
Financial Studies 29, 523564.
Hansen, P. R., 2008. Reduced-rank regression: A useful determinant identity.
Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 139, 26882697.
Harvey, C. R., Liu, Y., Zhu, H., 2016. . . . and the Cross-Section of Expected
Returns. Review of Financial Studies 29, 568.
Hendershott, T., Jones, C. M., Menkveld, A. J., 2011. Does algorithmic trading
improve liquidity? The Journal of Finance 66, 133.
Hill, M. D., Kelly, G. W., Lockhart, G. B., Van Ness, R. A., 2013. Determinants
and eects of corporate lobbying. Financial Management 42, 931957.
Hong, H., Kostovetsky, L., 2012. Red and blue investing: Values and nance.
Journal of Financial Economics 103, 119.
Bibliography 259
Hou, K., Xue, C., Zhang, L., 2015. Digesting Anomalies: An Investment Approach.
The Review of Financial Studies 28, 650705.
Hou, K., Xue, C., Zhang, L., 2018. Replicating Anomalies. The Review of Financial
Studies .
Hu, J., 2014. Does Option Trading Convey Stock Price Information? Journal of
Financial Economics 111, 625645.
Jegadeesh, N., 1990. Evidence of Predictable Behavior of Security Returns. Journal
of Finance 45, 881898.
Jens, C. E., 2017. Political uncertainty and investment: Causal evidence from U.S.
gubernatorial elections. Journal of Financial Economics 124, 473490.
Jin, W., Livnat, J., Zhang, Y., 2012. Option Prices Leading Equity Prices: Do Op-
tion Traders Have an Information Advantage? Journal of Accounting Research
50, 401432.
Johnson, T. L., So, E. C., 2012. The Option to Stock Volume Ratio and Future
Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 106, 262286.
Julio, B., Yook, Y., 2012. Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles.
Journal of Finance 67, 4583.
Jurado, K., Ludvigson, S. C., Ng, S., 2015. Measuring Uncertainty. American
Economic Review 105, 11771216.
Kelly, B., Pastor, L., Veronesi, P., 2016. The Price of Political Uncertainty: Theory
and Evidence from the Option Market. Journal of Finance 71, 24172480.
Kelly, B., Pruitt, S., 2015. The three-pass regression lter: A new approach to
forecasting using many predictors. Journal of Econometrics 186, 294316.
Kempf, A., Korn, O., Sassning, S., 2015. Portfolio Optimization Using Forward-
Looking Information. Review of Finance 19, 467490.
Bibliography 260
Kim, C., Pantzalis, C., Chul Park, J., 2012. Political geography and stock re-
turns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power. Journal
of Financial Economics 106, 196228.
Kostakis, A., Panigirtzoglou, N., Skiadopoulos, G., 2011. Market Timing with
Option-Implied Distributions: A Forward-Looking Approach. Management Sci-
ence 57, 12311249.
Kraus, A., Litzenberger, R. H., 1976. Skewness Preference and the Valuation of
Risk Assets. The Journal of Finance 31, 10851100.
Lehmann, B. N., 1990. Fads, Martingales, and Market Eciency. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 105, 128.
Li, J., Born, J. A., 2006. Presidential election uncertainty and common stock
returns in the United States. Journal of Financial Research 29, 609622.
Lintner, J., 1965. The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Invest-
ments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets. The Review of Economics and
Statistics 47, 13.
Lo, A. W., Wang, J., 2006. Trading volume: Implications of an intertemporal
capital asset pricing model. Journal of Finance 61, 28052840.
Lou, D., Polk, C., Skouras, S., 2018. A Tug of War: Overnight Versus Intraday
Expected Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 134, 192213.
Maio, P., Santa-Clara, P., 2012. Multifactor models and their consistency with the
icapm. Journal of Financial Economics 106, 586  613.
Martin, I. W., Wagner, C., 2019. What Is the Expected Return on a Stock?
Journal of Finance 74, 18871929.
Merton, R. C., 1973. Theory of Rational Option Pricing. The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 4, 141183.
Bibliography 261
Muravyev, D., 2016. Order Flow and Expected Option Returns. Journal of Finance
71, 673708.
Muravyev, D., Pearson, N. D., 2020. Options Trading Costs Are Lower than You
Think. The Review of Financial Studies Hhaa010.
Nagel, S., 2012. Evaporating liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 25, 20052039.
Neumann, M., Skiadopoulos, G., 2013. Predictable Dynamics in Higher-Order
Risk-Neutral Moments: Evidence from the S&P 500 Options. The Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, 947977.
Newey, W. K., West, K. D., 1994. Automatic Lag Selection in Covariance Matrix
Estimation. The Review of Economic Studies 61, 631653.
Novy-Marx, R., 2013. The other side of value: The gross protability premium.
Journal of Financial Economics 108, 128.
Ofek, E., Richardson, M., Whitelaw, R. F., 2004. Limited arbitrage and short sales
restrictions: Evidence from the options markets. Journal of Financial Economics
74, 305342.
Pan, J., Poteshman, A. M., 2006. The Information in Option Volume for Future
Stock Prices. Review of Financial Studies 19, 871908.
Pantzalis, C., Stangeland, D. A., Turtle, H. J., 2000. Political elections and the
resolution of uncertainty: The international evidence. Journal of Banking and
Finance 24, 15751604.
Pastor, L., Stambaugh, R. F., 2003. Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns.
Journal of Political Economy 111, 642685.
Pastor, L., Veronesi, P., 2013. Political uncertainty and risk premia. Journal of
Financial Economics 110, 520545.
Bibliography 262
Rehman, Z., Vilkov, G., 2012. Risk-Neutral Skewness: Return Predictability and
Its Sources. SSRN Working Paper.
Roll, R., Schwartz, E., Subrahmanyam, A., 2010. O/S: The relative trading activ-
ity in options and stock. Journal of Financial Economics 96, 117.
Ross, S. A., 1976. Options and Eciency. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
90, 7589.
Santa-Clara, P., Valkanov, R., 2003. The Presidential Puzzle: Political Cycles and
the Stock Market. Journal of Finance 58, 18411872.
Sharpe, W. F., 1964. Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under
Conditions of Risk. The Journal of Finance 3, 425442.
Snowberg, E., Wolfers, J., Zitzewitz, E., 2007. Partisan impacts on the economy:
evidence from prediction markets and close elections. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 122, 807829.
Stambaugh, R. F., Yu, J., Yuan, Y., 2015. Arbitrage Asymmetry and the Idiosyn-
cratic Volatility Puzzle. Journal of Finance 70, 19031948.
Stambaugh, R. F., Yuan, Y., 2017. Mispricing Factors. Review of Financial Studies
30, 12701315.
Stilger, P. S., Kostakis, A., Poon, S.-H., 2017. What Does Risk-Neutral Skewness
Tell Us About Future Stock Returns? Management Science 63, 18141834.
Wang, K., 2017. The Cross-Sectional Variation of Skewness Risk Premia. SSRN
Working Paper.
Xie, C., 2014. Asset Pricing Implications of Volatility Term Structure Risk. SSRN
Working Paper.
Bibliography 263
Xing, Y., Zhang, X., Zhao, R., 2010. What Does the Individual Option Volatility
Smirk Tell Us about Future Equity Returns? Journal of Financial and Quanti-
tative Analysis 45, 641662.
